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Abstract  
 
Background 
 
This review provides intelligence to NHS managers and clinicians involved in 
commissioning and procurement of non-pay goods and services. It does this in light of on-
going pressure for the NHS to save money through a combination of cost cutting, 
productivity improvements and innovation in service delivery, and in the context of new 
commissioning structures developing as a result of the Health and Social Care Act 2012.  
 
Objectives 
 
We explore the main strands of the literature about procurement and supply chain 
management (P&SCM); consider the extent to which existing evidence on the experiences of 
NHS managers and clinicians involved in commissioning and procurement matches these 
theories; assess how the empirical evidence about different P&SCM practices and techniques 
in different countries and sectors might contribute to better commissioning and procurement; 
map and evaluate different approaches to improving P&SCM practice. 
 
Review method 
 
We use a realist review method, which emphasises the contingent nature of evidence and 
addresses questions about what works in which settings, for whom, in what circumstances 
and why. Adopting realist review principles, the research questions and emerging findings 
were sense-checked and refined with an advisory group of 16 people. An initial key term 
search was conducted in October 2013 across relevant electronic bibliographic databases. To 
ensure quality, the bulk of the search focused on peer-reviewed journals, though this criterion 
was relaxed where appropriate to capture NHS-related evidence. After a number of stages of 
sifting, quality checking and updating, 879 texts were identified for full review.  
 
 
Results  
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Four literatures were identified: organisational buying behaviour; economics of contracting; 
networks and inter-organisational relationships; and integrated supply chain management. 
Theories were clustered by their primary explanatory focus on a particular phase in the 
P&SCM process. Evidence on NHS commissioning and procurement practice was found in 
terms of each of these phases, though there were also knowledge gaps relating to: decision-
making roles, processes and criteria at work in commissioning organisations; the impact of 
power on collaborative inter-organisational relationships over time; and the scope to apply 
integrated supply chain management thinking and techniques to supply chains delivering 
physical goods to the NHS. Evidence on P&SCM practices and techniques beyond the NHS 
was found to be highly fragmented and at times contradictory but, overall, demonstrated that 
matching management practice appropriately with context is crucial.  
 
Conclusions  
 
We found that the P&SCM process involves multiple contexts, phases and actors. There are 
also a wide variety of practices that can be used in each phase of the P&SCM process.   
Thinking about how practice might be improved in the NHS, requires an approach that 
enables the simplification of the complex interplay of factors in the P&SCM process.  
Portfolio-based approaches, which provide a contingent approach to considering these 
factors, are recommended.  
 
Future work  
 
This should focus on:  
• conflicting preferences in NHS commissioning and procurement and the role of 
power and politics in conflict resolution 
• the impact  of power on the scope for collaboration in healthcare networks 
• the scope to apply integrated supply chain management  practices in NHS 
procurement organisations 
Word count: 500 
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Glossary of procurement and supply chain management terms 
Agile supply chain management Collaborative management of buyer-supplier 
relationships in an extended chain or network, designed 
to achieve flexibility and responsiveness to uncertain 
changes in demand  
Category management Aggregation of expenditure within specified categories 
(e.g. IT, facilities), with different organisational sub-
units working together to agree common specifications 
and approved suppliers    
Contractual incompleteness As a result of uncertainty, a contract is drawn up which 
does not take account of all possible future 
contingencies or eventualities and therefore is said to 
contain gaps  
Demand management Pre-contractual steps in the procurement process, 
including identification of need, development of 
specification, identification and approval of potential 
sources of supply, and design of request for proposal  
E-procurement Managing the procurement process in an online or 
electronic environment, including software to analyse 
expenditure and supply markets, and to manage 
tendering, contracts and payment of invoices 
Framework agreement Agreement with a preferred supplier that specifies the 
nature of the goods or services to be procured and the 
prices to be paid, but does not commit the buying 
organisation to a specified level of demand, most useful 
where demand is uncertain   
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Industrial marketing and purchasing Broad term used to describe the study of organisational 
or business-to-business marketing and purchasing 
activity and to distinguish it from consumer marketing 
and purchasing, associated with a group of academics 
primarily based in the UK and Scandinavia 
Integrated supply chain management Theoretical perspective which assumes that supply 
networks can and should be seen as entirely closed and 
therefore manageable systems, and that buyers and 
suppliers should be encouraged to interact cooperatively 
across an extended network to optimise their collective 
performance    
Just-in-time Practice of keeping minimal levels of stock in a supply 
chain and pulling products from suppliers as and when 
they are required 
Lean supply chain management Collaborative management of buyer-supplier 
relationships in an extended chain or network, designed 
to minimise waste and inefficiency 
Organisational buying behaviour Literature which focuses on the pre-contract or demand 
management phase of the procurement process, seeing it 
as a multi-actor, multi-agenda process and therefore as a 
locus of intra-organisational power and politics 
Portfolio approach Approach to procurement decision-making and 
management, which suggests that there are choices 
about how goods and services might be procured and 
that these should be made appropriately in line with the 
nature of what is being procured and with circumstances   
 
Procurement Process encompassing all activities associated with 
identifying the need for, specifying, acquiring and 
managing an organisation’s supply inputs 
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Supply chain management Sub-set of procurement activities concerned particularly 
with the monitoring, management and development of 
on-going supplier relationships and the associated flows 
of supply inputs 
Transaction cost economics Theoretical perspective which focuses on how to 
manage buyer-supplier transactions most efficiently 
while minimising the potential for supplier opportunism  
Vendor managed inventory Technique whereby a buyer delegates the management 
of its inventory to a supplier so that stock is replenished 
efficiently and only when it falls below a certain 
specified level    
Value stream mapping Technique involving a detailed assessment of 
operational activities and processes, both within an 
organisation and between organisations, to identify and 
eliminate waste, facilitate cost reductions and increase 
productivity  
 
 
Scientific summary 
 
Background 
 
This literature synthesis draws lessons from procurement and supply chain management 
(P&SCM) theories and from empirical evidence from a range of sectors and countries, to 
assist NHS managers and clinicians in developing more effective approaches to 
commissioning and procurement. We assume that there is a more significant overlap between 
commissioning and procurement than is typically understood in the NHS, which allows us to 
draw lessons for the commissioning cycle from the P&SCM literature. The NHS commonly 
understands procurement to be the ‘acquisition’ of goods or services, both as part of the 
healthcare commissioning cycle and in support of healthcare service delivery. We suggest 
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that this definition is perhaps too narrow, and that some aspects of ‘planning’ in the 
commissioning cycle (needs assessment and specification of priorities and requirements) 
should be seen as procurement activities, because effective procurement practice should 
begin with a clear statement of what an organisation needs or wants to buy. 
 
The research meets a need in the NHS management community flowing from two sources. 
Firstly, in the context of the Coalition Government’s deficit reduction plan, the NHS is 
expected to save £20 billion by 2015 through a combination of cost cutting, productivity 
improvements and innovation in service delivery. More efficient and effective procurement 
will play a key role in delivering these savings. Secondly, the new commissioning structures 
and policies introduced by the 2012 Health and Social Care Act have thrown up a number of 
management challenges. GPs, other clinicians and managers in clinical commissioning 
groups are now required to exercise commercial skills and make contract award decisions in 
the context of wider healthcare markets of which many have very limited knowledge and 
experience. This research provides a source of guidance to NHS decision-makers to assist 
them in meeting these challenges. 
 
Objectives 
 
Objective 1: To explore the literature about P&SCM and to identify the main theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks which relate to decisions about, and the effective management of, 
providers or suppliers of goods and services.                                                                                                                    
Objective 2: To understand to what extent existing evidence on the experiences of NHS 
managers and clinicians involved in commissioning and procurement matches these theories 
and to provide an explanatory framework for understanding the characteristics of effective  
policy and practice in the NHS.                                                                                                                                
Objective 3: To assess the empirical evidence about how different P&SCM practices and 
techniques can contribute to better procurement processes and outcomes.                                                   
Objective 4: To map and evaluate different approaches to improving P&SCM practice and 
identify how these approaches relate to theories about effective P&SCM.                                                                                                                                  
 
Methods 
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The research terrain is characterised by complexity in terms of multiple sources of evidence 
across different disciplinary traditions, by weakness and ambiguity in terms of association 
and causation, and by the influence of contextual factors on the appropriateness, effectiveness 
and outcomes of different P&SCM practices and techniques. Consequently, a conventional 
systematic review would not be appropriate. By contrast, a realist review approach 
emphasises the contingent nature of  evidence and addresses questions about what works in 
which settings, for whom, in what circumstances and why.  
 
In line with realist review principles, the research questions and emerging findings were 
sense-checked and refined with an expert advisory and stakeholder group. A key term search 
was conducted in October 2013 across relevant electronic bibliographic databases. This 
identified 3562 results. After a number of stages of sifting, refinement and updating in 
October and November 2013, 879 texts were selected for review. 
 
 
Results 
 
1. Theories about procurement and supply chain management 
We identified four broad literatures, each associated with particular P&SCM theories and 
each focused  on a particular  phase in the P&SCM process. These are: 
• The organisational buying behaviour  literature grounded in various theories of 
organisational decision-making,  focusing on the demand management phase (the pre-
contractual steps of the P&SCM process) 
• The economics of contracting literature grounded in agency theory and transaction cost 
economics,  focusing on the selection and contracting phase 
• The networks and inter-organisational relationships literature grounded in social 
exchange, resource dependency, relational contract and dynamic capabilities theories,  
focusing on the relationship management phase 
• The integrated supply chain management  literature grounded in systems theory and 
behavioural economics,  focusing on the operational delivery phase 
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To address this theoretical diversity we developed a realist interpretation framework 
identifying the contextual assumptions, key explanatory mechanisms and intended outcomes 
of these various P&SCM theories. This suggests that practitioners engaged in P&SCM 
activities face choices about which theory might be  best for interpreting their situation and 
for guiding their actions. It may be more appropriate to focus on some mechanisms than on 
others depending on what an organisation’s interest is in terms of intended outcome.  
 
 
 
 
2. Relevance and utility of P&SCM theories for NHS policy and practice 
 
On NHS commissioning and procurement policy we found that:   
•  
• The economics of contracting literature provides a relevant lens for understanding 
policies to align the interests of patients and GPs and to drive the coordination or 
consolidation of NHS spending; agency theory and transaction cost economics are also 
relevant to the various market-based reforms introduced into the NHS since the 
purchaser-provider split in 1991.  
• The networks and inter-organisational relationships literature, particularly that addressing 
power, is relevant to joint commissioning or collaborative procurement initiatives, and for 
understanding why  inter-organisational cooperation has persisted alongside competition 
and market-based reforms in the NHS.  
• Aspects of the integrated supply chain management literature are relevant to 
understanding collaborative procurement initiatives. 
 
On NHS commissioning and procurement practice we found that:  
 
• evidence on demand management (decisions about what needs to be commissioned or 
procured, who might be potential providers or suppliers, what criteria should be used to 
select the provider or supplier) is discussed in terms of arguments and concepts associated 
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with the organisational buying behaviour literature, although there are few direct and 
explicit references to that literature  
• evidence on selection and contracting  explicitly acknowledges the relevance of the 
economics of contracting literature  
• evidence on relationship management  is typically discussed in terms of concepts drawn 
from the networks and inter-organisational relationships literature  
• evidence on operational delivery is often discussed in terms of concepts drawn from the 
integrated supply chain management literature  
 
We also found several knowledge gaps in the NHS research literature, in particular about: 
 
• The decision-making roles, processes and criteria at work in clinical commissioning 
groups and commissioning support units, and  how these  organisations should operate to 
be effective.   
• The development of inter-organisational buyer–supplier relationships over time in the 
context of a wider network of organisational interactions, and how collaborative efforts 
can be engendered to deliver improvement and innovation in the NHS.  
• The scope to apply different integrated supply chain management ideas and techniques to 
supply chains delivering physical goods to the NHS. 
 
 
3. Evidence on the impact of P&SCM practices and techniques 
 
Exploring P&SCM practices and techniques beyond the NHS, in different countries and 
sectors, demonstrated that: 
 
• Evidence on the P&SCM process is in disparate literatures. Certain elements have been 
systematically studied, but there is very little research that has examined all phases of the 
process and made the connections between them.  
• Evidence on practices and techniques associated with demand management is weaker, e-
procurement apart, than it is for the other P&SCM process phases. Evidence on 
competitive tendering in the public sector, contracting, buyer-supplier relationship 
management and lean supply management practices is particularly strong. 
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• There is significant evidence that organisations adopting a contingent approach to 
P&SCM practice achieve superior value for money outcomes.  
• The most important consideration for selecting appropriate management practices is the 
nature of a purchase in terms of financial value, complexity, asset specificity, uncertainty 
and demand characteristics. Other influential contextual factors are buyer-supplier power 
relations and supplier managerial behaviour (trustworthiness or opportunism).  
• Parts of the evidence base, particularly some studies examining collaborative buyer-
supplier relationships and integrated supply chain management practices, do not 
acknowledge the importance of contextual factors like power and managerial behaviour. 
They are not, therefore, a fair test of the impact of these practices.  
 
4. Portfolio approaches to improving P&SCM practice in the NHS 
 
We found that various portfolio approaches to management might be a useful means of 
improving commissioning and procurement in the NHS given the complex interplay of 
contexts and practices in the various phases the P&SCM process. A portfolio approach has 
two key elements. First, management decision-makers will typically face a range of different 
contexts each requiring particular management practices to deliver intended outcomes. 
Second, the decisions made and the practices consequently deployed in these different 
contexts should be seen as interdependent, because organisations are resource constrained. A 
portfolio approach emphasises the need for managers to make trade-offs in their decision-
making to achieve an appropriate balance of outcomes across the different contexts which 
they face.  
 
We identified three types of portfolio analysis categorised on the basis of their main focus or 
unit of analysis: 
• Purchase category portfolio models 
• Relationship portfolio models 
• Supply chain portfolio models 
 
These models identify key contextual factors in the demand management, relationship 
management and operational delivery phases of the P&SCM process respectively, and 
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suggest appropriate forms of management intervention to deliver intended outcomes in 
particular contexts. For example, applying the logic of a purchase category portfolio model to 
the NHS shows why the various types of goods or services procured by a clinical 
commissioning group or a hospital trust should be managed differently. Non-critical 
categories like office stationery (low purchase importance and low supply market 
complexity) should be procured in a way that minimises transaction costs, such as through 
the NHS Supply Chain online catalogue. By contrast, strategic categories like accident and 
emergency services or advanced medical equipment (high purchase importance and high 
supply market complexity) should be given much more detailed attention by those 
commissioners or procurement managers with the most experience and expertise. Similarly, 
relationship portfolio thinking suggests that relationships with providers or suppliers in non-
critical categories should be relatively short-term and arm’s length, while relationships in 
strategic categories should ideally be longer-term and more collaborative.   
 
 
Conclusions  
1. Theories about procurement and supply chain management 
 
The P&SCM research domain draws on a very diverse range of disciplinary bases and 
theories. It is not possible to identify a single, coherent and dominant body of thought. The 
realist framework developed through our analysis suggests that practitioners engaged in 
P&SCM activities face choices about which theory might be best for interpreting their 
situation and guiding their actions. It may be more appropriate to focus on some mechanisms 
than on others depending on what an organisation’s interest is in terms of intended outcome. 
 
We found that the precise characteristics of the mechanism-outcome configurations are likely 
to vary depending on the context. This draws our attention to portfolio models of P&SCM 
practices. These suggest that the general mechanisms in each P&SCM theory used to explain 
different outcomes should be understood as an expression of specific practices or 
management interventions used in particular contexts. 
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2. Relevance and utility of P&SCM theories for NHS policy and practice 
 
We found that all four of the P&SCM literatures identified by our review are of some 
relevance and use in making sense of policy and practice in NHS commissioning and 
procurement. We found that some of these P&SCM theories have been used much more 
heavily and explicitly than others as frames of reference in the particular contextual 
circumstances of the NHS. Transaction cost economics, agency theory and aspects of the 
networks and inter-organisational relationships literature dealing with trust and collaboration, 
in particular relational contract theory, are the most frequently used. Some aspects of the 
integrated supply chain management literature, in particular concepts like lean, also feature 
heavily, but typically in an intra-organisational context focused on improving patient care 
pathways. By contrast, our review found that the organisational buying behaviour literature, 
the resource dependency models of power relationships in supply chains, and the inter-
organisational supply chain management literature have been applied less explicitly or in a 
heavily circumscribed way in the NHS context. 
 
3. Evidence on the impact of P&SCM practices and techniques 
 
We found that empirical evidence on the efficacy of different P&SCM practices and 
techniques, informed by different theories, is highly fragmented and at times contradictory. 
Research to test the efficacy of practices and techniques in one phase of the P&SCM process, 
while in many cases systematic and co-ordinated, has largely been undertaken in isolation 
from testing in the other phases. There is very little empirical research that has considered all 
of the phases in the process and examined the connections between them. The evidence does 
suggest though that matching management practice appropriately with context is crucial in all 
phases. Key contextual variables identified by the literature are the characteristics of a 
purchase, the behavioural orientation of suppliers, national culture and buyer-supplier power. 
 
4. Portfolio approaches to improving P&SCM practice in the NHS 
 
The P&SCM process is complex and involves multiple contexts, phases and actors. There are 
also a very wide variety of practices or management interventions that can be used in each 
phase of the P&SCM process. In order to think about how we might improve P&SCM 
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practice in the NHS, we need an approach that enables us to simplify the complex interplay 
of contexts, phases, actors and practices in the P&SCM process. We need to be able to 
categorise different P&SCM contexts and relate them to particular types of management 
practices aimed at achieving particular intended outcomes. Our review of the literature 
suggested that a portfolio approach would be the most effective way of achieving such a 
categorisation. Our review has also shown that these models can and often should be used in 
a customised way to take account of the particularities of specific organisational contexts.  
 
5. Areas for further research 
 
We suggest three main areas for further research: 
• Issues arising out of conflicting preferences and the role of power and politics in 
resolving such conflicts are not well understood, particularly in the context of NHS 
commissioning organisations. We recommend empirical research to examine the 
processes through which those working in clinical commissioning groups and 
commissioning support units are making different kinds of commissioning decisions and 
to see if the various factors proposed by the organisational buying behaviour literature 
can help us to make sense of these processes. This would provide an evidence base on 
which to consider how these commissioning organisations might improve their decision-
making. 
 
• We identified only a limited number of studies that use resource dependency theory to 
think about the impact of power on the scope for and the nature of collaboration between 
organisations in the NHS context. Moreover, those studies tend in most cases to look at 
dyadic relationships and to ignore the wider network in which those relationships are 
embedded. We recommend a study to examine the role of power in NHS healthcare 
networks, looking in particular at the resources that clinical commissioning groups might 
have at their disposal to encourage collaborative relationships with potentially powerful 
providers to bring about desired innovations and improvements. 
 
• We recommend empirical research to explore how much understanding of integrated 
supply chain management  thinking and techniques exists in NHS procurement 
NIHR HS&DR Project 12/5004/03   
 
22 
 
organisations, to see which, if any, practices are currently being used and what scope 
there might to be implement such practices in a more comprehensive way. 
 
Word count: 2,508 
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Plain English summary 
 
New structures and policies are being introduced in the NHS as a result of recent legislation – 
the Health and Social Care Act 2012. Family doctors alongside other clinicians and managers 
are now organised as clinical commissioning groups, which are in charge of procuring 
healthcare services from providers for patients. Procurement of healthcare related goods and 
services also takes place in NHS hospitals. Those doing procurement in clinical 
commissioning groups and NHS hospitals need to gain a greater understanding of how this 
activity is done in commercial settings to improve their skills in the NHS. This study reviews 
research that has been done in this area already, presents an overview of it and uses it to 
suggest ways that clinicians and managers in the NHS can carry out their procurement role 
better. It first looks at studies that explain how procurement should be done in theory and 
then looks at how this compares to what has been done in the NHS over its recent history. It 
then looks at how procurement is carried out in other places and other types of industry and 
from this review suggests improvements. By looking at this previous research, the study 
concludes that NHS staff involved in procurement need to address different procurement 
situations in different ways using a portfolio approach. This means that there are choices 
about how healthcare goods and services might be procured and that these should be made 
appropriately in line with the nature of what is being procured and with circumstances.   
 
Word count: 250  
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Chapter 1 
Objectives and Context of the Review 
 
1.1 Objectives 
The main objective of the literature review reported here is to draw out lessons from 
procurement and supply chain management (P&SCM) theories and from empirical evidence 
from a range of other sectors and countries, to assist NHS managers and clinicians in 
developing more effective approaches to commissioning and procurement. The review meets 
an expressed need in the NHS management community flowing from two primary sources. 
 
Firstly, the NHS is under pressure to save money through a combination of cost cutting, 
productivity improvements and innovation in service delivery. As we discuss in the next 
section of this chapter, there have been various organisational and process reforms in NHS 
commissioning and procurement over the past two decades intended to improve cost 
efficiency and effectiveness (e.g. the development of national framework contracts by the 
NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency, creation of regional procurement hubs). Despite these 
reforms, a recent report from the National Audit Office1 shows that there are still significant 
variations and inefficiencies in current NHS procurement practice. At the same time, the 
NHS is under massive pressure to make its contribution to the Government’s deficit reduction 
plan by saving £20 billion by 2015. A more efficient and effective approach to procurement, 
which accounts for around 30% of hospital operating costs, will play a key role in delivering 
these savings.2 Procurement has also been identified as a key part of the Quality, Innovation, 
Productivity and Prevention initiative.3  
 
Secondly, the review is needed to assist NHS managers and clinicians in meeting the 
challenges thrown up by the new commissioning structures and policies introduced by the 
Health and Social Care Act (2012)4 in which GPs, other clinicians and managers in clinical 
commissioning groups and in NHS England are required to exercise commercial skills and 
make contract award decisions in the context of wider healthcare markets of which many 
have very limited experience and knowledge.  
NIHR HS&DR Project 12/5004/03   
 
25 
 
 
It is useful here to reflect briefly on the differences in NHS parlance between the terms 
‘commissioning’ and ‘procurement’. Commissioning is used to refer to the planning, 
acquisition, and monitoring and evaluation of healthcare services.5 As of April 2013 this is 
the remit of clinical commissioning groups for local services and of NHS England and its 
area teams for specialist and GP services. One NHS usage of the term procurement is to refer 
to the ‘acquisition’ aspect of this commissioning cycle, whereby NHS commissioners 
identify, select and contract with providers and monitor their performance in delivering these 
healthcare services.6 Procurement is also used in the NHS to refer to the acquisition of other 
goods and services (e.g. dressings, medical equipment, IT equipment, temporary staff) 
needed to support healthcare delivery.2 Procurement defined in this way is undertaken both 
by NHS commissioning organisations and by NHS healthcare providers.  
 
Thus, the common feature of procurement as it is commonly understood in the NHS is a 
focus on the ‘acquisition’ of goods and services. Service planning, or assessing needs and 
specifying how and when those needs might be met, are not typically seen as aspects of the 
procurement process, particularly as it relates to the commissioning cycle. The suggestion 
that underpins this review, however, is that the NHS definition of procurement is perhaps too 
narrow. It is our intention to show that it is unhelpful to see needs assessment and the 
specification of priorities and requirements as separate, non-procurement activities in the 
commissioning cycle, because effective procurement practice should begin with a clear 
statement of what an organisation needs or wants to buy.7 We do acknowledge that even if 
one accepts our broader definition of procurement it is not entirely synonymous with NHS 
commissioning, but suggest nonetheless that there is a more significant overlap than is 
typically understood in the NHS which allows us to draw out lessons for the commissioning 
cycle from the P&SCM literature. The review will therefore provide a vital source of 
knowledge and guidance to GPs, other clinicians and NHS managers responsible for 
commissioning as the reforms are implemented over the coming years. 
 
The four objectives of this literature review and synthesis are as follows: 
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Objective 1: To explore the main strands of the literature about P&SCM (for example in 
institutional and production economics, operations management, organisation theory, the 
resource-based view of strategy, business-to-business marketing, public management) and to 
identify the main theoretical and conceptual frameworks which relate to decisions about, and 
the effective management of, providers or suppliers of goods and services.                                                                                                                    
Objective 2: To understand to what extent existing evidence on the experiences of NHS 
managers and clinicians involved in commissioning and procurement matches these theories 
and to provide an explanatory framework for understanding the characteristics of effective 
policy and practice in the NHS.                                                                                                                                
Objective 3: To assess the empirical evidence about how different P&SCM practices and 
techniques can contribute to better procurement processes and outcomes.                                                   
Objective 4: To map and evaluate different approaches to improving P&SCM practice, 
including modelling, diagnostic and facilitation tools, and identify how these approaches 
relate to theories about effective P&SCM. 
 
1.2 Context of the review 
In order to set the scene for the rest of the review, the remainder of this first chapter presents 
a summary of the main policy changes that have shaped commissioning and procurement in 
the English NHS over the past two decades. The broad policy context of NHS commissioning 
and procurement has been defined by the EU public procurement rules, which were first 
introduced in 1993 as part of the Single European Market programme. Since then these rules 
have been subject to successive waves of reform, broadly intended to achieve simplification 
and a lightening of the regulatory burden.8 The detail of how the rules are applied differs for 
the commissioning of healthcare services, where the requirements are less onerous, as 
compared with the procurement of clinical and non-clinical goods and services. Nevertheless, 
all NHS commissioning and procurement decisions are expected to conform to the 
fundamental principles of the rules, namely transparency and non-discrimination in dealings 
with providers or suppliers. 
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The organisational and structural context of English NHS commissioning and procurement at 
the time of writing is a result of periodic restructuring and reform over more than twenty 
years, since the purchaser-provider split was first created in April 1991.9 This restructuring 
and reform is characterised to some extent by continuity, in the sense that each successive 
wave of reform has retained and built on aspects of what went before. This has led to the co-
existence of several different, sometimes competing forms of organisation and governance, 
what Exworthy et al10call quasi-hierarchy, quasi-market and quasi-network. Each wave of 
reform has also, however, made some important changes to the organisational ecology and to 
the distribution of authority over and accountability for the non-pay expenditure of the NHS. 
This blend of change and continuity can be illustrated if we consider snapshots of the 
organisational settlement at four points in time, which show the outcomes of significant 
policy reforms. Each successive snapshot also reveals an increasingly complex set of 
organisational arrangements. The first, in Figure 1, shows the results of reforms made 
between 1991 and 1997. 
 
In 1997 two main sets of actors were responsible for NHS healthcare commissioning, the 
district health authorities and GPs acting as fund-holders.  This plurality in NHS 
commissioning arrangements had been established as a key component of the purchaser-
provider split in April 1991, with GP fund-holding seen as a way of encouraging service 
providers to be more responsive to the needs of particular groups of patients. While district 
health authorities were deemed to have sufficient purchasing power, at least in theory, to 
extract performance improvements from service providers, they were seen as relatively 
unresponsive to differing local needs.11 District health authorities commissioned primary 
(GP) and secondary (NHS hospital trust) healthcare services for a geographically defined 
population. They negotiated annual block or cost and volume contracts with NHS hospital 
trusts, based on historical data, for the provision of specified numbers and types of clinical 
interventions. In principle, hospital trusts in different areas were supposed to compete with 
one another for these district health authority contracts12, but in reality most trusts maintained 
the long-standing relationships with their local health authority that had been in place under 
the unitary, pre-1991 system.  
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Figure 1: Structure and organisation of NHS commissioning and procurement c.1997 
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commissioned on behalf of a population of about 300,000 people, similar to that served by a 
typical district health authority. By 1997, commissioning through the variants of GP fund-
holding accounted for around 10% of the secondary healthcare services budget.14 
 
Turning to the procurement of clinical and non-clinical goods and services, in 1997 this was 
organised and managed by a combination of the NHS Supplies Authority (NHS Supplies), 
operating at the national level, and procurement teams based in each NHS trust. NHS 
Supplies was set up in 1991 to address inefficiencies arising from fragmented procurement 
and uncoordinated supply routes that had been identified by the National Audit Office. It 
initially had a regional structure, with six divisions buying on behalf of trusts in their 
respective geographical areas and providing a logistics service. In 1995, this regional 
structure was replaced by a national one. NHS Supplies continued to provide a logistics 
service, but its remit was extended to provide a national contracting function, which operated 
through a combination of procurement consultancy advice and framework agreements for use 
by trusts. A direct customer service function, which managed trust-based procurement teams, 
was also introduced. A major challenge to the efficacy of NHS Supplies, however, was that 
NHS trusts were not required to use its services. NHS Supplies competed with other logistics 
providers and buying agencies to sell its services to trusts; it received no central funding from 
the Department of Health. Trusts were also free to directly employ and manage their own 
procurement team, who could select and contract with suppliers without any reference to 
practice elsewhere in the NHS.15148 It is unsurprising then that, five years after the creation of 
NHS Supplies, the Audit Commission produced a report showing that there were still huge 
variations in the prices and service levels of suppliers selling the same items to different 
trusts.16149   
 
Following the election of the New Labour Government in 1997 there were a number of 
further reforms in the structure and organisation of NHS commissioning and procurement, 
which meant that by 2001 the picture was markedly different (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Structure and organisation of NHS commissioning and procurement c. 2001 
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481 primary care groups had evolved into 303 primary care trusts , which replaced district 
health authorities as the lead NHS organisations responsible for healthcare commissioning.18 
Primary care trusts also replaced NHS community hospital trusts as providers of community 
health services such as district nursing and some mental health services. Most mental health 
services continued, though, to be provided by mental health trusts. Positioned above the 
primary care trusts, at a regional level, were 28 strategic health authorities. These were 
responsible for performance management, ensuring that national NHS priorities were 
integrated into local plans, and the commissioning of some specialist services from NHS 
acute trusts. 
 
By 2001 there had also been some significant changes in the organisations responsible for 
procurement of clinical and non-clinical goods and services. Most significant was the 
replacement of NHS Supplies in 2000 by two separate organisations, the NHS Purchasing 
and Supply Agency and the NHS Logistics Authority (NHS Logistics), each of which took on 
some of the functions of NHS Supplies. The Purchasing and Supply Agency was responsible 
for the national contracting function (consultancy advice to trusts and framework 
agreements), but it also had a much wider remit to act as the NHS’s centre of excellence on 
procurement and supply management and to improve procurement performance across all 
levels of the NHS in England.19152 Unlike NHS Supplies, the Purchasing and Supply Agency 
was a part of the Department of Health and received central funding, which gave it a much 
more stable platform from which to carry out its wider policy and practice development 
remit. NHS Logistics retained the procurement and distribution functions of NHS Supplies, 
and like its predecessor it was a special health authority funded by charging NHS trusts to use 
its services. The direct customer service function of NHS Supplies had disappeared, however. 
All trust-based procurement practitioners were now directly employed and managed by their 
trust. In addition to this restructuring at the national level, the Purchasing and Supply Agency 
formally recognised the need for a mechanism to coordinate procurement at a regional level 
by introducing NHS supply management confederations. These were voluntary, virtual 
organisations without a prescribed structure or dedicated funding.15148 Each confederation 
was intended to bring together all NHS hospital trusts and primary care trusts within the 
boundaries of a strategic health authority so that they could procure commonly used goods 
and services in a more coordinated manner. As before, however, NHS hospital trusts 
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remained free if they chose to procure their goods and services directly from suppliers 
without reference to contracts being agreed by other NHS organisations.       
 
A number of further changes in the structure and organisation of NHS commissioning and 
procurement over the next five or six years, brings us to the situation in 2007 (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Structure and organisation of NHS commissioning and procurement c. 2007 
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On the commissioning side, a policy of practice-based commissioning designed to encourage 
greater GP involvement and collaborative working between practices was introduced in 2005. 
This was to some extent a return to the principles of GP fund-holding and Total Purchasing 
Pilots, but the important difference was that primary care trusts gave GPs only virtual 
‘indicative’ budgets to commission healthcare services. Accountability for and authority over 
the actual spending was retained by the primary care trusts.20 In 2006 the number of strategic 
health authorities was reduced through amalgamation from 28 to 10, but they retained the 
same role of performance managing the primary care trusts and ensuring that national 
priorities were embedded in local strategies. The number of primary care trusts was also 
reduced through a process of amalgamation from 303 to 152. This was a response to the 
argument that they had been not been powerful enough in financial and management resource 
terms to commission effectively, to ‘insist on quality and challenge the inefficiencies of 
providers.’21((p3) Finally, under the Transforming Community Services programme primary 
care trusts were required to formally separate their community health service provider 
functions from their commissioning function.22 Community health services were taken on by 
a range of different providers in the NHS and in the third and private sectors. 
 
Alongside this restructuring of primary care trusts, there were a number of other initiatives 
designed to improve the quality and cost effectiveness of commissioning. These included the 
World Class Commissioning  initiative introduced in 2007, which involved the evaluation of 
primary care trust commissioning performance against a set of ten competencies to identify 
areas for improvement.23156 One possible solution to weaknesses in any of these 
competencies was proposed in the Framework for Procuring External Support for 
Commissioners, which showed primary care trusts how to buy in private sector 
commissioning support.24157 Commissioners were also given a number of new mechanisms 
designed to influence the behaviour and performance of providers, under the broad umbrella 
of the payment by results  policy. Payment by results replaced the traditional block or cost 
and volume contracts used in the NHS with a system under which providers were paid a fixed 
tariff for each episode of a particular type of care. This was intended to encourage providers 
to reduce their costs to below the tariff level and to increase patient throughput, thereby 
reducing waiting times. Payment by results tariffs were introduced for all elective secondary 
care from 2005 (representing about 30% of activity); outpatient, non-elective and accident 
and emergency  services were covered by tariffs from 2006; and by 2008 the payment by 
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results system covered ‘90% of significant inpatient, day-case and outpatient activity.’25158 
(p12) An associated reform introduced from 2004 meant that better performing NHS trusts 
were given foundation trust  status. Foundation trusts had greater autonomy from and less 
accountability to the central NHS, which crucially allowed them to act in a more business-
like way in pursuit of lower costs.26159 
 
Aligned with this was the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation scheme, under which 
up to 2.5% of the value of provider contracts was linked to compliance with stipulated quality 
standards.27160 There was also an effort to put providers under some competitive pressure to 
perform through the ‘Patient Choice’ policy.22155 This gave patients the right, with the 
support of their GP, to choose their provider for elective secondary care. A similar policy 
agenda was being developed at this time in social care through the vehicle of personal health 
budgets. These enabled individuals to commission their own social care services rather than 
being reliant on their local authority. The ‘personalisation’ agenda is beyond the scope of this 
review as we focus on healthcare commissioning and procurement, but for a useful discussion 
see Needham.28 Patients making these choices were expected to have access to a range of 
performance data, and consequently commissioning decisions were intended to be a driver 
for greater responsiveness and cost effectiveness from providers.29 The choices available to 
commissioners were also extended through a policy of ‘Any Willing Provider’, which 
allowed private sector providers to offer elective secondary care at NHS tariff prices as long 
as they were able to meet NHS quality standards. Efforts to stimulate a growth in the private 
provider market came from the Commercial Directorate of the Department of Health, which 
offered contracts for the setting up of independent sector treatment centres to carry out this 
elective treatment. One estimate suggested that by 2008 around 15% of NHS elective 
procedures would be delivered by the private sector30, but in practice contestability on the 
provider side was tempered by a policy announced in 2009 that NHS organisations would be 
‘preferred providers’ assuming they were delivering satisfactory services. 
 
On the procurement side, the structure in 2007 was broadly similar to that in 2001. Two 
important changes had taken place in the intervening years, however. First, the functions of 
the NHS Logistics Authority and parts of the Purchasing and Supply Agency were 
outsourced in 2006 to a private sector supplier. A ten year contract was awarded to DHL, 
NIHR HS&DR Project 12/5004/03   
 
35 
 
which made a commitment to deliver innovation through significant IT investments and cost 
savings in excess of £1 billion. Following this outsourcing, NHS Logistics changed its name 
to NHS Supply Chain. Second, under the auspices of the Supply Chain Excellence 
Programme launched in 2003 by the Commercial Directorate of the Department of Health, 
the Purchasing and Supply Agency established a number of collaborative procurement hubs 
at regional level. These took the place of the virtual and variously configured NHS supply 
management confederations. The hubs were relatively homogenous organisational structures, 
with their own management and financial resources, designed to undertake coordinated 
procurement on behalf of their member trusts. As before, however, NHS trusts also retained 
the freedom to procure their goods and services directly from suppliers. 
 
Finally, we turn to the situation in 2014 (see Figure 4). On the commissioning side the picture 
looks significantly different to that in 2007, although there are echoes of previous 
organisational arrangements designed to get GPs more involved, in particular GP fund-
holding and Total Purchasing Pilots. Following the passage of the Coalition Government’s 
Health and Social Care Act44, the 152 primary care trusts and 10 strategic health authorities 
were replaced in April 2013 by 211 clinical commissioning groups and by NHS England, 
which is comprised of 27 area teams. Clinical commissioning groups are mandatory 
membership organisations of all the GPs serving a geographically defined resident 
population. They must also involve clinicians other than GPs in their governing body, but the 
legal requirements here are minimal (one nurse and one secondary care clinician in each 
clinical commissioning group). The division of commissioning responsibilities between the 
clinical commissioning groups and NHS England has been redistributed to recognise that the 
former are essentially led by GPs. So, the area teams of NHS England are responsible for 
commissioning GP as well as specialist services in their regions. They also hold the clinical 
commissioning groups to account and provide them with developmental support, an echo of 
the role played by the strategic health authorities. The clinical commissioning groups are 
responsible for commissioning secondary care, community health and mental health services 
from NHS and non-NHS providers under the ‘Any Qualified Provider’ policy. To further add 
to the organisational complexity, the task of public health commissioning previously 
managed by the primary care trusts has been transferred to the 152 English local authorities. 
These, in turn, have established health and well-being boards as a forum for strategic 
NIHR HS&DR Project 12/5004/03   
 
36 
 
coordination and to enhance the accountability of clinical commissioning groups to their local 
population.31164 
Figure 4: Structure and organisation of NHS commissioning and procurement c. 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relationship between clinicians and non-clinical managers looks very different under the 
new model of commissioning to that under previous commissioning arrangements. The 
previous relationship, based on a managerial hierarchy, has been replaced by one with a more 
commercial and contractual edge. A separate group of 19 commissioning support units, 
Department 
of Health 
NHS 
England 
Area Teams 
Clinical 
Commissioning 
Groups 
NHS Acute 
Hospital 
Trusts 
General 
Practitioners 
Providers 
DH 
Commercial 
Medicines Unit 
Procurement teams 
in NHS Trusts 
Suppliers of clinical 
and non-clinical 
goods and services 
Key:  Financial resource flow 
 Management resource flow 
Healthcare commissioning and 
service provision 
Non-
NHS 
Providers 
Procurement of clinical and non-
clinical goods and services 
Collaborative 
Procurement 
Hubs 
NHS Supply 
Chain 
Government 
Procurement 
Service 
NHS 
Community 
and Mental 
Health 
Trusts 
Commissioning 
Support Units 
Commissioners 
NIHR HS&DR Project 12/5004/03   
 
37 
 
staffed by non-clinical managers, has been created to give procurement and contract 
management support to the clinical commissioning groups. The commissioning support units 
do not have managerial authority over, or legal accountability for, the commissioning 
decisions made by the clinical commissioning groups. The clinical commissioning groups are 
‘autonomous organisations exposed to full financial risk’31(p 9) and are free to contract with 
the commissioning support units or to make other arrangements for commissioning support, 
for instance with private sector service providers. Under previous arrangements, ultimate 
managerial authority and ‘legal accountability remained with a managerially-led structure 
sitting above the clinical group.’31(p 9) These were the district health authorities in the case of 
GP fund-holders and Total Purchasing Pilots or the primary care trusts in the case of practice-
based commissioning. 
There have also been some significant changes since 2007 on the procurement side of the 
picture. Perhaps the most significant change was the abolition of the Purchasing and Supply 
Agency in 2010, which means there is currently no organisation fulfilling its  policy role as a 
national centre of excellence dedicated to improving procurement and supply management 
practice across the NHS. There has recently been recognition that this was an important and 
necessary role, and there are plans to create a new Centre of Procurement Development  in 
the Department of Health which will mirror much of what the Purchasing and Supply Agency 
was previously doing .32 On the operational procurement side, the Purchasing and Supply 
Agency’s responsibility for national drugs contracts has been transferred to the Department of 
Health Commercial Medicines Unit, and its responsibility for negotiating national framework 
agreements for categories like energy, telecoms and IT services has been transferred to the 
Government Procurement Service , which works across all central government departments. 
 
In some areas, though, the picture remains relatively unchanged. NHS Supply Chain is still 
operating on an outsourced basis under the terms of the ten-year contract agreed with DHL in 
2006. Nine collaborative procurement hubs are still operating at a regional level. In some 
cases these hubs have merged with co-terminus commissioning support units, which is a 
potentially very significant development because those working in the hubs will bring their 
commercially-honed procurement and contract management skills to bear on the 
commissioning of healthcare. Finally, NHS hospital trusts remain absolutely free to procure 
their own goods and services directly from suppliers without reference to contracts being 
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agreed by other organisations such as NHS Supply Chain and the collaborative procurement 
hubs. Consequently, as was recognised in the recently published Procurement Development 
Programme for the NHS32165, there are still significant variations in the products being used, 
the prices being paid and the service levels being received by different trusts. 
 
1.3 Conclusion 
Having established the broad policy context of commissioning and procurement in the 
English NHS, we turn in the next chapter to a discussion of the approach, focus and method 
that we have adopted in our review of the P&SCM literature.  
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Chapter 2 
Approach, Focus and Method 
 
2.1Approach  
The approach that we have taken in this study is a theory based realist review. We chose this 
route on the basis of our judgement that what constitutes an effective approach to P&SCM is 
likely to be highly context dependent. We begin by scoping the range of theories and 
conceptual frameworks used to describe and explain various aspects of P&SCM practice, 
including a discussion of underlying assumptions about units of analysis, actor behaviour and 
intended outcomes. We then examine the literature about NHS commissioning/procurement 
policy and practice to see to what extent the various P&SCM theories provide an insight into 
what is intended and what happens in this specific context. Next, we examine and assess the 
empirical evidence about the effect of different P&SCM practices and techniques on 
procurement processes and outcomes in different sectors and organisational contexts. We end 
by mapping and evaluating approaches to improving P&SCM practice, drawing on the logic 
of portfolio analysis to examine the importance of context. Our conclusions offer the basis of 
an explanatory framework for understanding the characteristics of effective P&SCM practice 
in the different contexts and types of NHS organisations. 
 
The study is an evidence synthesis of a diverse theoretical and empirical literature on 
P&SCM. We draw on material from a variety of different disciplines, sectors and countries to 
identify lessons for more cost-effective policy and practice in the NHS. The research terrain 
is characterised by considerable complexity in terms of the multiple sources of evidence 
across different disciplinary traditions, by weakness and ambiguity in terms of association 
and causation, and by the influence of contextual factors on the appropriateness, effectiveness 
and outcomes of different P&SCM practices and techniques. Given these characteristics, a 
conventional systematic review, with its emphasis on a hierarchy of evidence and randomised 
controlled trials as the chosen research design to address questions of effectiveness, would 
not be appropriate. Indeed, a traditional literature review would almost certainly be unable to 
take account of the multiple and inter-connected variables that impact on the effectiveness of 
P&SCM practices and techniques. 
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A realist review approach, on the other hand, emphasises the contingent nature of the 
evidence and addresses questions about what works in which settings, for whom, in what 
circumstances and why. Realist review has a ‘generative model of causality’, which argues 
that ‘to infer a causal outcome (O) between two events, one needs to understand the 
underlying mechanism (M) that connects them and the context (C) in which the relationship 
occurs.’338 (pp21-22) A realist review can also be used to generate a theory map exposing the 
differences between programme theories and theories in use. The purpose is to ‘articulate 
programme theories and then interrogate existing evidence to find out whether and where 
these theories are pertinent and productive.’349 (p74) This is appropriate given that a key aim of 
this study is to illuminate differences between how P&SCM might be carried out and current 
NHS policy and practice. The value of realist review and evaluation is exemplified by a 
number of studies of commissioning strategies in the NHS.35-3710-12 We therefore chose to use 
this as our over-arching research design. Denyer et al3813 and Jagosh et al3914 provide a useful 
discussion of the key terms used in realist review. Box 1 contains a summary. 
 
Box 1: Key terms used in realist review 
Middle-range theory: An implicit or explicit explanatory theory that can be used to evaluate 
programmes of action or specific interventions. A theory is middle-range if it can be tested 
with empirical evidence and does not deal with more abstract social, economic or cultural 
forces (i.e. a grand theory like Marxism). 
 
Context-Mechanism-Outcome (CMO) configurations: CMO configurations are used to 
generate causal explanations associated with the empirical evidence. The process draws out 
and reflects on the relationship between context, mechanism and outcome either in a whole 
programme of action or in specific aspects/interventions. Drawing out CMO configurations is 
a basis for generating and/or refining the middle-range theory that represents the final product 
of a realist review. 
 
Context: The surrounding factors, the external and internal environment and the 
characteristics of actors, which influence behavioural change. Programmes of action or 
interventions are always embedded in a particular context. Factors include the experience and 
competency of individual actors, the cultural norms or history of a community in which a 
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programme or intervention is implemented, the nature and scope of existing social networks, 
and the geographical location. Context can be understood as any factor that shapes the 
behaviour of a mechanism triggered by an intervention. 
 
Mechanism: The generative force that leads to outcomes. It typically represents the 
reasoning of one or more actors in response to the programme of action or the intervention 
with which they are faced. Mechanisms are about how actors interpret, make sense of and 
respond to the incentives or resources associated with a programme or intervention. 
Identifying mechanisms allows realist review to go beyond describing ‘what happened’ (the 
outcome) to explaining ‘why it happened, for whom and under what circumstances.’ 
 
Outcome: The results of a programme of action or an intervention, which can be intended or 
unintended, proximal, intermediate or final. Examples of outcomes resulting from P&SCM 
interventions are supplier/provider cost reduction or improved quality and responsiveness.      
 
 
Realist synthesis belongs to the family of theory driven review. It begins with knowledge and 
theory and ends with more refined knowledge and theory, in the process ‘stalking and sifting’ 
ideas and empirical evidence.338 In this research, the synthesis addresses questions in 
particular about how P&SCM practices (interventions) are carried out, how and why these 
practices are influenced by context and circumstances, the impact of these practices on 
procurement outcomes, and the appropriateness and effectiveness of approaches to improving 
P&SCM. The focus is therefore very much on the mechanisms within these practices rather 
than on the practices per se. Realist review learns from, rather than controls for, real world 
phenomena. Our study thereby acknowledges that no two procurement processes are exactly 
the same in terms of the context or the actors involved.  
 
The limitation of realist synthesis is that it is a relatively new method, still in development 
and with a relatively small number of exemplar studies.338 Nevertheless, there has recently 
been an effort to propose and codify a set of quality and publication standards for realist 
synthesis through the RAMESES study.40, 41 These standards represent an important 
development in establishing realist synthesis as a coherent, consistent and robust review 
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methodology. Moreover, based on the reviews and literature published to date it is an 
approach that seems to address the limitations of traditional systematic review methods when 
dealing with complex social interventions across different circumstances, using a range of 
mechanisms, and with varying underlying beliefs and assumptions.38, 42, 4313, 15, 16 Realist 
synthesis is focused on offering explanations (what is) rather than making normative 
judgements (what should be), and developing principles and guidance rather than making 
rules. Pawson et al338 (p24) comment that ‘realist review delivers illumination rather than 
generalisable truths and contextual fine-tuning rather than standardisation.’  
 
Gough et al44 support this message in their comparison of different types of systematic 
review. They note that realist synthesis is both configurative in that it begins by clarifying the 
nature of the theory or theories that might explain a specific programme of action or a 
particular intervention, and aggregative in that it gathers a body of evidence to test those 
theories. Also, unlike standard systematic reviews realist synthesis considers empirical 
evidence from a broad range of sources and ‘will assess its value in terms of its contribution 
rather than according to some pre-set criteria.’44 (p6)  For the purpose of this evidence 
synthesis, we believe that this is the most appropriate approach to take. It will offer insights 
for managers and clinicians to take note of and make use of in enhancing their P&SCM 
practice. This judgement is further reinforced by Popay’s45 analysis of alternative approaches 
to systematic review, summarised in Table 1, which underlines that only realist synthesis 
focuses on mechanisms rather than whole programmes. In our case, this allowed us to focus 
on particular discrete aspects of the procurement process (specification of requirement, 
provider selection and evaluation, contract drafting and negotiation, contract and relationship 
management and so on) rather than having to consider P&SCM practice as the overall unit of 
analysis. 
 
Table 1: Summary of alternative approaches to systematic review (from Popay4517 (p89)) 
Approach Unit of 
Analysis 
Focus of 
Observation 
End Product Application 
Meta-analysis Programme Effect sizes Relative power Whole 
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of like 
programmes 
programme 
application 
Narrative review Programme Holistic 
comparison 
Recipes for 
successful 
programmes 
Whole or 
majority 
replication 
Realist synthesis Mechanisms Mixed fortunes 
of programmes 
in different 
settings 
Theory to 
determine best 
application  
Mindful 
employment of 
appropriate 
mechanisms 
 
 
One of the principles of realist synthesis is the importance of sense-making. The meta-
narrative mapping approach to synthesising evidence is attractive, because it acknowledges 
different disciplinary traditions and changes to dominant narratives over time. This approach 
has been used, for example, to reveal changing paradigms across different disciplines in 
relation to studies about the diffusion of innovations.46 P&SCM is also a good example of an 
area of practice where the dominant narrative has shifted over time, from the highly technical 
and rational discourse of production economics to a more hybridised one in which, amongst 
others, issues of power, politics and bounded rationality from various branches of 
organisation theory are now playing a much greater role. We therefore use a meta-narrative 
mapping exercise within the realist framework specifically to address our first research 
question, which is to identify and explain the emergence of different theories about P&SCM 
practice. 
 
It is important to emphasise here that in recognition of the very diverse theoretical and 
empirical literature about P&SCM we consciously draw on evidence from a broad range of 
peer reviewed journals, books and policy documents. This does not mean, however, that our 
search strategy is comprehensive or exhaustive. Rather we use purposive sampling to focus 
on literature that helps us to address the CMO configurations that drive the review. In realist 
review, the relevance and rigour of the literature is not judged primarily by its academic 
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provenance but by the light it sheds on the particular CMO configuration under 
consideration.33, 44  
 
A key test for studies funded by the NIHR’s HS&DR programme is that the research 
questions and subsequent research findings are relevant to and useful for the target audience, 
those responsible for the organisation and delivery of healthcare services. Similarly, realist 
review emphasises the need for theorising to be highly practical, with practitioners helping to 
shape the investigation of what works, in which circumstances, how and why.47 In 
accordance with the principles of realist review, therefore, we saw our research questions as 
provisional and we discussed, refined and amplified these with an expert advisory and 
stakeholder group composed of 16 people. This had 4 representatives of the target audience 
of NHS managers and clinicians, including a senior manager from a commissioning support 
unit, the Head of Contracting and Procurement from a clinical commissioning group, a GP 
and chair of the NHS Alliance, and a commissioner of social care services for a local 
authority. To provide a broader perspective the advisory group also had 8 academic 
researchers and consultants with an active interest in P&SCM, 2 non-NHS procurement 
practitioners, the chief executive of a third sector provider of NHS services representing 
service users/patients, and a representative of the UK Chartered Institute of Purchasing and 
Supply (the professional body for procurement managers). 
 
We convened this group on a face-to-face basis in Birmingham in month 3 of the study, and 
ran a facilitated workshop to elicit and discuss programme theories about different 
approaches to P&SCM and to explore and amplify the research questions. One outcome of 
the workshop was a list of additional questions of interest to the advisory group, which are 
listed in the next section. We held one further face-to-face meeting of the group in month 6 of 
the study to seek their feedback on some of the early findings. Further provisional findings 
and a draft of the final report were shared electronically with the group and feedback 
comments were received. This embeds the linkage between practitioner and researcher 
communities, which is advocated as a key feature of realist synthesis and helps to translate 
findings from research into practice.48 
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2.2 Focus of the review 
According to Pawson et al33 there are five key steps in a realist review.  These are, first, 
clarifying the scope, second, searching for evidence, third, appraising the literature and 
extracting the data, fourth, synthesising the evidence and drawing conclusions, and fifth, 
disseminating the conclusions and implementing recommendations with practitioners and 
policy-makers. The quality and publication standards developed by the RAMESES study40, 41 
have added further depth and detail to each of these steps. Our study adheres broadly to this 
guidance on the realist synthesis approach rather than following it to the letter. So, while we 
identify a range of alternative theories relevant to the P&SCM process and test their 
explanatory value in terms of CMO configurations at various stages of the process, we stop 
short of generating new theory on the basis of this testing. Our broad approach to realist 
synthesis is justified by complexity and breadth of the research topic. We are looking at 
aspects of the broad P&SCM process rather than at a specific policy programme or 
interventions within a programme.  
 
This chapter begins to clarify the scope of our study by identifying the research questions and 
discussing the purpose of the review. Chapter 3 completes the scoping by articulating the 
main P&SCM theories to be explored and by using them to create a realist synthesis 
framework for evaluating the evidence. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 focus on the appraisal and 
synthesis of the evidence, and Chapter 8 draws conclusions. 
 
We used the four research objectives described in Chapter 1 to generate four concomitant 
research questions. These are presented below. Guided by the realist approach to clarifying 
the scope of the study, these questions were treated as provisional and they were refined and 
amplified through discussion with the advisory and stakeholder group. This discussion 
generated a number of additional questions of interest, also presented below. The study did 
not explicitly seek to address these additional questions, but rather used them as points of 
reference during the review.  
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Research question 1: What are the main disciplinary sources of ideas about P&SCM and what 
are the principal theories, conceptual frameworks and main paradigms? 
  
Research question 2: How can theories about P&SCM in general help NHS managers and 
clinicians in their commissioning and procurement activities, in particular in light of recent 
and planned changes to commissioning structures, incentives and processes in the NHS? 
 
Additional questions of interest to members of the advisory group: 
 
How does/can the NHS use incentives in commissioning and procurement? 
 
How does/can the NHS deliver on contractual obligations?  How can NHS managers and 
clinicians ensure that third party contractual obligations are delivered? 
 
How do different sets or layers of rules or guidelines in the NHS impact upon commissioning 
activities? What are the differences as compared with private sector practice?  
 
How should NHS managers and clinicians commission services for different client groups?   
 
How does commissioning differ across different services within the health sector?  What is 
the significance and impact of commissioning from different types of providers (private, third 
sector)? 
 
What is the impact on NHS commissioning of variations in demand between/within health 
localities? 
 
How does commissioning for health vary in different institutional contexts within the UK? 
 
Research question 3: What is the empirical evidence about the impact of different P&SCM 
practices and techniques on outcomes at different stages of the procurement process and in 
different settings and organisational contexts? 
 
Additional questions of interest to members of the advisory group: 
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Who is responsible for the various P&SCM activities and at which stages of the process? 
How and where is responsibility handed over, and who is responsible for co-ordinating this? 
 
Who is responsible for the overall design of the supply chain?  Where is the P&SCM 
design/management function located within an organisation and what are the implications of 
this? 
How can a market be developed and managed?  To what extent can alternative suppliers 
shape the market environment? 
 
When and where within a supply chain does competition work? When and where is 
collaboration better?  How can these two approaches be co-ordinated? 
 
When, or for which categories of spend, can P&SCM activities be outsourced?   
 
For which categories of spend can P&SCM activities benefit from economies of scale?  
Which categories of spend require local design/implementation of P&SCM activities? 
 
Research question 4: What are the different approaches to improving P&SCM practice and 
which are likely to work best in the different contexts and types of NHS organisations? 
 
Additional questions of interest to members of the advisory group: 
 
Is there evidence of ‘best practice’ from the private sector?  If so, how useful is this in the 
NHS context?  
 
What constitutes ‘evidence’ in ‘evidence-based commissioning’? 
 
What are the particularities of commissioning in health that could mitigate the import and 
implementation of models and practice from other sectors? 
 
What constitutes ‘a success’ in P&SCM activities and what constitutes ‘a failure’?  
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2.3 Research methodology 
A detailed description of the research methodology is presented in Table 2 below. It is worth 
noting here that the four main objectives outlined in Chapter 1, and their associated research 
questions, are closely inter-related. For example, the mapping and evaluation of different 
approaches to improving P&SCM practice (Objective 4) is founded on literature presenting 
and discussing theories about P&SCM, the application of those theories in NHS and other 
contexts, and evidence about how various practices impact on procurement outcomes. 
Equally, although Table 2 suggests a sequential set of phases, in realist review there is 
iteration between the phases. So, for example, theories about P&SCM and explanations about 
effective procurement practices in NHS contexts were shaped and reshaped throughout the 
course of the study. 
 
Table 2: Research methodology drawing on realist synthesis and meta-narrative 
mapping 
Phase Actions 
Define the scope of the review 
 
RQ1Theories about procurement and supply 
chain management 
 
RQ2 Evidence on experiences of NHS 
managers and clinicians 
 
RQ3 Impact of practices on outcomes at 
different stages of procurement process 
 
RQ4 Different approaches to improving 
procurement and supply chain management 
practice 
 
• Explore literature and evidence across 
different disciplines, sectors and 
countries 
• Clarify research questions with 
advisory/stakeholder group  
• Find and articulate the programme 
theories 
• Select ‘landmark studies’ 
• Identify main research traditions 
associated with procurement and 
supply chain management 
• Develop theory maps 
Search for, extract and appraise the evidence • Decide purposive sampling strategy 
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(see Table 3 below for more detail) 
 
• Define search sources, terms and 
methods 
• Develop data extraction forms 
• Test for rigour and relevance 
• Set thresholds for saturation 
 
Synthesise findings • Compare and contrast findings from 
different studies 
• Seek confirmatory and contradictory 
findings 
• Final search in light of emerging 
findings 
• Refine theory maps and programme 
theories in the light of evidence 
 
Draw conclusions and make 
recommendations in relation to the original 
objectives of the study 
 
OB1 Explanation of theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks about procurement 
and supply chain management 
OB2 Application of theories to understand 
characteristics of effective procurement 
practice in NHS contexts 
OB3 Assessment of the evidence about how 
different practices can contribute to better 
procurement outcomes 
OB4 Mapping and evaluation of different 
approaches to improving procurement and 
supply chain management practice 
 
• Consult advisory group members in a 
review of findings 
• Further refinement of findings 
• Disseminate review conclusions both 
in theoretical terms and in the form of 
a practical procurement guide for 
NHS managers and clinicians 
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Further specific details about the search, appraisal and extraction strategy used in the study 
are provided in Table 3 below. With respect to managing a large volume of papers, from 
diverse sources, a purposive sampling strategy was used to set strict boundaries in relation to 
relevance, allowing for iteration. Relevance was judged against each of our four research 
objectives and their associated research questions. Data selection, leading to decisions about 
inclusion or exclusion, was less linear and predetermined than in traditional systematic 
reviews. Decisions here were based on pre-existing knowledge of the subject area and the use 
of expert judgment on what to include in or exclude from the review, drawing upon advice 
from the research team and from the advisory group as required.  
 
Table 3: Search, appraisal and extraction strategy 
 Decide purposive sampling strategy • Scope the range of material to be retrieved to 
test particular theories and to answer specific 
questions 
• Repeat as necessary as theoretical 
understanding develops 
 
Define search sources, terms and 
methods 
• Sources to include ‘grey’ literature as well as 
research literature 
• Terms to be decided which will elicit theory 
and evidence and answer questions important 
to stakeholders 
• Methods will include database searching, 
snowballing, citation tracking and hand 
searching 
• ‘Key word’ searching of databases including 
ABI-Inform, Business Source Premier, 
EBSCO, Pro-quest, Medline, HMIC 
 
Develop data extraction forms • Title of paper 
• Name of reviewer 
• Type of paper, i.e. theoretical lens, research 
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design 
• Details of analysis, e.g. nature of context, 
P&SCM interventions, mechanisms, 
outcomes 
• Relevant findings, importance for our 
research questions 
• Methodological strength of paper in its 
domain 
  
Test for rigour and relevance • Does the paper make an original and 
scholarly contribution? 
• Is the paper about the topic under scrutiny? 
• Does it add value for NHS managers and 
clinicians? 
  
Set thresholds for saturation • Check whether additional searching will add 
new knowledge, within limits of available 
time and resources 
 
 
The appraisal process focused on the rigour and relevance of the selected data. Rigour was 
assessed by looking at the credibility and robustness of the methodology used in a piece of 
research. Literature reporting anecdotal qualitative evidence and quantitative research 
drawing on a small data-set were judged to be insufficiently rigorous. Relevance was 
assessed by considering whether a particular paper or piece of evidence within a paper was 
addressing the theories being tested, and by asking whether it might add valuable insights for 
NHS managers and clinicians. Data extraction was done using forms that were specifically 
tailored to each of our research questions, but in each case we focused on gathering data that 
revealed the nature of context, mechanisms and outcomes. For research question 1, for 
example, we extracted data about the contextual assumptions, proposed explanatory 
mechanisms and intended outcomes embedded in different P&SCM theories. For research 
question 2, by contrast, we extracted data about the empirical context studied within the 
NHS, the commissioning or procurement interventions taking place within that context, the 
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mechanisms thought to be triggered by those interventions, and the observed outcomes. 
Examples of completed data extraction forms are provided in Appendix 2. 
 
Analysis and synthesis of the extracted data was done iteratively and sequentially. First, a 
body of evidence related to each research question and expressed in terms of context, 
mechanism and outcome was built up. This was followed by a process of comparing and 
contrasting evidence from different studies to identify recurrent patterns of CMO 
configurations in respect of each research question. Finally, we undertook synthesis by seeing 
how far one or more P&SCM theories might be useful in interpreting and explaining these 
recurrent patterns in our evidence. This sequence of steps was then iterated by analysing 
further evidence in relation to each research question through the lens of context, mechanism 
and outcome. Provisional findings and conclusions from this process were shared periodically 
with the advisory and stakeholder group to sense-check their relevance and value for NHS 
managers and clinicians. We also used the expertise and experience of the advisory group to 
help us frame our final conclusions and recommendations.          
 
2.4 Literature search 
An initial literature search was conducted in early October 2013 across the electronic 
resources listed below. The results of this search were then iteratively updated and refined 
during the remainder of October and early November. The resources used included the 
leading bibliographic databases in their respective disciplinary fields to ensure both quality 
and breadth of coverage and to minimise duplication.  They were also selected for their 
relevance to each of our research questions. 
• ABI/INFORM Global (ProQuest): This is a large business journal database providing 
the full text of articles from over 2,300 business and management journals and 
abstracts from a further 1,000. Coverage includes business, management, marketing 
and strategy.   
• ASSIA (ProQuest): The Applied Social Science Index and Abstracts is an indexing 
and abstracting tool covering health, social services, economics, politics and 
education.  
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• Business Source Premier (EBSCO): This complements ABI/INFORM Global by 
providing full text access to more than 2,000 business and management journals 
(mostly different journals to those on ABI/INFORM Global) as well as trade journals. 
• HMIC (Ovid): This database from the Health Management Information Consortium 
brings together information from two key institutions: the Library and Information 
Services of the Department of Health and the King's Fund Information and Library 
Service.    
• IBSS (ProQuest): The International Bibliography of the Social Sciences includes over 
2.6 million references to journal articles, books, reviews and selected chapters.  
• Scopus (Elsevier): This is a large abstract and citation database which provides access 
to 19,000 titles from a wide range of international publishers. 
• Social Science Citation Index (via the Web of Knowledge): This index covers almost 
2,500 journals across more than 50 social science disciplines and is one of the 
databases that make up the Web of Science, which is accessible via the Web of 
Knowledge.  
 
Specific titles 
The journals listed below were considered to be particularly relevant by the research team.  
They were covered by the chosen bibliographic databases as indicated.   
• Academy of Management Journal (1963+ ABI, BSP, IBSS, Scopus, SSCI) 
• American Economic Review  (1911+ ABI, BSP, IBSS, Scopus, SSCI) 
• British Journal of Management (1990+ ABI, BSP, IBSS, Scopus, SSCI) 
• Environment and Planning C: Government 
and Policy  
(1983+ IBSS, Scopus, SSCI) 
• Harvard Business Review  (1922+ ABI, BSP, Scopus, SSCI) 
• Health Services Management Research (1998+ ABI, ASSIA, BSP, Scopus 
HMIC) 
• Industrial Marketing Management  (1971+ ABI, BSP, Scopus, SSCI) 
• International Journal of Operations and 
Production Management  
(1980+ ABI, BSP, Scopus, SSCI) 
• Journal of Business and Industrial 
Marketing 
(1994+ BSP, Scopus, SSCI) 
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• Journal of Business-to-Business 
Marketing 
(1993+ ABI, BSP, Scopus, SSCI) 
• Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organisation  
(1984+ ABI, ASSIA, BSP, IBSS, 
Scopus, SSCI) 
• Journal of Economic Literature (1969+ ABI, BSP, IBSS, SSCI) 
• Journal of Health Economics  (1982+ ABI, ASSIA, HMIC, IBSS, 
Scopus, SSCI) 
• Journal of Health, Organisation and 
Management  
(1992+ ABI, ASSIA, HMIC, Scopus) 
• Journal of Health Services Research and 
Policy 
(1995+ ASSIA, Scopus, SSCI) 
• Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization 
(1985+ ABI, BSP, IBSS, Scopus, SSCI) 
• Journal of Marketing Management  (1992+ ABI, BSP, IBSS, Scopus) 
• Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management 
(2003+ ABI, BSP, Scopus, SSCI) 
• Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly (1996+ ABI, ASSIA, Scopus, SSCI) 
• Policy and Politics (1979+ IBSS, Scopus, SSCI) 
• Production and Operations Management (1996+ ABI, BSP, Scopus) 
• Production Planning and Control  (1990+ ABI, BSP, Scopus) 
• Public Administration  (1965+ ABI, BSP, IBSS, Scopus, SSCI) 
• Public Administration Review (1965+ ABI, BSP, IBSS, Scopus, SSCI) 
• Supply Chain Management  (1996+ ABI, BSP, Scopus, SSCI) 
 
The following titles were also searched individually 
• Harvard Business Review  
• Californian Management Review 
 
The literature search was conducted using keywords relating to the specific focus of each of 
our research questions as set out in Appendix 1.  The keywords were combined with the 
Boolean operators ‘AND’ and ‘OR’, which narrowed and widened the search respectively.  
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Combinations with Boolean operators were not used if search terms were found to be 
infrequently employed, to maximise the capture of material. In addition, the terms were 
variously inputted into the search function at the level of title, abstract or subject heading in 
order to ensure adequate breadth and depth of the search as relevant to the research question.  
Search terms were truncated (i.e. the root of a word is used with an asterisk) to capture 
various relevant suffixes of a term for maximum coverage.  Speech marks were used if it was 
necessary to keep multiple words together as a single search term, further ensuring relevance. 
 
The search was limited to retrieve material in English only.  It was deemed unnecessary to 
limit the search by any date of publication as the purpose of the research involved reviewing 
the P&SCM and related terms since their earliest usage.  The vast majority of the search was 
limited to peer-reviewed literature, which was taken as an indication of quality, though this 
was relaxed where appropriate (e.g. for RQ2, to collect relevant grey literature). 
 
The results of the literature search were exported into Endnote, an electronic reference 
management tool.  Four Endnote libraries were created, one for each of the research 
questions. The functions of Endnote enable the references in each library to be sorted into 
separate sub-folders to allow greater focus in the review process, and to be searched and 
ordered in various ways; for example by keywords, by publication date or by type (article, 
book chapter, report etc). The software also allows electronic versions of the texts to be 
attached and stored as part of the reference.   
 
In the first phase of the literature review, each of the libraries was examined by the principal 
investigator (JS) and the researcher (TM) together to ensure that the imported references were 
relevant to the corresponding research questions, and references were reallocated as 
necessary.  In phase two, abstracts and summaries were reviewed by the principal 
investigator and the researcher to remove duplicate references and any material not related to 
our research questions; for example studies dealing with purchasing power parity and with 
legal commissions. In the final phase, full articles and texts were scanned and a judgment was 
made to select for detailed review or to discard based on the exclusion criteria described 
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below. Further hand searching, snowballing and Rich Site Summary (RSS) updates were also 
used to add to the literature under scrutiny. 
 
2.5 Literature excluded from the review 
The following study topics and types were excluded from the review as they were judged not 
relevant to our research questions, nor were they of interest to members of the advisory 
group: 
a) Studies based exclusively on theoretical/mathematical modelling or simulation, as the 
realist review approach focuses on experiences of practice. 
b) Studies relating to individual consumer buying/purchasing or related behaviour, rather 
than business or industrial buying/purchasing. 
c) Empirical studies exhibiting inadequate methodological rigour; for example 
quantitative research based on a small sample or qualitative research reporting 
anecdotal evidence. 
 
2.6 Literature included in the review 
The initial literature search identified 3562 results. Based on the first phase of the review, 
these were distributed across the research questions as follows: 
• RQ 1: 1048 texts 
• RQ 2: 720 texts 
• RQs 3 and 4: 1794 texts 
 
Following the second phase of the review, with the removal of duplicate references and any 
texts dealing with unrelated subjects, 1800 texts remained. These were distributed across the 
research questions as follows:  
• RQ 1: 472 texts 
• RQ 2: 412 texts 
• RQs 3 and 4: 916 texts 
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In the final phase, after the application of criteria for exclusion and the inclusion of additional 
material from hand searching, snowballing and updating, 879 texts were selected for full 
review as follows: 
• RQ 1: 191 texts (all of which were journal articles) 
• RQ 2: 194 texts (138 journal articles, 25 research reports, 16 book chapters and 15 
NHS policy documents) 
• RQs 3 and 4: 494 texts (all of which were journal articles) 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Having described and justified the approach, focus and detailed methodology of our literature 
review, we turn in the next chapter to a discussion of the various theories that have been used 
to interpret and explain the P&SCM process.  
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Chapter 3 
Theories about Procurement and Supply Chain Management 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The primary aim of this chapter is to address research question 1, which asks: what are the 
main disciplinary sources of ideas about procurement and supply chain management 
(P&SCM) and what are the principal theories, conceptual frameworks and main paradigms? 
We begin in the next section by identifying what are the main disciplinary sources of ideas 
about P&SCM. We then discuss the principal theories and conceptual models used to 
understand, explain and guide P&SCM practice. We also categorise these various theories 
into a number of broad literatures focused upon particular aspects of the P&SCM process. 
 
In addition, this chapter builds on work by authors like Giannakis and Croom49, Halldorsson 
et al50, and Möller51 who have developed meta-theoretical analyses to suggest how different 
theories can inform thinking about and practice in different aspects of P&SCM. The 
underlying aim of this type of analysis can either be to develop a contingency perspective on 
middle-range P&SCM theories (Halldorsson et al50, Möller51)) or to go in search of a unified 
general theory to support the development of a cognate P&SCM discipline (Giannakis and 
Croom49). Our aim is to make a contribution to the development of a contingency perspective 
by adopting a realist review method, focusing on which P&SCM theory works, for whom and 
under what circumstances. We recognise, as does Möller51, that the search for a unified 
general theory is likely to be fruitless given the ontological differences between several of the 
component theories, and that theory like practice ought to be sensitive to context. To this end, 
the chapter also develops and discusses a realist interpretation framework of P&SCM 
theories. This framework is then used in the rest of the report as a basis for examining what 
lessons can be learned from the general literature on P&SCM for practice in the NHS. 
 
 
3.2 Definitions of procurement and supply chain management 
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Before turning to the primary task of this chapter we need to define our main terms, 
‘procurement’ and ‘supply chain management’, and the relationship between them for the 
purposes of this report. Larson and Halldorsson52 provide a useful basis for this discussion in 
a paper which considers the scope and meaning of supply chain management. They note, as 
many others have done (see for example Svensson53; Giannakis and Croom49; Giunipero et 
al54), that the literature offers a multiplicity of definitions of supply chain management. Some 
of these definitions share references to the coordinated management both of an organisation’s 
upstream (supplier) and downstream (customer) relationships to achieve superior value for 
end customers. Other definitions are solely focused on the integrated management of an 
organisation’s upstream, supply-side relationships. The interesting question raised by Larson 
and Halldorsson52 is how should we define and think about procurement in relation to supply 
chain management defined in these two different ways? They identify four perspectives on 
this question, which they call ‘traditionalist’, ‘relabeling’, ‘unionist’ and ‘intersectionist’. 
These are illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Four perspectives on procurement and SCM (adapted from Larson and 
Halldorsson52) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relabeling Traditionalist 
Procurement Procurement 
SCM SCM 
Intersectionist Unionist 
SCM 
Procurement SCM 
Proc.
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The first two perspectives are associated with the notion of supply chain management as 
integrated management of an organisation’s supply-side relationships. The traditionalist 
perspective sees supply chain management as a strategic aspect or sub-set of procurement, 
concerned particularly with supplier development and building collaborative supply 
relationships. Procurement in this perspective is broader than supply chain management and 
is defined as all activities associated with acquiring and managing the organisation’s supply 
inputs. The relabeling perspective suggests that in many organisations procurement is 
‘evolving’ into supply chain management. This appears to mean that supply chain 
management is seen as a more modern and enlightened version of procurement, involving a 
generally less aggressive and more collaborative approach to supplier management. 
 
The unionist and intersectionist perspectives are both associated with the idea that supply 
chain management involves the coordinated management of an organisation’s upstream and 
downstream relationships. Consequently, these perspectives cast supply chain management in 
very broad terms and suggest that it encompasses a wide range of activities and functions 
including procurement, logistics, operations and marketing. The unionist perspective is 
perhaps the more radical of the two in that it subsumes and attempts to integrate what have 
traditionally been seen as separate organisational functions. The intersectionist perspective, 
on the other hand, retains procurement, operations, marketing etc. as separate functions and 
sees supply chain management as the coordination of cross-functional efforts across multiple 
organisations.  
 
The definitions of procurement and supply chain management adopted for the purposes of 
our review are presented in Box 2. 
 
Box 2: Definitions of procurement and supply chain management 
 
Procurement is the process encompassing all activities associated with acquiring and 
managing the organisation’s supply inputs. Supply chain management is the sub-set of 
procurement activities concerned particularly with the monitoring, management and 
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development of on-going supplier relationships and the associated flows of supply inputs.  
 
 
These definitions are perhaps closest to Larson and Halldorsson’s52 traditionalist perspective. 
We have adopted these supply-side focused definitions to delimit the scope of our literature 
review in a way that focuses attention on particular aspects of the NHS and the interactions 
between its constituent organisations. This review is not concerned with literature that might 
cast light on an organisation’s management of its relationships with customers or, more 
appropriately for the NHS, patients or service users. The focus is instead firmly on the 
literature that addresses an organisation’s interactions with its external suppliers or, in NHS-
parlance, providers.    
 
3.3 Disciplinary sources of ideas about procurement and SCM 
Reflecting on the findings of a number of extant literature reviews it is clear that the P&SCM 
literature is theoretically diverse and fragmented and draws on a very wide range of 
underpinning disciplines. Burgess, Singh and Koroglu55 (p710) define a discipline as ‘a body of 
practice that is well supported by occupational groupings that identify with a defined territory 
of activity’ and that has an infrastructure (e.g. professional associations, publications) 
‘designed to transfer and create knowledge’. They review 100 randomly selected journal 
articles and identify eight main disciplines, including marketing, logistics, strategy, 
sociology, economics and operations management, that underpin the P&SCM literature. This 
disciplinary diversity is further underlined by the fact that these 100 articles are published in 
31 different journals covering many disciplinary areas. 
 
Harland et al56 review only 41 papers, but with a specific focus on work that considers 
disciplinary issues and the nature of theory and conceptual development in the area of 
P&SCM. They find that P&SCM is characterised by ‘borrowing theories from other 
disciplines’ (p745) particularly economics (e.g. game theory and transaction cost analysis) and 
sociology (e.g. social capital theory). They also identify that their relatively small sample of 
papers are published in 20 different journals, both specialist and general management, 
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representing disciplines as diverse as production economics, operations management and 
marketing.  
 
Chen and Paulraj57 review over 400 papers and identify a similar diversity of disciplines 
contributing to P&SCM thinking, including logistics, marketing, information management 
and operations management. Giunipero et al54 also review just over 400 papers published in 
nine different journals heavily associated with P&SCM research. They comment that ‘SCM 
has been a melting pot of various disciplines, with influences from logistics and 
transportation, operations management and materials and distribution management, 
marketing, as well as purchasing and information technology’(p66). Finally, the paper by 
Chicksand et al58 takes a different approach and reviews a much larger sample of 1,113 
papers, but drawn from three specialist journals only. Despite this narrower search strategy, 
the paper once again notes the highly multi-disciplinary nature of P&SCM research. It 
identifies economics, strategy and sociology as key sources of theory in topic areas of interest 
to P&SCM researchers. 
 
3.4 Principal theories and P&SCM literatures 
As this brief discussion indicates, P&SCM research is underpinned by a very diverse 
disciplinary base. Consequently, this area of research is also marked by the use of many 
different theories and associated models and conceptual frameworks. In an extensive review 
of organisational buying behaviour research, Johnston and Lewin59 identify the use of several 
sociologically grounded decision-making process models and frameworks. Buvik60 identifies 
the use of theoretical perspectives drawing on sociology (organisational decision-making 
theory, resource dependency theory) and economics (agency theory, transaction cost analysis, 
game theory). Burgess, Singh and Koroglu55 similarly identify the use of theories from 
sociology (inter-organisational networks and organisational learning) and economics 
(transaction cost and agency theory), and they add theory drawn from strategic management 
(resource based view of firm).  
 
NIHR HS&DR Project 12/5004/03   
 
63 
 
Halldorsson et al50 argue that practices in the domain of P&SCM are best understood by 
applying multiple theoretical perspectives drawn from economics (agency theory and 
transaction cost analysis), sociology (social exchange theory, resource dependency theory) 
and strategic management (resource based view). Shook et al61 make the same case for the 
use of a number of well-established theoretical perspectives as a basis for better 
understanding and explaining activities like outsourcing, supplier selection and buyer-
supplier relationship management. They make use of ten different theories, again drawn from 
sociology (institutional, resource dependence, network, organisational decision, critical), 
economics (agency and transaction cost analysis), and strategy (resource based view and 
strategic choice). They also identify the value of systems theory for thinking about the need 
for and the value of coordinated and collaborative relationships in supply networks. This 
theory was drawn originally from the natural sciences (biology and physics), but has been 
developed for use in management and organisations.  
 
Finally, Chicksand et al58 use their extensive review of articles from three specialist P&SCM 
journals to identify what they see as the dominant theoretical perspectives. Again, they 
mention agency theory and transaction cost analysis drawn from economics; network and 
resource dependency theory drawn from sociology; and dynamic capabilities and the resource 
based view drawn from the strategy literature. They also identify a version of systems theory 
that they call the integrated supply chain management perspective. 
     
When engaging with the P&SCM literature, then, we are faced with a diverse and fragmented 
use of theory. Reflecting on the discussion here, though, we can start to discern a picture of 
those theories that are employed most often. A representative list of the most prevalent 
theoretical perspectives and models would include: various models of organisational 
decision-making, agency theory, transaction cost theory, social exchange theory, resource 
dependency theory, dynamic capabilities and the resource based view, systems theory and 
game theory. This purely descriptive listing of the dominant theories is only of limited use, 
however, given our realist review objective of understanding how theory might guide practice 
in different contexts, for different actors and in different aspects of P&SCM. We therefore 
need a basis on which to categorise these theories that connects with our realist review 
objective.  
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To categorise these theories it is useful to consider Möller’s51 notion of a research domain 
like P&SCM as having several interrelated or nested layers (single actor, group, organization, 
inter-organizational, network, industry). We can also make use of Giannakis and Croom’s49 
idea of different P&SCM decision domains (synthesis, synergy and synchronisation) in 
accordance with the diversity of activities and processes involved. Our approach draws on 
these notions of nested layers and decision domains by categorising the programme theories 
in terms of their primary explanatory focus on a particular broad phase in the P&SCM 
process. As can be seen in Figure 6, which illustrates a typical P&SCM process, we can 
crudely identify four broad phases each associated with one or more steps or activities in the 
process.  
 
Figure 6: Phases and steps in the P&SCM process (adapted from Corey62) 
Phase 1 – Pre-contract (demand management) 
1. Identification of need and development of a specification of the physical and 
performance characteristics of the required goods or services 
2. Identification of potential sources of supply (market search) 
3. Qualification of potential suppliers and their goods or services 
4. Design of the request for proposal/quotation and the solicitation of bids 
Phase 2 – Selection and contracting 
5. Bid evaluation and supplier selection 
6. Negotiation of contractual terms and conditions with selected suppliers 
Phase 3 – Post-contract, relationship management (soft management tasks)  
7. Monitoring of supplier performance and the management of on-going supplier 
relationships 
Phase 4 – Post-contract, operational delivery (hard management tasks) 
8. Establishment of supply chain management strategies, control systems and 
performance measurement systems 
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9. Management of inventories of purchased parts, materials and supplies 
10. Recycling or disposal of unused materials and obsolete finished products (reverse 
logistics) 
 
By identifying these four broad phases we are able to propose a four-fold categorisation of 
broad literatures, each associated with particular theories, as shown in Table 4. These are: 1) 
the organisational buying behaviour literature grounded in various theories and models of 
organisational decision-making; 2) the economics of contracting literature grounded in 
agency theory and transaction cost economics; 3) the networks and inter-organisational 
relationships literature grounded in social exchange theory, resource dependency theory and 
aspects of industrial economics; and 4) the integrated supply chain management literature 
grounded in systems theory and behavioural economics, in particular game theory. 
Table 4: A process-based categorisation of the P&SCM literature 
Literature and cognate theories/models Primary focus in procurement process 
Organisational buying behaviour 
• Organisational decision making 
theories, including role theory, 
process models, motivation and buyer 
choice theories 
 
Phase 1, steps 1-4 
(but also concerned with aspects of step 5 
and step 7) 
Economics of contracting 
• Agency theory 
• Transaction cost theory 
 
 
Phase 2, steps 5 and 6 
(but also concerned with aspects of step 7) 
Networks and inter-organisational 
relationships 
• Social exchange theory 
• Resource dependency theory 
• Relational contract theory 
Phase 3, step 7 
(but also concerned with aspects of step 6 
and step 8) 
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• Dynamic capabilities theory 
Integrated supply chain management 
• Systems theory 
• Behavioural economics/ game theory 
 
Phase 4, steps 8-10 
(but also concerned with aspects of step 7) 
 
It should be noted that while each broad literature is primarily focused on one of the four 
phases, there are inevitably overlaps as the process steps are not discrete, nor do they occur in 
a strictly sequential manner. While phases 1 and 2 do occur in sequence, phases 3 and 4 are 
typically concurrent. Moreover aspects of phase 3, for example the history of managing a 
supplier relationship, can impact on activities in phase 2 if an existing supplier is being 
considered for a new or renewed contract. 
 
We now discuss each broad literature in turn, presenting the basic assumptions and the 
implications for P&SCM practice of the associated theories. We also discuss the major 
criticisms of each theory. 
 
3.5 Organisational buying behaviour 
The organisational buying behaviour literature focuses primarily on what might be called the 
pre-contract or the demand management phase of the procurement process. Box 3 provides a 
summary of the implications of this literature for P&SCM practice.  
 
The main disciplinary underpinning of this literature is in organisational sociology, with a 
focus on political models of decision-making. The basic assumptions underpinning such 
models are that actors have bounded rationality and differing motivations and preferences, 
and that intra-organisational conflict is inevitable in situations of joint decision-making.63 By 
viewing organisational buying behaviour as a multi-actor, multi-agenda process, this 
literature conceptualises buying decisions as being a potential locus of intra-organisational 
politics. This, in turn, highlights the possibility for power to be used to resolve conflicts of 
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interest.64-68 Deciding what to buy, drawing up a specification, choosing a shortlist of 
potential suppliers, assessing the bids submitted and selecting a supplier are seen as intensely 
political rather than purely technical decisions. The literature also acknowledges, though, that 
decision-making conflicts can be resolved without the use of power, through problem-solving 
and persuasion.69 
 
Box 3: Implications of organisational buying behaviour literature for P&SCM practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This literature has its roots in the seminal texts on industrial buying and marketing by 
Robinson, Faris and Wind70, Webster and Wind71 and Sheth69. A core idea common to these 
early models is that organisational buying behaviour should be treated as a process, in which 
there are a number of phases or stages representing a sequence of activities.72Robinson, Faris 
and Wind70 encapsulated this in their ‘buy-grid framework’, which presents a number of what 
they termed ‘buy-phases’. In broad terms, the key activities identified by these authors are 
akin to those shown as steps 1-4 in Figure 6, although there is also some interest in step 7 in 
the form of supplier performance evaluation and feedback. 
 
All of these early models also suggest that there are contextual factors at three levels 
influencing the nature of buying decisions).59 At the first level there are environmental or 
situational factors, for example suppliers, competitors, technology, regulation, politics and 
• Procurement decisions differ in terms of the level of risk that they pose for the 
organisation 
• Organisational buying behaviour is a multi-actor, multi-agenda process, and 
consequently procurement decisions are a potential locus of intra-
organisational power and politics 
• Higher risk procurement decisions (more important, more complex, more 
uncertain and more urgent) tend to be characterised by greater intra-
organisational conflict and hence power and politics are more important in 
reaching a decision outcome  
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culture. Secondly, there are organisational factors such as the buying organisation’s size, 
structure, orientation, technology, reward systems and goals. Thirdly, there are factors 
associated with the characteristics of different types of purchase or what Robinson, Faris and 
Wind70 call ‘buy-classes’, such as product type, purchase novelty, purchase complexity and 
time pressure.  
 
Finally, all three models posit a number of variables or dimensions that are used to 
characterise the actors involved in organisational buying decisions, the ways in which they 
are expected to behave, and the decision-making criteria they are expected to use. Tanner72 
suggests that these early researchers are thus exploring three different questions: who 
participates, what happens, and what causes or influences a specific decision? 
 
The core concept drawing all of these strands together to explain variation in organisational 
buying behaviour is the level of risk associated with a given procurement situation.59 Risk is 
seen as a function of purchase importance, complexity, uncertainty and time pressure73, and 
the key antecedents of these variables are primarily found in the contextual factors discussed 
above: environmental, organisational and purchase characteristics. So, for example, purchase 
uncertainty might be related to uncertainty in the buying organisation’s environment or to 
characteristics of the buying firm such as technical competence. Purchase importance might 
be a function of the buying organisation’s size and the type of product or service being 
bought (e.g. capital equipment or supplies). Purchase complexity might also be related to the 
type of product or service and to the nature of the buying task (new spend or renewal of an 
existing contract). Finally, time pressure might be a function of the nature of the buying task. 
The relationship suggested by the literature between different levels of procurement risk and 
various aspects of organisational buying behaviour intended to mitigate that risk is illustrated 
in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7: The relationship between procurement risk and organisational buying 
 Simple buying centre 
Less experienced and less well 
qualified participants 
Limited conflict and minimal 
b i i  b t  ti i t  
Complex buying centre 
Experienced and well qualified 
participants 
Substantial conflict and political 
bargaining between participants 
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behaviour 
 
 
 
 
It is argued that as the risk associated with a buying decision increases the group of actors 
involved in making the decision, known in this literature as the buying centre, will become 
larger and more complex. In other words, more people will be involved in high risk buying 
decisions and they will be drawn from a wider range of departments or organisational sub-
units with different preferences and agendas. The participants involved in a high risk buying 
decision will also typically be more highly qualified and experienced, and will be motivated 
to commit greater attention throughout each stage of the procurement process. Role theory 
has been used by a number of authors to examine which organisational functions participate 
in buying decisions and what specific roles they play.74, 75 
 
The literature associates high risk buying decisions with greater conflict between participants 
and with greater use of aggressive bargaining strategies to resolve such conflicts.69 The 
likelihood of intra-organisational conflict is increased as a result of the greater diversity in 
departmental perspectives and motivations. The use of power and politics rather than a 
collaborative or problem-solving approach to conflict resolution is a result of the high stakes 
Procurement Risk HIGH LOW 
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associated with important purchasing decisions particularly where certain departments 
represented in the buying centre might be negatively impacted by the purchase outcome. In 
these circumstances, participants will be reluctant to make concessions without some type of 
compensation. In a complementary vein, other authors have discussed actor behaviour 
through the lens of behaviour choice theory.76, 77 This theory focuses on the choices made by 
buyers about how they will undertake the buying process. As Tanner72 argues, the actors 
involved in a buying decision may be more focused on using the process to demonstrate and 
develop their management and decision-making skills than on the outcome of acquiring a 
particular good or service. 
 
As Johnston and Lewin59 note, the particular decision rules used in any given procurement 
situation are fundamentally firm specific, but the literature does still suggest that, in general, 
there will be a preference for more formal control mechanisms and decision guidelines as 
procurement risk increases. The logic here is that as the buying centre for a high risk decision 
will be larger and more complex, the governance mechanisms need to be much more explicit 
and detailed to ensure that they are clearly understood by all involved. By contrast, because 
lower risk procurement decisions are expected to involve a smaller and less diverse group of 
decision-makers the decision-making process can be governed more informally and tacitly. 
 
In terms of searching for information about supplier options, the literature suggests that this 
will become more active and extensive as procurement risk increases. For a high stakes 
buying decision, buying centre participants will be strongly motivated to access a wide 
variety of formal (trade journals and sales literature) and informal (personal industry 
contacts) information sources. This can be seen as an effort to mitigate the uncertainty and 
complexity that characterise high risk procurement decisions. Moreover, it is argued that 
known suppliers offering well proven products and services will be favoured in high risk 
situations, and there will be an emphasis on non-price selection criteria (i.e. quality, delivery 
performance, service levels). Price will only play a decisive role in selection if there are two 
or more suppliers that appear equally capable of satisfying the buying centre’s non-price 
requirements. For less important, less complex, less uncertain and therefore lower risk 
procurement decisions, by contrast, buying centre participants will use price as the dominant 
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selection criterion and seek to stimulate competition from as wide a range of suppliers as 
possible. 
 
Building on the points above, the literature also suggests that in situations of high risk buying 
centre participants will favour suppliers with which their organisation has strong prior 
relationships and well established networks of communication. These features are seen as an 
important means of mitigating purchase uncertainty, complexity and time pressure by 
facilitating by buyer-supplier cooperation and information exchange. 
 
Turning now to criticisms of the organisational buying behaviour literature, these are 
primarily made by contributors to the literature offering a competing vision of how it should 
develop. Two main strands can be identified in such critiques. First, it is argued that the 
literature has traditionally been too focused on discrete transactions from the buying 
organisation perspective and has given little, if any, insight into on-going buyer-supplier 
relationships.78 Second, it is suggested that the literature has been too narrow in its 
conception of what should be the focus of the procurement process. As we have discussed, 
the organisational buying behaviour literature traditionally places emphasis on the mitigation 
of risk in procurement decisions. The possibility that the procurement process might deliver 
cost and innovation benefits from suppliers, receives very little attention.  
 
Wilson79 brings these two strands together by suggesting that fundamental changes in the 
business environment facing many organisations (intensified and globalised competition, 
more rapid technological innovation) have forced them to adopt a ‘total quality management’ 
perspective emphasising higher quality at lower cost and with increased flexibility. The need 
to deliver these objectives has, in turn, led them to adopt longer-term and more cooperative 
relationships with many of their suppliers. Wilson’s78  argument is that the traditional 
organisational buying behaviour literature cannot provide an adequate explanation of these 
changes and that it needs to be replaced by theory focusing on buyer-supplier relationships. 
Tanner72 counters this argument, however, by suggesting that the organisational buying 
behaviour literature may still have insights to offer to an understanding of buyer-supplier 
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relationships, particularly in terms of thinking about what happens inside the buying 
organisation that has an impact on relationships with particular suppliers. 
 
3.6 Economics of contracting 
Steps 5-6 in the typical P&SCM process are the focus of the economics of contracting 
literature, grounded in institutional economics. Box 4 provides a summary of the implications 
of this literature for P&SCM practice. 
 
Key strands of this literature draw on agency theory and transaction cost economics. Agency 
theory applies broadly to circumstances in which one actor (the principal) delegates 
responsibility for the execution of valued activities to another (the agent), and the principal 
needs to ensure that these activities are undertaken in a way that serves his or her interests 
rather than those of the agent.80 It is perhaps best known as a basis for understanding issues of 
ownership and control within business organisations, where managers are expected to act as 
agents on behalf of owners.81, 82 This principal-agent relationship can also be seen, though, 
when a buyer (principal) engages a supplier (agent) to deliver a good or service.83-85 
Transaction cost economics is perhaps more obviously concerned with issues of buyer-
supplier interaction, focusing on the question of how to organise business transactions most 
efficiently.86 
 
Box 4: Implications of economics of contracting literature for P&SCM practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Suppliers can and do exhibit various forms of opportunistic behaviour, which 
can damage the value for money received by the buyer 
• Supplier opportunism is a problem, because buyers either face information 
asymmetry (agency theory) or suffer from bounded rationality (TCE) 
• These hazards of opportunism should be addressed either through a complete 
contract (agency theory) or through the appropriate alignment of governance 
mechanisms with transactions (TCE) 
• TCE suggests a simple, low cost governance mechanism (spot market) for 
transactions with a low potential for opportunism, while more complex and 
higher cost bilateral or unified governance mechanisms are suggested for more 
hazardous transactions 
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Dealing first with underlying assumptions we can observe that these theories share a basic 
assumption that suppliers can and do exhibit various forms of opportunistic behaviour, which 
can damage the value for money received by the buyer. Opportunism is defined as self-
interest seeking with guile86, which extends the notion that actors simply aim to maximise 
their self-interest in an open and honest way to include blatant and subtle strategic behaviour. 
These theories therefore focus attention on the various behavioural hazards that can arise 
when a buyer engages an external supplier to deliver a good or service. They are underpinned 
by an assumption that both buyer and supplier are individual utility maximisers, and that 
consequently the latter is not likely to always act in the interests of the former. 
 
These theories diverge on the issue of actor rationality, however. Agency theory assumes, 
like classical economics, that actors are rational and are therefore unencumbered in their 
capacity to make decisions based on all of the information available to them. It does 
acknowledge, however, that information relevant to an interaction between a principal and an 
agent is not necessarily perfectly or costlessly available to both parties. Rather, one party 
might be less well informed than the other and therefore be faced with a situation of 
information asymmetry. Transaction cost economics, by contrast, assumes that actors have 
inherent bounded rationality. This means that they make rational decisions, but within the 
limits imposed by a restricted cognitive capacity. 
 
These different assumptions about actor rationality have important implications for the 
suggestions made by these theories about how best to manage the hazards of supplier 
opportunism. The theories discuss the mechanisms, contractual or otherwise, that are 
available to mitigate such hazards and identify the agency or transaction costs that are 
incurred in using these mechanisms. The focus for agency theory is on the use of contractual 
mechanisms. With an assumption of full rationality, agency theory argues that it is possible 
ex ante to design complete contracts covering every conceivable contingency that might 
NIHR HS&DR Project 12/5004/03   
 
74 
 
impact on a buyer-supplier transaction. The agency costs incurred in mitigating supplier 
opportunism are thus primarily associated with contract drafting, to design incentive 
structures and monitoring regimes, and with contract enforcement or supplier bonding.80 
 
By contrast, the focus for transaction cost economics is more broadly on the use of what are 
called governance mechanisms. These range from arm’s length spot market interactions, 
through closer and more involved forms of bilateral governance, to the use of internal 
hierarchy where a transaction takes place within the boundaries of a single organisation. 
Transaction cost economics assumes bounded rationality. This means that contracts designed 
ex ante tend to be incomplete and therefore cannot solely be relied upon to mitigate supplier 
opportunism.87, 88 Thus, in order to prevent a supplier from exploiting the gaps in a contract 
the buyer needs to use extra-contractual mechanisms to incentivise appropriate behaviour. 
This can be the threat of simple spot market contestation, which has very low transaction 
costs, or the use of more complex bilateral or unified management mechanisms (monitoring, 
negotiation and adjudication) that have higher transaction costs. Transaction cost economics 
is concerned with mitigating the hazards of opportunism in the most cost efficient way for 
each transaction. The basic argument, then, is about the appropriate alignment of governance 
alternatives with transactions. A simple, low cost governance mechanism (spot market) is 
suggested for transactions with a low potential for opportunism, while more complex and 
higher cost bilateral or unified governance mechanisms are suggested for more hazardous 
transactions.86 
 
Amongst the opportunistic behaviours discussed by the literature are adverse selection, 
strategic misrepresentation and moral hazard. All of these behaviours involve a supplier 
exploiting an information asymmetry advantage over a buyer to win and execute a contract 
on an unfair or misleading basis. The information economics literature draws attention to the 
notion of search, experience and credence goods.89, 90 Using this categorisation, we can think 
about the types of goods or services most likely to be characterised by such an information 
asymmetry between buyer and seller.  
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Search goods (e.g. office furniture) are the least likely to pose a problem of information 
asymmetry, because they are simple enough for the buyer to be able to have a detailed 
understanding of how they are made and delivered. Consequently, the quality of a supplier’s 
offering and the veracity of their pricing can be accurately assessed before the purchase 
occurs. In this case, it is possible ex ante to design a simple complete contract as proposed by 
agency theory or to use spot market governance as proposed by transaction cost economics. 
 
Experience goods (e.g. IT services) pose an increased problem of information asymmetry, 
because the value for money of a supplier’s offering can only be assessed after the good has 
been delivered for an extended period of time. Here, agency theory would suggest that one 
could still ex ante design a complete contract using standard terms and conditions to specify 
desired performance outcomes, but that this should probably be offered on a short-term trial 
basis in the first instance to incentivise supplier adherence. Transaction cost economics 
would suggest a bilateral governance mechanism, which might include financial performance 
bonds (bonuses), to complement an incomplete contract. 
 
The problem of information asymmetry is most acute, however, in the case of credence 
goods. Here the buyer cannot acquire the necessary information, even after consumption, to 
assess whether he has received good value for money. Professional services, including legal 
services and management consultancy, are all classic examples of credence goods which are 
particularly prone to adverse selection and moral hazard problems.91 Literature on the hazards 
associated with buying professional services (see, for example, Ellram et al92; Homburg and 
Stebel93; Mitchell et al94; Schiele and McCue95) argues that the buyer’s requirements will 
typically be complex and, to some extent, unique and therefore very difficult to specify in 
detail in a contract. The supplier will therefore be in a position to deliver, or under-deliver, 
the service in a way that increases their returns, but which the buyer will find it difficult to 
detect. In this case agency theory still suggests that the solution is to design a contract ex-
ante, but that this should be a hybrid partly specifying desired performance outcomes and 
partly creating incentives for non-opportunistic behaviour during contract delivery. This 
draws on arguments made by the behavioural variant of agency theory82, which moves closer 
to the tenets and recommendations of transaction cost economics by acknowledging that 
complete ex-ante contracting is sometimes impossible. 
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Hold-up is another opportunistic behaviour, discussed using a transaction cost economics lens 
in particular.86, 96 This refers to a situation where a supplier is able to cease (hold-up) delivery 
of a good or service until the buyer agrees to a deal more favourable to the supplier. The 
buyer is forced to agree to the supplier’s demands, because they are locked-in to the contract 
by significant and asymmetric sunk cost investments in assets like land, buildings, machinery 
or management systems/knowledge.97 Hold-up is often seen as a particularly acute hazard in 
long-term contracts, associated with large and complex capital investments. The complexity 
and long timescales associated with such contracts tend to result in contractual 
incompleteness, which creates the scope for renegotiation and therefore hold-up. Projects 
funded under the UK’s Private Finance Initiative (PFI) have many of these characteristics.98 
Transaction cost economics reasoning would suggest that hold-up in this kind of situation is 
best addressed through a form of bilateral governance, which creates incentives for 
renegotiation to be handled in an efficient and joint maximising manner.99 
 
The criticisms levelled at the economics of contracting literature fall into two main 
categories. First, the validity and robustness of its behavioural assumptions is challenged. 
Critics argue that the assumption of pervasive actor opportunism, founded on an 
individualistic and maximising view of human nature, is simplistic and ignores the 
complexity of individual motivation and behaviour in an organisational context.100, 101 Some 
emphasise that satisficing is perhaps more realistic as a way of conceptualising decision-
making, and that adhering to group norms to achieve social legitimacy is perhaps more 
important than maximising personal (economic) utility.102, 103 Agency theory’s assumption of 
the possibility of complete ex-ante contracting, based on actor rationality, is also seen as 
dubious given widespread evidence of contractual incompleteness. Second, this literature is 
criticised for what is seen as an overly narrow focus on the costs associated with discrete 
transactions. These theories are solely interested in understanding how to achieve efficient 
outcomes at the level of individual transactions, and ignore the fact that these transactions 
often occur in the context of, and are influenced by, on-going buyer-supplier relationships.104, 
105 It is to this issue of buyer-supplier relationships that we turn in the next section.        
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3.7 Networks and inter-organisational relationships 
A third broad category of literature, addressing networks and inter-organisational 
relationships106, focuses our attention particularly on the on-going management of supplier 
relationships (phase 3), but also touches on supply innovation and performance improvement 
(phase 4, step 8). Box 5 provides a summary of the implications of this literature for P&SCM 
practice.  
 
This literature, like that addressing organisational buying behaviour, has its roots in 
organisational and economic sociology, but here the focus is outward, on the on-going 
interactions between firms in the context of their wider environment. Given the breadth of 
this literature it is useful to discuss it in terms of a number of different sub-sets, which have 
overlapping theoretical roots but differ in some of their basic assumptions particularly about 
the scope for planned management action in a network context. 
 
Box 5: Implications of inter-organisational relationships literature for P&SCM practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first major sub-set is commonly referred to as the industrial network approach and is 
associated with the work of authors in the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) 
• It is important to see individual buyer-supplier relationships as part of and 
interacting with a wider network of relationships 
• Firms and other organisations rely on each other’s resources (i.e. access to raw 
materials, goods, services, finance, knowledge) for their survival and success 
• A proper understanding of buyer-supplier relationships requires attention both 
to economic (investment and adaptation) and behavioural (conflict and 
mutuality) aspects 
• Some argue that relationships and networks are essentially emergent and 
unmanageable, while others argue that specific networks can be intentionally 
designed, created and managed as partially closed systems to deliver enhanced 
value either through innovation or cost reduction or through a combination. 
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Group.107-109 These authors draw primarily on resource dependency theory110 and social 
exchange theory.111, 112 Key themes common to this strand of research are the dynamic nature 
of interactions between buyers and sellers over time, the gradual emergence of close, high 
trust relationships in some cases, and the importance of seeing individual buyer-supplier 
relationships as part of and interacting with a wider network of relationships. The unit of 
analysis here is both the buyer-supplier relationship and the network within which it is 
embedded. The focus of discussion is on both the structure and dynamics of relationships and 
networks. This literature has thus made a major contribution to the development of the 
concept of the supply network, and has shown how a proper understanding of buyer-supplier 
relationships requires attention both to economic (investment and adaptation) and behavioural 
(conflict and mutuality) aspects. 
 
The Actors-Resources-Activities framework108 has been a particularly influential model in 
this approach. This draws on resource dependency theory to show how firms and other 
organisations rely on each other’s resources (i.e. access to raw materials, goods, services, 
finance, knowledge) for their survival and success.110, 113 It is assumed, then, that buyers and 
suppliers are linked in a network through resource dependency and that these linkages or 
relationships are characterised by the exchange of existing resources and the co-creation of 
new resources.114 The model also draws on social exchange theory to examine how buyer-
supplier relationships operate and evolve over time, using concepts such as expectations, 
cooperation, trust, commitment, communication and conflict behaviour.115 Actors are 
assumed to be self-interested rather than opportunistic, and to recognise that serving their 
self-interest requires them to interact with others in a network context. One of the key 
insights offered is that a single buyer-supplier relationship can be characterised by both 
competitive and cooperative behaviour, either simultaneously on different levels within each 
organisation or at different times in the relationship. Another is that change in buyer-supplier 
relationships is best seen in emergent, unplanned terms rather than as a result of conscious 
planning. In this way, firms are seen as organic and adaptive rather than mechanistic and 
rational. 
 
Two other key assumptions of the industrial network approach should be emphasised. The 
first is that the specific context and history of a buyer-supplier relationship are crucial for 
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understanding how and why the actors in that relationship behave as they do. As Moller51 
(p330) puts it: ‘actor behaviour is highly embedded in a layered manner’, which suggests that it 
is difficult to draw general lessons from particular relationship and network cases. Second, 
actors are assumed to have bounded rationality and as a consequence they have only a limited 
understanding of their network environment. Moreover, the content of this limited 
understanding is assumed to be highly specific at an individual or group level, with different 
actors even within the same organisation enacting different interpretations or world-views of 
the same network.116 The industrial network approach therefore provides richly detailed, 
context and time specific representations of the complexity of relationship and network 
interactions. As a consequence, though, it is short on specific managerial implications, and 
‘can provide only relatively broad guidelines regarding how to manage in a network 
environment’. 51 (p330)  Specific guidance must be accompanied by an in-depth historical 
understanding of a particular network situation and must always remain context dependent. 
 
An associated sub-set of the literature, focusing in particular on the role of trust in inter-
organisational relationships, is relational contract theory. This is associated most prominently 
with the work of Macneil, who argues that exchange transactions necessarily occur in a 
‘social matrix’ and follow characteristic ‘relational patterns’.117 (pp344-45) He suggests, 
therefore, that a purely economic analysis of buyer-supplier relationships, based on rational 
calculations of advantage in single, discrete exchanges is likely to be of limited utility in 
explaining real-world behaviour. Moreover, a buyer-supplier relationship cannot be 
understood solely in terms of the contract that creates its legal basis, because there are also 
important ‘relational norms’ such as flexibility, solidarity and reciprocity that derive from the 
social context of an exchange.104       
 
There are other sub-sets of the networks and inter-organisational relationships literature, 
however, with more normative managerial implications. One is that dealing with notions of 
focal networks118 and strategic nets.119-121 Like the industrial network approach this draws on 
resource dependency theory and social exchange theory, but it presents a more proactive 
managerial vision by including insights on actor cognition and organisational learning.122, 123 
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The term focal network refers to the idea that, although business networks are borderless or 
open in a descriptive sense, resource constrained firms and their boundedly rational decision-
makers deal primarily with those network actors they are able to see and regard as relevant to 
their objectives. The key issues for this perspective are to understand the roles and network 
positions that an actor can try to achieve in their perceived focal network, and to understand 
the process by which an actor forms their picture or theory of the network. It is argued that an 
actor’s learning capacity is a key influence on this process of building a network theory124, 
which in turn influences their network perceptions, interpretations and actions.125  
 
The idea of a strategic net is used to complement this concept of a focal network by 
suggesting that specific networks can be intentionally designed, created and managed as 
partially closed systems to deliver enhanced value either through innovation or cost reduction 
or through a combination. Each one of the members of a specific network, in turn, has jointly 
agreed upon roles and responsibilities aimed at achieving the chosen value creating goals.120, 
126, 127 There is an underlying contingency principle, here, in that the particular value creating 
goals of a network are assumed to influence how it is structured and governed and the 
managerial capabilities that are required. The members of a strategic net are assumed to be 
self-interested, but to recognise that their individual self-interest is best served by working 
collectively. This is, in effect, a networked version of the dynamic capabilities perspective 
from the strategic management literature.128, 129 It is in sharp contrast to the notion of business 
networks as emergent and non-manageable entities that is put forward by the industrial 
network approach.114 
 
Another managerially relevant sub-set of this literature is that addressing the concept of 
power relationships in supply chains.130-133 This work again draws on resource dependency 
theory134, but brings in additional strands from industrial economics.135 The underlying 
behavioural assumptions here are the same as those adopted by the other network approaches 
discussed above: actors are self-interested and have bounded rationality. On the issue of how 
manageable business relationships and networks are, the power approach takes up a similar 
position to that espoused by the strategic nets perspective. It agrees that firms are, 
descriptively speaking, in an open system, but that they have a focal network that is visible 
and of particular relevance to their objectives. It differs, however, in its strong emphasis on 
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the role of buyer-supplier power in shaping how this relationship and network management is 
expressed. While the strategic nets perspective focuses solely on the notion of firms acting 
collectively, through jointly agreed-upon roles and responsibilities, the power approach 
argues that the management of a network might sometimes take this mutual, collective form, 
but on other occasions take the form of a dominant firm directing the behaviour of others in 
its sphere of influence. 
 
The power approach provides a conceptual framework identifying four basic power structures 
(buyer dominance, supplier dominance, interdependence and independence) and proposes 
that the nature of the power structures underpinning buyer-supplier relationships impact on 
the scope for collaborative interactions to improve supply network performance. This is 
because such interactions represent a substantial investment, which firms will only undertake 
if they have a strong incentive to do so. It is argued that this incentive to collaborate is strong 
either where one firm is dependent on another or where firms are interdependent. It is further 
argued that the incentive to collaborate is much weaker in circumstances of buyer-supplier 
independence.136 The power approach uses these arguments to propose the notion of power 
regimes within supply networks comprising one or more buyer-supplier relationships.137 
These are identifiable sub-sets of a network, each of which is characterised by a particular 
combination of power structures and each of which is therefore more or less likely to support 
collaborative interactions. To date, these ideas have been developed and empirically tested 
primarily in private sector supply chains131, although Sanderson131, 133 has focused 
extensively on the public-private interface in UK defence industry supply chains.  
 
3.8 Integrated supply chain management 
Finally, we turn to the literature that focuses on what might be called the operational delivery 
steps (phase 4) in the typical procurement process, but also engages with questions about the 
monitoring and management of supplier relationships (step 7). Box 6 provides a summary of 
the implications of this literature for P&SCM practice. The integrated supply chain 
management  literature encompasses work from logistics138, 139, materials management140 and 
operations management.141, 142 Its underlying theoretical bases are behavioural economics, in 
particular game theory, and systems theory. 
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Game theory, originally developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern143, argues that many 
economic decisions involving more than one actor (e.g. a buyer and a supplier) take the form 
of a sequential, strategic game involving anticipation by one player of the other player’s 
actions. Games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma have been used to show how cooperative 
behaviour becomes more likely if two actors interact with one another on a repeated basis. 
This is because repeated interactions enable them to get to know each other, to build trust and 
to overcome the lack of information available in a one-off interaction as to the other party’s 
likely behaviour. In a one-off interaction, where the other party’s intentions are unknown, the 
model suggests that both actors will behave competitively to try to maximise their individual 
utility.  Based on this theoretical provenance, the underlying assumptions of the integrated 
supply chain management approach are that actors are rational, but may face information 
problems; and that actors are self-interested utility maximisers, but will cooperate through 
repeated interactions where greater net gains can be had from doing so. The  integrated 
supply chain management literature has applied this reasoning to develop an understanding of 
how buyers and suppliers can be encouraged to cooperate on a long-term basis and innovate 
to create a larger pool of value rather than competing over a static pool of value.144 A crucial 
aspect of this approach is the idea that buyers and suppliers should be trusting and transparent 
with one another, sharing information through mechanisms like open book costing to signal 
their commitment and future intentions.145  
 
Box 6: Implications of integrated supply chain management literature for P&SCM 
practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• A supply network as a whole can and should be seen as an entirely closed and 
therefore manageable system 
• Integrated supply chain management  requires cooperative buyer-supplier 
behaviour on an extended basis across the network 
• Cooperation becomes more likely if buyer and supplier interact with one 
another on a repeated basis – repeated interactions enable them to get to know 
each other, to build trust and to overcome the lack of information available in 
a one-off interaction 
• Integrated supply chain management can be focused on supply chain 
efficiency (cost reduction) or effectiveness (innovation and flexibility) 
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Systems theory was initially developed within the natural sciences (biology and physics)146, 
but has subsequently become widespread in organisation and management theory as a means 
of explaining processes within and between firms. This theory brings with it an assumption 
that no system, in this case a supply network, should be thought of in terms of its component 
parts. Rather, it is argued that the processes and outputs of a system can only be understood 
by considering it in its totality. Reflecting on our earlier discussion of business networks as 
either open (unmanageable) or closed (manageable) systems, we can suggest that the  
integrated supply chain management approach goes even further than the focal network or the 
power perspective in arguing that a supply network as a whole can and should be seen as an 
entirely closed and therefore manageable system.  
 
Some of the earliest work to use systems thinking to suggest that supply networks should be 
seen and managed as an integrated whole comes from Jones and Riley147, Houlihan148 and 
Novack and Simco.149 These authors recognise that there is a continuous chain of functional 
areas in firms through which materials flow and that extends from raw material suppliers to 
final distributors interacting with end customers. The focus here is on material flow, with the 
associated flow of information between supply chain actors being largely ignored. Similar 
work has been produced in what might be called the traditional logistics perspective, with 
authors such as Scott and Westbrook150 discussing how to better manage fluctuations in 
material flows at the interfaces between supply chain actors. The main focus in this 
perspective is on improving supply chain efficiency by reducing inventory levels. 
Recognising the limitations of these early works, authors such as Lee and Billington151, 152 
and Christopher138 move the debate on by emphasising the importance of system-wide 
coordination of both materials and information flows. It is argued, as we noted above, that the 
sharing of information is an essential means of signalling commitment to drive on-going 
collaborative behaviour. These authors also introduce the idea that supply chains should be 
managed to improve both their cost efficiency and their service and quality effectiveness. 
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One particularly influential application of systems thinking is the work by Forrester153 on the 
dynamic behaviour of firms and their supply chains. Forrester identifies the so-called 
bullwhip effect, which suggests that the demand information passing from buyer to supplier 
along a supply chain can be distorted leading to over-production and excess inventory. This 
has led some authors to go beyond arguments about how to improve pre-existing supply 
chains and to consider how an entire supply system might be redesigned in order to improve 
its efficiency and effectiveness.154-158 Such authors have favoured the use of mathematical 
modelling techniques to simulate the dynamic behaviour of supply chain actors and their 
performance consequences using a range of possible supply chain designs. Popular variants 
of this thinking in recent years have been lean159, 160, agile161, 162 and build-to-order supply.163 
Perhaps the most significant criticism that is levelled at the integrated supply chain 
management literature comes from authors in the networks and inter-organisational 
relationships literature, which is unsurprising given their interest in broadly the same 
empirical domain. The former literature is seen by authors in the latter as being far too 
technicist and rationalist in its conception of the scope for management control in supply 
networks. The integrated supply chain management literature assumes that actors are rational 
and that they will respond in a predictable way to purely economic incentives. It is assumed 
that the actors in a supply chain will be able to recognise the additional value that can be 
generated by working together as a tightly coordinated whole, and will simply behave 
accordingly. Critics argue that this is not realistic, because it ignores the messy complexities 
and constraints of buyer-supplier relationships and networks, with their social as well as their 
economic dimensions. Failing to acknowledge these complexities and constraints gives one a 
very narrow understanding of what influences behaviour and outcomes in relationships and 
networks. 
 
3.9 Developing a realist interpretation framework of P&SCM theories 
As we have discussed, the P&SCM research domain draws on a very diverse range of 
disciplinary bases, theories and models. Consequently, it is difficult to identify a single, 
coherent and dominant body of thought relating to P&SCM such that it might start to take on 
a disciplinary status.50 This is not necessarily a negative situation, however. As Anderson164 
has argued, a subject’s scientific status is enhanced if the knowledge base is widely 
distributed and there are multiple ideas, concepts and perspectives on its constituent parts. 
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P&SCM encompasses a wide range of organisational processes, activities and actors, in many 
different contexts and types of organisations. It therefore makes sense to adopt a 
multidisciplinary perspective when seeking to explore and understand this complex and 
multifaceted aspect of organisational and business life. 
  
This chimes with the fundamental tenets of realist review, which proposes that the focus 
should be on explaining what works, for whom, in what circumstances and why, rather than 
making normative judgments about what should be. The logic of realist review, therefore, is 
to explore theory and evidence to see what light is shed on the relationship between context, 
intervention (practice), mechanism (theoretical explanation) and outcome in a particular 
programme or initiative. Given its emphasis on context, realist review is about reflecting on 
the explanatory scope of different theories to develop contingent principles and guidance 
rather than to make universal rules.33 With this in mind, we need to develop an interpretation 
framework, or a theory map, that surfaces the contextual assumptions, key explanatory 
mechanisms and intended outcomes embedded in each of the P&SCM theories discussed 
above. This is presented in Table 5. 
 
This framework illuminates two important points. First, it reinforces the idea that there is no 
single, universal theory of P&SCM, nor is there ever likely to be one given the diversity of 
contextual assumptions, mechanisms and intended outcomes which might be relevant to this 
broad and multifaceted research domain. As we discussed earlier, P&SCM has a number of 
interrelated or nested layers, each of which can be seen as a legitimate unit of analysis. As 
Table 2 shows, each broad literature focuses our attention on one of these layers or units of 
analysis, whether it is the intra-organisational (buying) group, the buyer-supplier transaction, 
inter-organisational relationships or the wider supply network. This suggests, as others have 
argued50, 61, that these different literatures should be seen as complementary. Second, the 
framework suggests that practitioners engaged in P&SCM activities face choices about which 
theory might work best as a basis for interpreting their situation and for guiding their actions 
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Table 5: A realist interpretation framework of P&SCM theories 
Literature and cognate 
theories/models 
 
 
Contextual assumptions 
 
Key explanatory mechanisms 
 
Intended outcomes 
Organisational Buying 
Behaviour 
 
• Organisational decision 
making theories, including 
role theory (who buys?), 
process models (what are 
the steps?), and motivation 
and buyer choice theories 
(what influences specific 
buying decisions?) 
 
• Units of analysis are the 
buying centre (multi-actor) 
and the process 
steps/stages 
• Actors have differing 
motivations and 
preferences 
• Actors have bounded 
rationality 
• Inevitable conflicts in 
decision-making are 
resolved either through 
persuasion or power and 
politics 
 
 
 
• Characteristics of the 
buying centre (size and 
complexity, experience 
and expertise of members) 
• Handling of conflict in 
buying centre 
• Nature of decision rules 
and information search 
• Purchase history (nature of 
buyer-supplier relations) 
 
• Minimisation (mitigation) 
of purchase risk in 
supplier selection decision 
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Economics of Contracting 
 
• Agency theory 
• Transaction cost 
economics  
 
 
• Unit of analysis is the 
buyer-supplier transaction 
• Buyers and suppliers have 
differing motivations and 
preferences – potential for 
opportunism 
• Buyers either have 
bounded rationality 
(Transaction cost) or face 
information asymmetry 
(Agency) 
• Buyers face different 
opportunism problems 
(adverse selection, moral 
hazard, hold-up) 
 
 
• Contractual (Agency) or 
governance (Transaction 
cost) safeguards as a 
vehicle for monitoring and 
control of supplier 
behaviour 
 
• Minimisation (mitigation) 
of supplier opportunism to 
achieve agency or 
transaction cost efficiency 
Networks and Inter-
organisational Relationships 
 
• Social exchange theory 
 
• Units of analysis are the 
buyer-supplier relationship 
and its position in a wider 
 
• Dynamic interactions 
between buyers and 
suppliers over time 
 
• Maximising value 
appropriation and, when 
possible, value creation 
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• Resource dependency 
theory 
• Relational contract theory 
• Dynamic capabilities 
theory 
 
network of relationships 
• Firms do not own all of 
the resources they need to 
succeed 
• Actors are self-interested 
and have bounded 
rationality  
 
• Appropriate relationship 
and network 
design/development to 
control dependency on 
others 
• Emergence in some cases 
of collaborative, high trust 
relations (Social 
exchange) 
• Establishing and 
maintaining a favourable 
power position (Resource 
dependency) 
 
through innovation 
 
Integrated SCM 
 
• Systems theory 
• Behavioural 
economics/game theory 
 
 
• Unit of analysis is the 
supply chain (extended 
enterprise) 
• Competition is between 
supply chains not 
individual firms 
 
• Collaboration between 
buyers and suppliers 
across an extended chain 
to build trust and facilitate 
coordinated effort 
 
• Maximising supply chain 
efficiency (leanness) or 
responsiveness (agility) as 
a basis for the firm to 
achieve competitiveness 
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• Actors are rational, but 
may face information 
problems. They are self-
interested, but will 
cooperate where greater 
net gains can be had from 
doing so (repeated 
interactions)  
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3.10 Conclusions 
Having delineated the wide range of literatures, theories and models of relevance to P&SCM 
practice, we can begin to draw some conclusions using the context- mechanism-outcome 
(CMO) logic of realist review. 
 
One important conclusion suggested by the realist interpretation framework in Table 5 is that 
it may be more appropriate to focus on some mechanisms than on others depending on what 
an organisation’s interest is in terms of intended outcome. If, for example, the intended 
outcome is to mitigate the technical or competence risks associated with a particular 
procurement decision (for example the reliability of a supplier’s offering or its compatibility 
with the buyer’s systems), then the mechanisms of interest should be the characteristics of the 
buying centre, the handling of intra-organisational conflict, and the nature of decision rules, 
information search and purchase history, predicated on the organisational buying behaviour 
literature. Alternatively, if the intended outcome is more about mitigating the behavioural 
risks of a procurement decision (various manifestations of supplier opportunism), then the 
mechanisms of interest should be the contractual or governance safeguards supporting the 
transaction, predicated on agency theory and transaction cost economics respectively. 
 
Procurement decisions are often about much more than risk mitigation, however. Where there 
is an interest in the benefits that can flow from P&SCM practice (value appropriation, value 
creating innovation, or improved efficiency and responsiveness), then the mechanisms 
associated with the inter-organisational relationships literature or the integrated supply chain 
management literature are the appropriate focus. The former literature focuses attention on 
the mechanism of the buyer-supplier relationship and its position in a wider network of 
relationships and suggests that value appropriation, and potentially value creation, is a 
function of understanding and cultivating these interactions. The integrated supply chain 
management literature has a similar interest in buyer-supplier relationships, but sees these in 
mechanism terms as an integrated extended supply chain operating on the basis of close 
coordination and collaborative effort to deliver a more efficient or responsive outcome. 
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These insights are at a generic level, however. Thus, a second important conclusion that we 
can draw from our discussion is that the precise characteristics of the mechanism-outcome 
configurations outlined above are likely to vary depending on the context. For example, the 
organisational buying behaviour literature informs us that the various characteristics of a 
procurement decision (e.g. size and complexity of buying centre, formality of decision rules, 
extent and intensity of information search) vary depending on the level of risk associated with 
that decision, which in turn depends on the characteristics of the purchase.59 Similarly, the 
integrated supply chain management literature tells us that choosing the appropriate 
techniques to integrate and coordinate a supply network, and the outcomes that those 
techniques are likely to have, depend on the nature of the product or service delivered by the 
network.165 The inter-organisational power literature also suggests that management choices, 
in this case concerning the extent to which a buyer and a supplier collaborate with one 
another, are shaped by the power context.166  
 
These observations draw our attention to the work of writers like Kraljic167 and Fisher168 who 
offer so-called portfolio models of P&SCM practices. Kraljic’s landmark paper suggests that 
buying organisations should categorise their purchases along two dimensions: the level of 
supply market complexity and the importance of the purchase. Using these dimensions 
Kraljic identifies four types of purchase (strategic, leverage, bottleneck and non-critical), and 
he suggests how each should be managed in terms of the characteristics of the procurement 
process (i.e. specification, supplier selection criteria, negotiation style, contract design, 
relationship style). Fisher168 offers a similar contingency argument, but categorises whole 
supply chains in terms of the nature of the end product or service, identifying them as either 
functional or innovative. He suggests that supply chains delivering functional products have a 
predictable demand pattern and should therefore be integrated and coordinated using lean 
supply techniques. Conversely, he suggests that supply chains delivering innovative products 
have an unpredictable demand pattern and should be managed using agile or responsive 
supply techniques. In summary, this discussion suggests that the general mechanisms in each 
P&SCM theory proposed as explaining different outcomes might best be understood as an 
expression of specific practices or interventions used in particular contexts. 
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We take forward these issues raised by questions of context, mechanism and outcome in the 
next two chapters. In Chapter 4 we discuss the particular context of NHS commissioning and 
procurement by considering what the P&SCM theories discussed in this chapter might reveal 
about the underlying mechanisms and the intended outcomes embedded in NHS 
commissioning and procurement policy. In Chapter 5 we review evidence on the nature of 
NHS commissioning and procurement practice and consider how far the theories discussed 
here are relevant and useful to understanding that practice. 
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Chapter 4 
Procurement and SCM Theories in NHS Policy 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter and the next together address research question 2, which asks: how can theories 
about P&SCM in general help NHS managers and clinicians in their commissioning and 
procurement activities, in particular in light of recent and planned changes to commissioning 
structures, incentives and processes in the NHS? We are interested then in the relevance and 
utility of the theories discussed in Chapter 2 for helping us to make sense of English NHS 
commissioning and procurement, and for understanding what effective policy and practice 
might look like. This chapter deals with policy and the next with practice. 
 
We begin in the next section by examining a number of the key themes – mechanisms and 
intended outcomes in realist review parlance – underpinning the changing NHS policy 
landscape and discuss how these might be understood in terms of the P&SCM theories that 
we have identified. Then in Chapter 5, we review evidence on the nature of NHS 
commissioning and procurement practice, and consider the relevance and utility of the 
P&SCM theories for understanding the context-mechanism-outcome (CMO) configurations 
of these practices. Our discussion of the evidence is presented using the four broad 
procurement process phases identified in Chapter 3 (demand management, selection and 
contracting, relationship management, and operational delivery) to enable us to focus on the 
CMO configurations in these discrete aspects. 
 
4.2 Key themes in NHS commissioning and procurement policy 
By tracing the changing policy landscape in NHS commissioning and procurement since 
1991, and its manifestation in a shifting organisational settlement, we can discern an over-
arching market-orientated and modernising discourse of innovation, choice and competition 
intended to deliver greater efficiency and responsiveness to patient needs. A number of key 
features of this discourse are illustrated in Table 6, showing how changes over the past 
twenty years have moved the NHS away from the model established at its inception in 1948.  
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Table 6: Summary of key changes in the NHS (adapted from Harland et al15) 
 1948 model New model 
National standards None National Institute of Health and 
Care Excellence  sets national 
policies on access to different health 
technologies 
 
Treatment standards embedded in 
national service frameworks  and 
monitored/ regulated by Care 
Quality Commission  
  
Service providers Local monopoly – NHS only Any qualified provider – NHS, 
private or third sector 
 
Monitor (regulator) to ensure ‘fair 
competition’ through adherence to 
competition law 
 
Working practices Rigid professional 
demarcations 
 
Modernised flexible professionals 
Patient-clinician 
relation 
Clinician as decider, patient as 
passive recipient of 
predetermined treatment plan 
 
Clinician as advisor, facilitating 
patient voice (freedom to choose 
where and when to receive 
treatment) 
 
Resource allocation Managerially-led, centralised 
and hierarchical 
 
Clinically-led and decentralised – 
devolved to primary care 
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Some tensions have arisen within this over-arching discourse as a result of contradictory 
practices and structural continuities persisting from the pre-1991, unitary system. Competing 
forms of governance, hierarchy, market and collaborative network, continue to co-exist.10 
Policy rhetoric about introducing market-style competition into the NHS has often been 
undermined by hierarchical management interventions, such as under-writing the deficits of 
individual NHS trusts at the end of the financial year to avoid service disruption and 
damaging political fall-out.169 Commissioners have preferred to spend their budget on 
familiar local providers, what Exworthy and Peckham170 call ‘localism’, which suggests a 
reliance on well-established network-style relationships. Nonetheless, successive reforms to 
the structures and processes of NHS commissioning and procurement do broadly reflect these 
notions of innovation, choice and competition. In what follows, we examine three main 
policy themes – mechanisms and intended outcomes in realist review parlance – which draw 
upon this over-arching discourse. In particular, we discuss how these themes (summarised in 
Box 7) might be understood in terms of the P&SCM theories that we identified in Chapter 3. 
Box 7: Key themes in NHS commissioning and procurement policy 
 
• Clinically-led commissioning and evidence-based procurement 
 
• Coordination or consolidation of spending through collaborative commissioning and 
procurement structures 
 
• Market-based reforms to separate purchaser and provider, introduce patient choice 
and stimulate competition on the provider side 
 
 
4.2.1 Clinically-led commissioning and evidence-based procurement 
As we have noted, there have been various policy initiatives since the purchaser-provider 
split in 1991 designed to introduce clinically-led commissioning by devolving budgets to GP 
practices. These are GP fund-holding , the Total Purchasing Pilots , practice-based 
commissioning , and most recently the creation of clinical commissioning groups. Although 
various distinctions can be drawn between these initiatives (i.e. indicative or real budgets, 
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voluntary or mandatory participation by GPs), all are based on the same underlying 
theoretical assumptions and therefore posit the same relationship between mechanisms and 
intended outcomes. First, all of these initiatives assume that GPs are in a better position than 
non-clinical managers to make appropriate and effective commissioning decisions, because 
they have the clinical expertise necessary to properly understand the treatment options 
available from providers. Second, these initiatives assume that GPs know the specific local 
needs of their patients better than a remote administrative body like a district health authority 
or a primary care trust and can therefore make more responsive and tailored commissioning 
decisions. Third, GPs will make better and more efficient commissioning decisions if they are 
accountable for the money that is spent and are able to re-invest in their practice a share of 
any budgetary surplus. Finally, as GPs are the actors providing continuity of care for patients 
in their area, they have a strong incentive to refer their patients to the best-performing 
providers of secondary care, those with the shortest waiting times and the best quality of care. 
It is assumed that this will in turn put pressure on other providers to improve.11, 171,172 
 
By identifying these underlying mechanism-outcome configurations we can see the relevance 
of two of the P&SCM literatures to this policy theme. The organisational buying behaviour  
literature draws our attention to the central issue of risk management in buying decisions.59 
One of the arguments made is that the participants involved in higher risk buying decisions 
will typically be highly qualified and experienced, and will be motivated to commit greater 
attention throughout each stage of the buying process.75 Clinically-led commissioning draws 
on this argument by suggesting that greater involvement by GPs, with their clinical expertise 
and experience, will lead to more appropriate and effective decisions that better mitigate 
clinical risk. Moreover, it is assumed that GPs will be motivated to give greater attention to 
specific, local needs in the commissioning process, because they have a closer, on-going 
relationship with their patients.  The economics of contracting literature, in particular agency 
theory80, is also relevant here even though the GP-patient relationship is not based on a 
formal contract. As Greener and Mannion36 (p. 60) note, clinically-led commissioning is 
intended to better align the interests of patients (principals) and GPs (agents) by creating 
‘incentives for GPs to refer patients to the best-performing providers, increasing their 
responsiveness, and encouraging GPs to save money by prescribing or referring only when 
necessary.’ 
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Alongside these clinically-led commissioning initiatives, there has been an intention to ensure 
that procurement decisions are better informed and more consistent across the NHS. 
Historically in the NHS there was no systematic comparative evaluation of the efficacy of 
health technologies (drugs, clinical techniques and medical devices). Consequently, the 
procurement of different technologies was largely determined by the subjective judgements 
of clinicians and the marketing efforts of suppliers. Different decisions in different areas led 
to so-called postcode prescribing. A policy intention to address such inequalities through 
evidence-based procurement led to the setting up of the National Institute of Health and Care 
Excellence in 1999. This body undertakes evaluations of health technologies and sets national 
policies for their use in the NHS. Given its limited resources, however, the National Institute  
focuses its attention on those technologies which are particularly complex and where the 
potential benefits are uncertain or on those which may have a major clinical impact.15 In other 
words, it evaluates the highest risk treatments. 
 
Again the organisational buying behaviour literature can help us make sense of the role 
played by the National Institute of Health and Care Excellence as a mechanism for systematic 
information search and as a source of buying decision rules. The literature suggests that 
searching for information about supplier options will become more active and extensive as 
procurement risk, linked to uncertainty and complexity, increases. The literature also suggests 
that there will be a preference for more formal decision rules as procurement risk increases. 
Such decision rules act as a governance mechanism to bring clarity and coordination where 
there are a diverse range of conflicting preferences.59 The National Institute of Health and 
Care Excellence can thus be seen as a response to the need to mitigate and manage the high 
risks associated with particular health technology procurement decisions. 
 
4.2.2 Coordination or consolidation of spending 
Our discussion of the changing policy landscape has identified a number of initiatives 
involving the coordination or consolidation of spending, either at local, regional or national 
level, through joint commissioning and procurement structures. On the healthcare 
commissioning side these are the Total Purchasing Pilots  which operated from 1995 to 
1999172, the primary care groups  introduced in 1999 as a forerunner to primary care trusts 173, 
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the area teams of NHS England established in April 2013 to commission specialist services at 
a regional level, and the clinical commissioning groups  established at the same time to 
replace primary care trusts.31 Primary care trusts were also encouraged from the early stages 
of their development to commission jointly.174 In 2006 this joint commissioning was enforced 
and formalised by merging co-terminus primary care trusts, reducing their number from 303 
to 152. 
 
As discussed above, each of these initiatives (with the exception of regional commissioning 
by NHS England) has GP-led commissioning as a core principle, but each has also focused 
attention on the benefits that are available if commissioning is done jointly or collaboratively 
by bringing together a number of GP practices. The primary benefit identified, and therefore 
the main theoretical assumption behind collaborative commissioning, is that GP practices 
acting jointly will achieve greater purchasing power in their dealings with NHS hospital 
trusts and with other providers.175-177 This should enable them, in turn, to hold providers to 
account for their performance more effectively and to engage with providers on performance 
improvement. Collaborative commissioning by groups of GP practices has also been 
identified as a means of addressing the lack of coordination and higher agency or transaction 
costs associated with commissioning by individual fund-holding practices.20 These initiatives 
are thus seen as a way of increasing purchasing power and of economising on agency or 
transaction costs, the costs of negotiating, drafting and monitoring contracts. 
 
On the procurement side, the coordination or consolidation of spending by NHS trusts has 
been facilitated at the national level by NHS Supplies, later NHS Logistics and now NHS 
Supply Chain. The NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency also played a role here through its 
national contracting function. At the regional level, coordination has been through the virtual 
NHS Supply Management confederations, and later the formally-constituted collaborative 
procurement hubs. These organisational initiatives are, like those in collaborative 
commissioning, intended to increase the procurement leverage available to NHS trusts and 
help them economise on agency or transaction costs by buying goods and services on their 
behalf where they have common requirements. 
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A key aspect of these initiatives has been efforts to develop and implement e-procurement 
systems in the NHS.15 The  Purchasing and Supply Agency played a significant role here as 
part of the Supply Chain Excellence Programme launched in 2003. E-procurement systems 
are a crucial source of basic information about the demand requirements of NHS trusts 
(volume and usage patterns), which suppliers are being used and how they are performing on 
price, quality and delivery times. This information is essential to understanding the scope for 
coordination or consolidation of spending at regional or national level. In addition, e-
procurement is a key enabler for organisations like NHS Supply Chain to work in a more 
integrated way with suppliers in an effort to create leaner supply chains with faster lead times 
and lower inventory levels. Using IT to improve information sharing with suppliers has been 
integral to NHS Supply Chain’s efforts to meet a target of cost savings in excess of £1 billion 
over the life of its ten year contract. 
 
Identifying these underlying mechanism-outcome configurations draws our attention to 
contributions from three of the P&SCM literatures. First, and most prominently we can see 
the relevance of the networks and inter-organisational relationships literature, specifically 
that dealing with resource dependency theory134 and inter-organisational power.133, 178 This 
literature proposes that the power structure underpinning a buyer-supplier relationship shapes 
the supplier’s willingness to perform well and the buyer’s ability to hold the supplier to 
account for poor performance. It is argued that either a dominant or an interdependent 
position for the buyer will provide the necessary performance incentive. The literature also 
suggests that the power structure impacts on a supplier’s willingness to work collaboratively 
with the buyer to improve its performance. Again, it is argued that the supplier’s incentive to 
work with the buyer to improve its performance will be strongest where the buyer is 
dominant or buyer and supplier are interdependent. Seen in the context of this argument, 
policy initiatives to achieve joint commissioning or collaborative procurement can be 
understood as an attempt to give commissioners or NHS trusts greater power resources in 
their interactions with providers or suppliers, to achieve if not dominance then at least 
interdependence.        
 
A second relevant literature is an extension of agency theory discussing collaboration 
between principals. In this case the principals are either the commissioners or the NHS trusts 
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acting as buyers. This extended agency theory suggests that where there are multiple 
principals asking a single agent (provider or supplier) to act on their behalf, the principals 
should collaborate and offer a joint contract if they share a common set of information and 
can make a commitment to shared outcomes or common  requirements.179 By offering a joint 
contract in these circumstances, the principals would serve their self-interests by setting 
shared rather than competing incentives thereby economising on agency costs.174 Finally, 
aspects of the integrated supply chain management  literature are relevant to understanding 
the role of e-procurement in helping to coordinate NHS trust demand and match it with 
supply more efficiently. This literature focuses our attention on the sharing of information 
with suppliers as a means of signalling commitment to drive on-going performance 
improvement. 
 
4.2.3 Market-based reforms 
The introduction of various market-based reforms into the NHS has been a prominent and 
much discussed policy theme over the past two decades .180-184 This theme concerns changes 
in the nature of healthcare commissioning only, with the progressive development of market-
style structures and processes intended to engender enhanced patient choice and greater 
provider competition and thereby stimulate improved performance. The procurement of 
clinical and non-clinical goods and services has not been the target of these reforms. 
 
The initial manifestation of these reforms was the creation, in 1991, of the internal market 
based on the purchaser-provider split. Before this, the NHS had been managed on a 
hierarchical basis, without a clear distinction between who was planning and paying for 
healthcare and who was providing it. After 1991, there was an intention to create the essential 
components of a market, a plurality of commissioners (district health authorities and GP 
fund-holders) and a significant number of independent self-governing community and acute 
trusts on the provider side. These provider trusts were supposed to compete with one another 
to offer the services needed by the commissioning organisations.9 This initial Conservative 
Government attempt to introduce market forces into the NHS was tempered by the New 
Labour Government elected in 1997 with talk of more collaboration in the form of longer-
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term service delivery agreements. The fundamental structural characteristic of the internal 
market, separation between commissioners and providers, remained in place however.  
 
Then, after a period of quiescence, New Labour moved during their second and third terms to 
re-establish the momentum by introducing their own set of market-based reforms. These had 
four main strands. First, a policy of fixed price reimbursement, payment by results , was 
progressively introduced, beginning with elective secondary care in 2005 and then covering 
outpatient, non-elective and accident and emergency  services over the next three years. 
Payment by results replaced the traditional block or cost and volume contracts used in the 
NHS with a system under which providers were paid a fixed tariff for each episode of a 
particular type of care. It was intended to encourage providers to be more efficient by 
reducing their costs to below the tariff level and by increasing patient throughput, thereby 
reducing waiting times.185 Second, there was an effort to put providers under some 
competitive pressure to perform through the ‘Patient Choice’ policy.22 This gave patients the 
right, with the support of their GP, to choose their provider for elective secondary care.29 
Third, the choices available to commissioners were extended through a policy of ‘Any 
Willing Provider’, which allowed private sector providers to offer elective secondary care at 
payment by results tariff prices as long as they were able to meet NHS quality standards. The 
‘Right to Request Scheme’ launched in 2008 was intended to stimulate a similar extension of 
provider choice in community healthcare by enabling NHS staff to ‘spin out’ their services 
into social enterprises.186 Finally, from 2004 better performing NHS trusts were given 
foundation trust  status, which meant they had greater autonomy from and less accountability 
to the central NHS. This earned autonomy included the freedom to act in a more business-like 
way, for example raising capital to invest in new services as a means of generating additional 
revenue.26 The intention was to give foundation trusts the same autonomy enjoyed by non-
NHS providers.    
 
Since 2010 the Coalition Government has extended patient choice and the payment by results 
tariff system into mental and community health services, and it has reaffirmed a commitment 
to diversity and competition on the provider side through its ‘Any Qualified Provider’ policy. 
This extends the previous government’s market access policy by further opening up primary 
care and community health services to non-NHS providers. Significantly, the Coalition has 
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also removed the previous government’s preference for NHS providers where they were 
delivering satisfactory performance by establishing a market regulator, Monitor, tasked with 
ensuring fair and open competition between all potential providers. The Government has also 
made clear that it intends all NHS trusts to take on foundation trust status to give them the 
autonomy needed to compete effectively.187 
 
Having identified the key mechanism-outcome configurations underpinning this policy 
theme, we suggest that two of the P&SCM literatures can provide relevant insights. The first, 
and perhaps most obvious, is the economics of contracting literature encompassing agency 
theory and transaction cost economics. This literature is relevant, because as one reading of 
the reforms would have it: 
‘Contracts were the fulcrum of the internal market. The separation of purchasers 
and providers could work only if there was agreement over what health care 
should be provided and at what price’ 188 (pp. 255-56). 
At first glance agency theory, with its argument about complete contracts as the best 
way of aligning the divergent interests of purchaser (principal) and provider (agent), 
seems the most relevant lens.189 The notion of complete contracting was fairly explicit 
in early guidance from the Department of Health12, which proposed that purchasers 
should operationalise their requirements, including those relating to quality standards, 
through contractual specifications. Contracts were thus seen as an effective way of 
controlling provider behaviour and enhancing their accountability by making the 
performance required of them explicit.188  
 
This view on the role and nature of contracts in the NHS has been widely criticised as 
too simplistic, however, and transaction cost economics has been suggested as a more 
relevant and useful theoretical lens.171, 188, 190 It is argued that the commissioning and 
provision of many healthcare services is characterised by the features identified by 
Williamson86 as leading to incomplete contracting. Williamson argues that in 
conditions of bounded rationality, uncertainty and complexity the transaction costs of 
trying to negotiate, draft and enforce a detailed and comprehensive contract will be too 
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high and will lead either to hierarchical management of a transaction or a form of 
cooperative bilateral governance akin to Macneil’s104, 191 relational contracting. 
 
Not all transactions have these characteristics, of course, and a complete contract as 
specified by agency theory may sometimes be possible and desirable. For example, the 
introduction of the payment by results tariff system can be interpreted as an attempt to 
adopt the principles of complete contracting.192 Payment by results tariffs are set on the 
basis of a pre-determined national average cost, or on occasion ‘best practice’ cost, for 
particular procedures and are intended to incentivise providers to behave more 
efficiently at the level of individual episodes of care.27 Williamson’s argument suggests, 
however, that complete contracting cannot be a ubiquitous solution and that the three 
forms of transaction governance he identifies, market, bilateral and hierarchical, are 
likely to co-exist in the NHS. This is indeed what has been observed in a number of 
studies .10, 171, 192, 193 
 
These observations about the continuing co-existence of different forms of governance in the 
NHS suggest that the inter-organisational relationships literature might also enhance our 
understanding of this policy theme. A major criticism of the economics of contracting 
literature is that these theories are solely interested in efficient contracting or governance at 
the level of discrete transactions, and largely ignore the wider context of on-going buyer-
supplier relationships and their position in a network of other relationships.105 Work by a 
number of authors (cf. Allen188; Ferlie and McGivern194; Gray and Higgins184; Guven-
Uslu192) addresses this criticism by drawing on the networks and inter-organisational 
relationships literature, particularly that dealing with trust, commitment and collaboration114, 
115, 195, 196, to understand how market-based reforms in the NHS have been enacted in practice. 
It has been observed, for example, that even after the introduction of the internal market  
‘the purchaser-provider relationship within the NHS worked largely through 
inter-organisational cooperation, heavily reliant on goodwill trust and a 
willingness to commit to relationships with partner organisations over the 
medium  to long term’184 (p. 45). 
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The same authors also recognise that continuing market-based reforms in the NHS (any 
qualified provider, payment by results, awarding hospitals foundation trust status) are likely 
to suppress or undermine elements of this inter-organisational cooperation, but they do not 
conclude that it will simply be washed away. The networks and inter-organisational 
relationships literature will remain a relevant lens for helping us to interpret the impact of the 
reform process in NHS commissioning. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
Having examined the relevance of the various P&SCM theories to the changing NHS policy 
context, we turn in the next chapter to a review of evidence about NHS commissioning and 
procurement practices. We consider the relevance and utility of the P&SCM theories for 
understanding the context-mechanism-outcome (CMO) configurations of these practices. Our 
discussion of the evidence is presented using the four broad procurement process phases 
identified in Chapter 3 (demand management, selection and contracting, relationship 
management, and operational delivery) to enable us to focus on the CMO configurations in 
these discrete aspects. 
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Chapter 5 
Procurement and SCM Theories in NHS Practice 
 
5.1 Evidence on demand management in the NHS 
Demand management refers to decisions about what needs to be commissioned or procured, 
who might be the potential providers or suppliers, and what criteria are to be used to select 
the provider or supplier. We argued in Chapter 3 that demand management is typically 
discussed in terms of the arguments made in the organisational buying behaviour literature. 
The evidence on demand management in the NHS is also discussed in terms of these kinds of 
arguments, but there are few direct and explicit references to the organisational buying 
behaviour literature. Papers look at commissioning and procurement decisions in terms of: 
the role, expertise and experience of decision makers; the size and composition of decision-
making units; the nature of the decision-making process; and in terms of the criteria that 
influence specific decisions. There is evidence of the political nature of some commissioning 
and procurement decisions and the impact of power on the resolution of conflicts between the 
preferences of different actors .197, 198 There is also evidence of the use of sense-making 
behaviours, persuasion rather than power, to influence commissioning decisions.199 
 
Looking at evidence on the expertise of decision makers, the size and composition of 
decision-making units, and the criteria that influence their decisions a number of themes 
suggested by the organisational buying behaviour literature emerge. Lian and Laing200 
examine the role of health professionals in the purchasing of occupational health services by 
private sector firms. Their data show that given the complexity and intangibility of health 
services, purchasing managers are heavily reliant on the expertise of their health service 
providers to help them make effective purchasing decisions. Although these data are not 
drawn from the NHS, Lian and Laing conclude that the lessons learned in their research can 
and should be applied to the NHS in what amounts to clinically-informed, if not quite 
clinically-led commissioning.  
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Continuing this theme, there have been a number of studies into the efficacy of smaller scale 
GP-led commissioning as opposed to larger-scale managerially-led commissioning.13, 20, 171, 
172, 203, 204 These studies are equivocal in their conclusions. On one hand they conclude that 
locally-based initiatives like GP fund-holding and total purchasing pilots were more 
responsive in securing improvements in primary care to meet the needs of particular groups 
of patients. On the other they observe that, despite the clinical expertise of GPs, there is no 
firm evidence that they have been able to make better commissioning decisions on secondary 
or specialist care than non-clinical managers. As Wyke et al  172 (p. 256) put it, GP-led 
commissioning is likely to be more effective 
‘in circumstances where the main purchasing task is to alter the balance and 
location of care between hospital and extramural settings…Other forms of 
purchasing or management may be more appropriate when the principal challenge 
facing the system is to improve the mix or quality specifications of specialist 
services.’  
Dopson and Locock 171 suggest that this may be partly about an asymmetry between the 
generalist clinical knowledge of GPs and increasing specialisation at the secondary care level. 
It could also be argued that GPs might find it difficult to translate their clinical experience of 
working with individual or relatively small groups of patients to commissioning services on 
behalf of much bigger populations.    
 
Laing and Cotton 205 observe that GP fund-holders tended to respond to this knowledge 
asymmetry by using provider reputation and their past experiences of a working with a 
provider as bases of commissioning decisions rather than using formal measures of previous 
service outcomes. The setting up of the National Institute of Health and Care Excellence in 
1999 was an attempted response to the perceived inequities caused by such informal decision 
criteria. Work by Hughes and Doheny 206 on the procurement of a high-cost cancer treatment 
concludes, however, that such decisions are only partially influenced by the National 
Institute’s guidance and are still subject to significant local professional judgement. They 
argue that this is a function of the staged, conditional and complex nature of the National 
Institute’s guidance.        
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Using research in the context of practice-based commissioning, Checkland et al  207 (p.14) 
provide some valuable insights into the nature of a good commissioning manager. As an 
exemplar of success they identify what they call ‘the manager as animateur’, that is a primary 
care trust manager who works in a particularly ‘active, yet non-hierarchical’ way with 
disparate groups of GPs to align their objectives. Drawing out the implications of their 
findings for the clinical commissioning groups, they conclude that it may be unhelpful to 
engage in an either/or debate as to whether GPs or non-clinical managers should lead. Rather, 
the focus should be upon the role of managers as facilitators of the desired behaviours by 
GPs. 
 
Evidence of the political character of decision-making processes in NHS commissioning and 
procurement has been provided by a number of authors. Horrocks et al 208 and Martin209 look 
at the involvement of patient groups and members of the public in commissioning decisions. 
They conclude that the power of these actors to have a meaningful influence on decisions is 
highly contingent on factors like decision scope and the coherence of a group’s ‘voice’ on the 
matter under consideration. In many instances they find that such groups play a largely 
symbolic role, merely legitimating decisions made by the NHS professionals. Allen et al  210 
(p. 508) note that, despite the rise of managed professional business archetypes in the NHS, 
healthcare professionals continue to dominate procurement decisions ‘through the referrals 
they make, the tests they order, and the drugs they prescribe.’ Lonsdale and Watson 198 apply 
a political model of procurement decision-making to the buying of pathology equipment and 
consumables in an NHS acute hospital trust, and identify the key role of powerful actors, 
most notably senior clinicians, in pursuing their own preferences as a major driver of 
fragmented expenditure leading to extracting poor value for money from suppliers. Cox et al 
197, similarly, discuss the ways in which the clinician-dominated character of many NHS trust 
procurement decisions leads to fragmented patterns of expenditure and thereby damages 
value for money and the scope to improve supplier performance. 
 
Checkland et al 199 discuss sense-making by middle-level managers in primary care trusts and 
show how this is might impart some influence in a highly political decision-making process, 
but through the use of persuasion rather than power. They identify two important sense-
making behaviours: selective attendance at meetings, with priority being given to those where 
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the agenda is not tightly predefined; and the production of artefacts (meeting minutes or 
presentation slides) to shape the parameters and terms of the decision-making process. They 
conclude that these sense-making behaviours may now be more difficult to enact for 
managers working in the commissioning support units. Their contractual relationship with the 
clinical commissioning groups may limit free discussion in scheduled meetings and reduce 
the scope to develop shared understandings of any artefacts that are produced. 
 
5.2 Evidence on selection and contracting in the NHS 
Selection and contracting refers to the decision to award a contract to a provider or supplier, 
to the process of agreeing contractual terms and conditions, and to efforts to ensure that those 
terms and conditions are honoured either through monitoring and enforcement or, where 
necessary, dispute resolution. We argued in Chapter 3 that selection and contracting is 
typically discussed in terms of the arguments made in the economics of contracting literature, 
encompassing agency theory and transaction cost economics. This literature focuses our 
attention on the potential for provider or supplier opportunism and on the mechanisms that 
might be used to mitigate such behaviour. Agency theory proposes the use of complete 
contracts written ex-ante.  Transaction cost economics suggests a range of governance 
mechanisms from spot market, through cooperative bilateral governance to administrative 
hierarchy depending on the characteristics of a transaction. 
 
Research on selection and contracting in the NHS also explicitly acknowledges the relevance 
of these theories. Transaction cost economics is, though, typically regarded as a more 
appropriate and useful lens given the difficulties of writing complete contracts ex-ante for the 
delivery of healthcare services characterised by uncertainty, complexity and acute 
information asymmetry .171, 188, 190, 211 Healthcare services share these credence good 
characteristics 89 with professional services like management consultancy and legal 
services.92, 95  Some writers 181, 188, 212  also draw on what they see as complementary ideas 
from relational contract theory 104, 191, demonstrating that this phase of the procurement 
process overlaps and interacts with the post-contract relationship management phase. 
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We turn first to evidence on provider selection and contracting by NHS commissioners. 
Allen’s 188 study of contracting for district nursing services by a health authority and GP 
fund-holders shows that the conditions needed for writing complete contracts did not pertain. 
She observed information asymmetry greatly favouring providers and notes that it was not 
possible to fully specify the nature of the services or to monitor them fully, because district 
nursing is complex, consisting of a wide range of continuing activities. She also observed that 
where efforts had been made to negotiate and draw up contractual documents these ‘were far 
from complete and were poorly drafted’ 188 (p. 261). Her primary conclusion is that some 
aspects of these contracts mirrored the cooperative relational mechanisms that would be 
predicted in these circumstances by transaction cost economics or relational contract theory, 
but that the picture was complicated by the wider institutional context of the NHS. This 
imposed a number of hierarchical, administrative controls on the award and operation of 
these contracts, and meant that although they were clearly not complete, they could not be 
characterised as entirely relational either. 
 
Other studies reach similar conclusions about the limitations in an NHS commissioning 
context of complete or classical contracting based on agency theory. Bennett and Ferlie 181 
study contracting for complex, multi-agency HIV/AIDS services within the NHS. They 
observe that the model of classical contracting is only ‘patchily evident’ in the four health 
authorities covered by their research. They find more evidence, in line with transaction cost 
economics and relational contract theory, of purchasers encouraging cooperative relationships 
with providers ‘to preserve stability’ 181 (p. 49). They also find that the wider institutional or 
regulatory context of the NHS constrains the ability of purchasers to develop classical 
contracts with an unrestricted choice of providers. Hughes et al 212 study contracting for 
secondary care services in the NHS, comparing the situations in England and Wales in the 
period 2008-10. They find that despite policy differences, with commissioners in England 
being encouraged to use more classical and harder-edged service contracts while those in 
Wales were emphasising cooperation and flexibility in the contracting process, practices on 
the ground were still remarkably similar. In particular they find, in tune with relational 
contract theory, that ‘long-term relationships and trust between purchasers and providers had 
an important role in both systems when the financial viability of organisations was at risk’ 212 
(p. 1). This recourse to relational contracting is explained partly by the exigencies of local 
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geography, history and patient expectations and partly, once again, by administrative 
pressures in the wider NHS context.  
 
By way of contrast, Coleman et al 213 provide evidence that classical, complete contracting 
does sometimes occur in a more fully developed form in the NHS, but not without problems. 
Their research, done in 2009-10 with two case study primary care trusts, shows that 
contracting for Alternative Providers of Primary Care  was clearly of a transactional nature, 
defined as ‘sticking more rigidly to specified timescales and targets and having the ability to 
penalise poor performance and ultimately terminate contracts’ 213 (p. 8). They argue that there 
was strong incentive to use this transactional approach, because the primary care trusts were 
contracting with new and often untried providers with which they had no prior relationships. 
There was a concern therefore to specify as clearly and as completely as possible the 
performance expected of providers and the penalties available to commissioners in the event 
of poor performance. The paper also identifies obvious problems with complete contracting 
however, in particular very high transaction costs associated with contract negotiation and 
drafting and with the monitoring of performance against detailed targets.  
 
Allen et al 180 (p. 29) provide complementary evidence of the high transaction costs incurred by 
healthcare service commissioners and providers in tendering processes and suggest that these 
may ‘vitiate the efficiency gains of competition.’ Mannion, Marini and Street 214 suggest there 
may also be transaction cost problems with efforts to introduce complete contracting in the 
form of payment by results , flowing in particular from the monitoring of provider behaviour 
to mitigate the potential for opportunistic gaming of the system through activities like up-
coding. 
 
Turning to research evidence on supplier selection and contracting by NHS trusts, we also see 
an acknowledgement of the relevance and utility of agency theory and transaction cost 
economics as theoretical frames of reference. Lonsdale and Watson 98 provide evidence from 
the management of PFI contracts by six NHS trusts, covering both the construction of 
hospital buildings and the delivery of facilities management services. Accounts from the 
trusts’ procurement and contract management teams suggest the existence of two main types 
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of supplier opportunism, moral hazard (quality shading) and hold-up (pre-contractual drift 
and post-contractual variations). The scope for this opportunism is explained in terms of the 
complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty of the trusts’ requirements, which can in turn generate 
contractual incompleteness. Interestingly though, and in contrast with much of the evidence 
on the use of contracts in NHS service commissioning, the procurement teams in these cases 
had a preference for mitigating supplier opportunism through contracts written ex-ante and 
associated mechanisms for competitive pressure and monitoring rather than using cooperative 
bilateral governance. Most of those interviewed ‘believed that buyers could, not always, but 
on many occasions, manage opportunism through the contractual process’ 98 (p. 691). Thus 
while transaction cost economics is a relevant source here of explanations for the problems of 
supplier opportunism, hold-up in particular, agency theory is a more appropriate reference 
point for managers’ efforts to mitigate these problems. One possible explanation for this 
preference for classical contracting is that ‘none of the trusts had any history with their PFI 
suppliers; they had all established new relationships’ 98 (p. 695). As discussed above, however, 
classical contracting is not a panacea when dealing with complex, ambiguous and uncertain 
requirements and most of the trusts in Lonsdale and Watson’s study were still struggling to 
control the opportunism of their suppliers.  
 
Lonsdale et al 211 provide a very similar analysis of supplier opportunism in their study of 
NHS trusts’ procurement of agency nursing services in the period 1997-2007. They identify 
various types of opportunism related to information asymmetry (adverse selection and moral 
hazard) between trusts and nursing agencies. They observe that trusts working individually 
and in concert with the NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency tackled this opportunism in the 
first instance through a combination of contractual and monitoring mechanisms, in particular 
detailed framework agreements and quality audits. They also observe, however, that over 
time the trusts’ procurement management response went beyond the purely contractual 
mechanisms recommended by agency theory to draw on the kind of cooperative bilateral 
governance mechanisms suggested by transaction cost economics. Recognising continuing 
problems of contractual incompleteness, linked to difficulties in specifying service 
requirements precisely and matching nurses appropriately with those requirements, trusts 
sought to develop preferred supplier and master vendor agreements ‘to ensure reliability and 
commitment and assist with the development of closer relationships’ 211 (p.814). 
NIHR HS&DR Project 12/5004/03   
 
112 
 
 
5.3 Evidence on relationship management in the NHS 
As discussed in Chapter 3, analysis of the on-going management of buyer-supplier 
relationships is typically framed in terms of arguments made by the networks and inter-
organisational relationships literature. This literature has a number of different sub-sets, but 
these share overlapping theoretical roots grounded in social exchange theory, resource 
dependency theory and relational contract theory. Key explanatory mechanisms of common 
interest to these various sub-sets are: the dynamic nature of interactions between buyers and 
suppliers over time; the gradual emergence of close, high trust relationships in some cases; 
recognition of and a need to cope with dependency on others; and the embedded nature of 
individual relationships in a wider network. The common interest in terms of outcomes is in 
how value is distributed between the members of a network and how value might be created 
through innovation. 
 
The networks and inter-organisational relationships literature is of clear relevance and utility 
in an NHS context, because as Allen et al 210 (pp. 506-07) have argued the NHS can be understood 
as ‘a network of multiple, extended supply chains, with purchaser and provider relationships 
operating as critical coordinating mechanisms at every level.’ Moreover, the reform process 
supporting greater patient choice in NHS service provision through the introduction of wider 
supply-side competition has made this network view of the NHS even more salient.184 
Unsurprisingly, then, a good deal of the research evidence on relationship management in the 
NHS is discussed in terms of concepts drawn from this literature. For ease of discussion, we 
can usefully divide relevant papers into those placing more emphasis on mechanisms like 
trust and collaboration drawn from social exchange and relational contract theories, and those 
emphasising mechanisms like power drawn from resource dependency theory. It should be 
remembered, of course, that these mechanisms are not discrete and that much of the research 
evidence is interpreted through a combination of conceptual lenses. 
 
In the former category, Connel and Mannion215 and Goddard and Mannion216 look at the 
continuing importance of trust and cooperation in facilitating relationships between 
commissioners and providers in health and social care markets despite efforts to increase 
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competitive tension. Their findings are mirrored by those of Bennett and Ferlie181, Allen188 
and Hughes et al 212 discussed in the previous section. Frosini et al183 discuss how 
competition is characterised and experienced by NHS and non-NHS acute care providers. 
They find that the forces of structural (market) competition are muted, that there are many 
examples of collaboration between NHS and non-NHS providers, and that patients and GPs 
are loyal to local providers with whom they have historical relationships. This evidence for 
the embeddedness of relationships leads them to conclude that collaboration might be a better 
lever than competition for improvements in service quality. Chambers et al35 provide 
evidence of the effectiveness of a close, high trust relationship between GPs and a private 
sector co-commissioner and provider in a case of whole system redesign in primary care. 
Their research suggests that commissioning based on a public-private partnership type model 
is appropriate where innovation in a complex service is required, in this case aimed at service 
redesign for people with long-term conditions.  
 
Porter et al 217 provide complementary evidence in their study of how services are 
commissioned by three English primary care trusts for people with diabetes, stroke and 
dementia. They find that the quasi-market reforms implemented in the NHS have had little 
effect in these services and that commissioning is still largely relational, based on trust and 
collaboration with incumbent providers. They suggest that ‘the adaptive persistence of 
relational commissioning’ is unsurprising given the absence of ‘conditions for a well-
functioning quasi-market’, such as clear demand information, clear specification of service 
requirements, and an effective choice of providers 217 (p. 1). Sheaff et al 218 further reinforce 
this theme of relational resilience in their research into how the NHS quasi-market reforms 
have impacted on four English health networks. They find that the reforms have had only a 
relatively limited impact on these networks. The biggest changes were evidenced in the 
formalised, managerial artefacts (e.g. reports, bids, guidelines) produced by the networks. 
There were also changes in some of the networks’ espoused values, those which both guided 
and legitimated changes in artefact production, but their underlying behavioural assumptions, 
essentially about the legitimacy and value of collaborative working, were largely unaffected. 
 
Some research suggests, however, that the quasi-market reforms have had a more significant 
disruptive effect on trust and collaborative relationships between NHS commissioners and 
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providers. This disruption brings mechanisms like power more to the fore. Writing just after 
the implementation of the purchaser-provider split, Freemantle et al 219 report on the 
development of relationships between district health authorities and their local hospital trusts. 
They observe a range of relationship types from ‘a rather cosy and comfortable co-existence 
to political chaos and absence of communication’. 219 (p. 538) In both cases, they conclude that 
the providers were considerably more powerful than the district health authorities. North 220 
examines a district health authority’s efforts to implement a purchasing strategy for stroke 
care services. She observes that the district health authority attempted to stick closely to the 
ideals of the internal market by dealing with the local hospital trusts on a formal arm’s length 
basis, even though there was no real competition for the providers in the area of acute stroke 
care. The health authority over-compensated for this lack of effective competition in acute 
care, by maintaining a threat of market-testing for non-acute services. The result, North 
concludes, was a break down in reciprocity and, because the health authority’s assumption of 
market power was false, intransigence by the trusts. Guven-Uslu 192 observes a similar lack of 
reciprocity and relationships in which two primary care trusts are dependent on a foundation 
trust hospital in her study of the use of management accounting information in 
commissioning under the payment by results system. 
 
The work of Gray and Higgins 184 provides evidence of the complex inter-play between 
collaborative, trust-based relationships and competitive, power-based relationships in the 
NHS commissioner-provider interface. Evidence about the implementation of the payment by 
results tariff system by a primary care trust and two hospital trust providers in the Midlands 
region shows on one hand that their relationships move to being more arm’s length and 
focused on the threat of contractual sanctions. On the other hand, there is also evidence of a 
continuing legacy of more collaborative ways of working drawing on notions of goodwill 
trust to resolve disputes. Gray and Higgins 184 suggest, however, that this legacy of 
collaboration is likely to come under a more sustained threat as hospitals are awarded 
foundation trust status and begin to seek out new income streams in services not covered by 
the payment by results system. Cast in the language of resource dependency theory, this 
implies a move by foundation trust hospitals to reduce their dependency on relationships 
facing increased competitive disruption from non-NHS providers.    
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Allen et al 26 also investigate the impact of being granted foundation trust status on the 
relationships of NHS hospitals with commissioners and other providers in the local health 
economy. They find some evidence of efforts by foundation trust hospitals to reduce their 
interdependency with other NHS organisations and to achieve greater control over their own 
destiny. On the foundation trusts’ relationships with commissioners they find that ‘their 
clearer financial objectives, coupled with autonomy in decision-making, had meant that FTs 
were not always acting co-operatively with their local PCTs about service developments’ 26 (p. 
98). On the foundation trusts’ relationships with other providers they find that ‘the hospitals in 
the study had developed a stronger sense of their own identity and of the need to protect their 
services and future income streams in the face of competition for funds’  26 (p. 98).  
 
In one of the few papers that goes beyond this focus purely on dyadic inter-organisational 
power, Addicott and Ferlie 221 examine the nature of power relations in wider network 
contexts. They look at how power was exercised and by who in five managed clinical 
networks for cancer services in London. Rather than being emergent or based on long-
standing relationships between healthcare professionals, the creation of managed clinical 
networks was mandated by the Department of Health. They brought together multiple 
teaching and local district hospitals with service commissioners and health authorities within 
relatively small geographical areas. The policy objectives of these networks were to 
streamline patient care and to foster collaborative knowledge sharing to drive service 
innovation. There is an echo here of the idea of a strategic net 120, which is an intentionally 
designed network intended to deliver enhanced value. 
 
The difficulty with the idea of managed clinical networks, and with strategic nets for that 
matter, is that they will only deliver innovation if there is a balance of power and a 
willingness to work towards common goals. As Addicott and Ferlie 221 show this was not the 
case in the networks examined by their research. Instead, they found a set of power relations 
that they characterise as ‘bounded pluralism’, wherein ‘a dominant coalition of medical 
professionals from the cancer centres battled to enact organisational change in their favour’ 
and ‘the interests of smaller district hospitals were seemingly ignored’ 221 (p. 402). Using the 
language of resource dependency theory, the power of these dominant medical professionals 
came from their possession of scarce and valuable (in the context of these networks) 
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specialist knowledge about cancer. Crucially, this research suggests that collaborative inter-
organisational relationships and networks cannot be centrally imposed on the NHS given the 
power of certain elite sub-groups of medical professionals. Collaboration can and does take 
place in NHS networks, but the nature of power relations is an important factor in when and 
where it occurs. 
 
5.4 Evidence on operational delivery in the NHS 
Finally, we turn to research evidence dealing with the operational delivery phase of the 
procurement process. This phase overlaps with the on-going relationship management phase 
discussed above, but focuses more on the physical delivery tasks, inventory or capacity 
management, performance measurement and management, and process redesign to achieve 
improvements in efficiency and effectiveness. As we suggested in Chapter 3, discussions 
about operational delivery are typically framed in terms of the integrated supply chain 
management literature. This encompasses work from logistics, materials management and 
operations management, and is underpinned by behavioural economics in the form of game 
theory and systems theory. The key explanatory mechanism in this literature is collaboration 
between actors across an extended supply chain or network to build trust, facilitate shared 
understanding of problems and achieve co-ordinated effort to improve performance. It is seen 
as possible and desirable for the supply chain to be managed as an integrated and co-
ordinated whole. 
 
The integrated supply chain management literature is of relevance and utility in an NHS 
context, because it has an explicit and heavy emphasis on technical problem identification 
and continuous performance improvement. Ideas like lean, agile and total quality 
management are relevant and useful in a context where resources are constrained, but high 
standards of quality (related to patient safety and dignity) and speed and responsiveness 
(related to patient satisfaction) have to be maintained. As a number of authors have 
observed210, 222, 223 this literature has been highly influential in the work of the NHS Institute 
for Innovation and Improvement and its predecessor the NHS Modernisation Agency. 
Unsurprisingly, then, the research evidence on operational delivery in the NHS is typically 
discussed in terms of concepts drawn from this literature. This research can be broadly 
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divided into papers which discuss the mapping and improvement of patient care pathways 
and associated processes (e.g. pathology, radiology, patient records), and papers looking at 
the management of inter-organisational supply chains delivering clinical and non-clinical 
goods and services to healthcare providers. 
 
Turning to the first category of papers, we find work that explores the scope to introduce lean 
or agile principles into healthcare organisations and that models patient flow through the 
phases of a treatment episode, seeing it as analogous to product flow in an industrial process. 
These papers therefore typically focus on what might be called the internal supply chain, 
which links the activities of various departments within a single NHS organisation. The 
extant literature suggests that lean and associated six sigma improvement techniques have 
been used and studied in the NHS more than agile techniques. 
 
Grove et al 224 present findings from a value stream mapping exercise in NHS primary care 
health visiting services. Value stream mapping is used to identify wasteful activity as a 
necessary precursor to the implementation of lean process improvement. Waste is defined as 
activities that are of no value to the customer or in this case the service user. Grove et al 224 
find that 65% of the 67 processes undertaken as part of the health visiting service are waste 
and could be removed in a redesigned process. They also find that the vast majority of these 
waste processes are administrative, which emphasises that waste is defined from the service 
user perspective. Proudlove et al223 report on the implementation of six sigma techniques in 
the NHS and draw out lessons for the potential implementation of lean thinking. They find 
that there are significant challenges in using six sigma techniques in the ‘messy, complex 
environment of the NHS’ 223 (p. 33). These are associated with ‘difficulties in identifying 
customers and processes’, ‘the use of clear and appropriate terminology’, and ‘tensions 
experienced between speed and rigour’ in the analysis undertaken. 223 (p. 33) Issues of 
resistance to change and the need for team coaching are also surfaced. They also find, though, 
that those involved in using the techniques did gain value from the structured mapping of 
processes and detailed guidance on the use of improvement tools. 
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Lodge and Bamford 225 provide evidence on the application of lean principles to patient 
referral and booking processes in an NHS trust radiology department. They find that the 
introduction of a single intranet-based system to replace three different and less functional 
information systems used by different parts of the department led to a reduction in waiting 
times of up to 30% in some cases. They too point to initial resistance to the use of lean 
techniques, and the need for persistent stakeholder management, consistent communication 
about the change process, and the provision of detailed practical training as key elements in 
overcoming that resistance. Brandao de Souza and Pidd 226 discuss three case studies of lean 
process improvement in NHS trusts, one covering the management of medical records, one 
addressing lengths of stay in elderly care, and one looking at waiting times for an audiology 
service. Like other authors they identify a wide range of behavioural and organisational 
barriers to implementing lean process improvement in the NHS. They also make some 
valuable observations about problems of perception and terminology linked to lean’s origins 
in Japanese manufacturing industry. Based on their case evidence, they conclude that lean 
can be implemented successfully in a healthcare context, but that the barriers ‘have 
considerably delayed its adoption compared to manufacturing’. 226 (p. 65) 
 
Despite the popularity of lean thinking in the NHS, some authors have provided evidence that 
agile management techniques may be more appropriate given the level of uncertainty 
characterising some patient care pathways. Bourlakis et al 227 provide what they claim to be 
an original and holistic mapping of actors and activities in hospital supply chains for elective 
care, based on interviews with senior operations managers in three NHS trusts. They map the 
supply chains in each of the main phases (pre-operative, admission and procedure, and post-
operative) and ask what impact the Patient Choice policy, which implies increased 
uncertainty, will have on the management of these chains. Their key finding is that the 
historical configurations of these supply chains (i.e. named consultant beds, division of wards 
by speciality, inflexible clinician employment contracts) are likely to be too inflexible to meet 
the growing demands of Patient Choice. This suggests a need for greater agility and 
responsiveness, and indeed they find that hospital managers are beginning to recognise the 
need to work more collaboratively with other hospitals, sharing skills and supplies ‘in order 
to enhance the flexibility of their supply chains’ 227 (p. 419).   
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We turn next to research looking at the management of inter-organisational supply chains 
delivering goods and services to NHS healthcare providers. Some authors 222, 227  note that 
relatively little work has been done to examine the impact of integrated supply chain 
management thinking and techniques on the procurement activities of NHS trusts and other 
relevant organisations like NHS Supply Chain and the collaborative hubs. Rather than a lack 
of interest from scholars, however, this suggests that integrated supply chain management 
thinking and practice have simply not been taken up in a big way by those in NHS 
procurement.228 Evidence supporting this observation came in a recent report, which 
suggested that these kinds of improvement tools and techniques are being underutilised in 
supply chains delivering physical goods to the NHS.1 It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that 
what little NHS research evidence does exist tends to be very narrowly focused, either on the 
implementation problems in particular supply chains or on the limited range of integrated 
supply chain management practices or technologies that have been tried, in particular e-
procurement. 
 
Browne et al 229 provide a mapping of the wound dressing supply chain in the English NHS. 
Their aim is to understand the nature and effectiveness of information transfer across the 
supply chain to see if it facilitates the manufacture of dressings to meet the needs of users. 
This picks up the lean idea of designing supply chains so that they deliver only what the 
customer or end user values. They find that although information transfer in the supply chain 
has been streamlined by the implementation of an e-procurement system, the communication 
of end user needs to wound dressing suppliers is not facilitated. The end to end flow of 
information required for a properly integrated and effective supply chain is prevented by the 
lack of mechanisms for generating user information and integrating it into the procurement 
process. One suggestion is for nurses, end users by proxy, to be better represented in the 
procurement process. Campling et al 230 provide corroborating evidence from a 
complementary study of the same supply chain. They find that ‘the lack of user focus is 
preventing the transfer of valid user information; those stakeholders who need feedback on 
the functioning of products such as manufacturers and suppliers are not gaining quality 
information’, which results in ‘haphazard supply’ and ‘unmet user needs’ 230 (p. 213). 
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Breen and Crawford 231 and Cullen and Taylor 232 provide evidence on the use of e-
procurement in NHS pharmaceutical supply chains. In both papers e-procurement is regarded 
as an important component in the more integrated, coordinated and efficient management of 
the supply chain. Both papers also reflect on the policy drivers for e-procurement adoption 
coming from the Department of Health and being channelled through the NHS Purchasing 
and Supply Agency. Breen and Crawford 231 report a survey on the extent of implementation 
of a very simple e-procurement technology, electronic data interchange, in hospital 
pharmacies in the north-west of England. They find that 58% of the pharmacies surveyed are 
using electronic data interchange to communicate with suppliers (place orders, receive 
invoices etc.) and that these pharmacies typically see significant net benefits in using this 
technology, both in terms of cost savings and operational improvements. They also explore 
the reasons why such a significant minority of the pharmacies in their survey are not using 
electronic data interchange, and find a mixture of barriers including lack of funding, lack of 
senior management support and problems in IT development. Cullen and Taylor’s232 work 
considers the factors, as perceived by users, that influence the successful implementation of 
e-procurement systems in NHS pharmaceutical supply chains. The survey in this case is 
much more extensive, however, with coverage of both the NHS (buyer side) and the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and wholesalers (supplier side). The study finds that 
information quality, system quality and trust are the most important factors influencing the 
use of e-procurement in this particular supply chain context. This suggests therefore that 
decisions about system design and whether e-procurement is implemented ‘on the back of 
existing trading relationships and using processes that are familiar to the user’ are likely to be 
crucial management choices 232 (p. 1180). 
 
Finally, Bakker et al 233 also focus on the factors influencing the adoption of e-procurement in 
the NHS. They present interview findings from five NHS trusts, nine suppliers, the NHS 
Purchasing and Supply Agency and NHS Logistics. Their study is empirically much broader 
than either of those discussed above, because they examine practice in supply chains 
delivering four different types of products (cardiac stents, orthopaedic footwear, intravenous 
fluid bags and blood sample bottles). Also unlike other studies, which typically look at 
internal and external drivers for e-procurement use in isolation, they consider the interaction 
between internal context (organisational, IT and buying need characteristics) and external 
context (supply chain, demand and industry characteristics). Perhaps unsurprisingly they find 
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that decisions about the adoption of e-procurement are likely to be subject to tensions 
between these internal and external factors. Such decisions are therefore best framed in terms 
of a trade-off between internal and external pressures, with the stronger pressures influencing 
the nature of the system adopted or a compromise solution being sought where the pressures 
are in balance. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
The discussion here and in the previous chapter has shown that all of the P&SCM literatures 
discussed in Chapter 3 are of some relevance and use in helping us to make sense of policy 
and practice in NHS commissioning and procurement. This suggests, in turn, that the context-
mechanism-outcome (CMO) configurations embedded in these theories can offer some 
guidance to NHS practitioners about how to proceed when seeking to achieve certain 
intended outcomes in particular circumstances. 
 
That said, our review of the NHS literature also reveals that some of these P&SCM theories 
are seen by researchers as more relevant than others in the particular contextual 
circumstances of the NHS. These theories have therefore been used much more heavily and 
explicitly as frames of reference. Transaction cost economics, agency theory and aspects of 
the networks and inter-organisational relationships literature dealing with trust and 
collaboration, in particular relational contract theory, are the most frequently used. Some 
aspects of the integrated supply chain management literature, in particular concepts like lean, 
also feature heavily, but typically in an intra-organisational context. By contrast, our review 
suggests that the organisational buying behaviour literature, the resource dependency models 
of power relationships in supply chains, and the inter-organisational integrated supply chain 
management literature have been applied less explicitly or in a heavily circumscribed way in 
the NHS context.  
 
This suggests that there are a number of knowledge gaps in the NHS research literature where 
the relevance and utility of some P&SCM theories has not yet been properly articulated and 
explored. We suggest three main gaps, summarised in Box 8: 
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Box 8: Key knowledge gaps in the NHS research literature 
 
• Knowledge about the decision-making roles, processes and criteria at work in the 
clinical commissioning groups and the commissioning support units, and about how 
these commissioning organisations should operate to be effective.  The organisational 
buying behaviour literature is likely to be of particular utility.  
• Knowledge about how inter-organisational buyer–supplier relationships develop over 
time in the context of a wider network of organisational interactions, and about how 
trust and collaborative efforts can be engendered to deliver supply improvement and 
innovation in the NHS. The work on power relationships in supply chains is likely to 
be of particular significance as it draws attention to the resources that clinical 
commissioning groups need to have at their disposal to balance the influence of 
potentially powerful supply-side actors and bring about desired innovations and 
improvements. 
• Knowledge about the scope to apply integrated supply chain management thinking 
and techniques (lean, agile, six sigma, build-to-order supply) to supply chains 
delivering physical goods to the NHS. The use of such ideas is currently heavily 
focused on improving patient care pathways. 
 
 
Having established these knowledge gaps we turn in the next chapter to a review of empirical 
evidence about how different P&SCM practices and techniques impact on outcomes at 
different stages of the procurement process and in different settings and organisational 
contexts. Our aim is to begin to address these gaps by drawing lessons for the NHS from this 
wider body of empirical evidence about what works in which settings, for whom, in what 
circumstances and why. 
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Chapter 6 
Evidence on the Impact of Procurement and SCM Practices and Techniques 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses research question 3, which asks: what is the empirical evidence about 
the impact of different procurement and SCM practices and techniques on outcomes at 
different stages of the procurement process in different settings and organisational contexts? 
We are interested then in ascertaining the extent of the evidence base that supports the 
various practices and techniques that have been advanced within the academic literature and, 
in many cases, have become a familiar part of the P&SCM landscape. 
 
The chapter is structured in line with the four phase model of the P&SCM process (see Figure 
6, Chapter 3) and is guided by the realist review approach of assessing the efficacy of 
particular practices in particular contexts, that is, the investigation of context-mechanism-
outcome (CMO) configurations. It is divided into six main parts. In the next five parts, 
evidence concerning practices and techniques in the four phases of the P&SCM process is 
presented. Conclusions are then drawn on the strength of the evidence base underpinning the 
practices and techniques advanced in the literature. 
 
As established earlier, there are various strands to the literature relevant to P&SCM that have 
developed within very different areas of business management and economics. The 
consequence of this is that the testing of the efficacy of practices and techniques in one stage 
of the procurement process, while in many cases systematic and co-ordinated, has largely 
been undertaken in isolation from the testing in the others. This fact is one of the key 
conclusions of the chapter. 
 
 
6.2 Evidence on practices and techniques associated with demand management 
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As discussed in Chapter 3, a critical part of the task of obtaining best value for money from 
suppliers actually takes place within the buying organisation, away from any contact with the 
supplier. This section will look at six aspects of demand management: the structure of 
procurement, collaborative buying, internal resource allocation, specification development, e-
procurement systems and internal behaviours. 
 
6.2.1 Organisational structure of the procurement function 
Right at the outset, a fundamental issue for buying organisations is the way in which the 
procurement function is structured. The options include centralised structures, localised 
structures and hybrid structures. It is important to be clear what the adoption of a particular 
procurement structure does and does not mean. A procurement structure dictates the reporting 
lines of procurement staff and their location within the organisation. It does not necessarily 
dictate the nature of the actual procurement. For example, decentralised procurement 
structures do not necessarily preclude organisation-level procurement.  
 
The potential benefits of a centralised structure have been reported as the maximisation of 
purchasing power, process standardisation, enhanced data collection/analysis, capacity for 
commodity/service specialists and the ability to attract high quality procurement staff. 
Suggested drawbacks are detachment from business need, excessive bureaucracy causing 
delays to internal customer requests and reduced early involvement in the procurement 
process. The benefits and drawbacks of decentralised procurement structures are largely the 
opposite of those of centralisation, with the key advantage being close and early contact with 
internal customers. Hybrid structures, such as the Centre-led Action Network  system 234, 
however, are a third option and have been advanced as a way of getting the ‘best of both 
worlds’. In a Centre-led Action Network system, there is a small central team that undertakes 
certain organisation-level procurements (for example, energy), sets standards, seeks to 
encourage ‘best practice’ and, crucially, promotes joint procurement initiatives between 
different business units’ procurement teams where there are obvious synergies.  
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Arguments have been made that no structure represents ‘best practice’ as any structure must 
be tailored to the nature of the organisation. For example, centralised procurement is unlikely 
to suit a geographically dispersed conglomerate. It also needs to be recognised that no 
management structure will ever be successful in achieving its objectives without effective 
leadership and management actions. Nevertheless, the choice of procurement structure is still 
an important one. Consequently, the lack of high quality academic research on this issue is 
striking. What evidence exists mainly concerns centralised structures and the findings are 
broadly in line with the advantages and disadvantages outlined above. Reduced prices and 
transaction costs resulting from centralisation are reported by Karjalainen 235 in the Finnish 
public sector, Kastanioti et al 236 in European healthcare systems, Sorenson and Kanavos 237, 
also in European healthcare systems, and Sorte 238 in the Brazilian public sector. However, 
Kastanioti et al 236 express concerns about the long-term effects of centralised procurement 
on the healthcare sectors under study, Sorenson and Kanavos 237 find evidence of an over-
focus on cost in centralised public procurement and McCue and Pitzer 239 find no clear 
evidence in their study of the US public sector of benefits from either centralisation or 
decentralisation but do find evidence for adopted structures simply being the outcome of 
broader organisational preferences. Thatcher and Sharp 240, meanwhile, report on the benefits 
to local economies of decentralised NHS procurement. 
 
6.2.2 Purchasing category management 
An argument against centralised procurement is that organisations can obtain many of the 
potential benefits of centralisation without adopting it. Even where organisations have 
adopted decentralised or Centre-led Action Network procurement structures, it is still 
possible, it is said, to have expenditure aggregation and common standards. This is through 
the adoption of purchasing category management.241 Here, rather than buying certain 
categories of expenditure separately, different business units come together and agree certain 
specifications and approved suppliers, and a governance arrangement for supplier 
management. Purchasing category management has been one of the most prominent 
developments in procurement over the past 20 years. However, it has not been an area of 
academic interest. The closest issue that has attracted academic attention is collaborative 
buying, to which our attention now turns. 
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6.2.3 Collaborative buying 
Related to both the structure of procurement and purchasing category management is the 
practice of collaborative buying, sometimes referred to as ‘consortia buying’, ‘group 
purchasing’ or ‘joint buying’. This is where different organisations join forces to buy 
collectively in the hope of benefiting from greater purchasing power, more comprehensive 
information and reduced transaction costs. While, on the face of it, collaborative buying 
appears an obvious and straightforward practice, there are in fact many complicating factors, 
including the development of common specifications, the timing of group purchases and the 
governance of collaborative buying entities.  
 
Despite these challenges, most of the empirical papers on collaborative buying are at least 
cautiously positive. In the US healthcare context, where collaborative buying is customary, 
Burns and Lee 242 report cost savings, Nollet and Beaulieu 243 report lower transaction costs, 
while Camillus and Rosenthal 244 report a by-product of better information, including 
investments in pooling regional health care data, the promotion of public reporting of quality 
and cost information and the coordination of pay-for-performance initiatives. In the different 
context of European manufacturing, Tella and Virolainen 245 also report cost savings and 
benefits from synergies. 
 
The empirical literature also provides advice on the development of collaborative buying 
arrangements. Walker et al 246, assessing efforts within the UK’s National Health Service and 
local authorities, found that organisational and party politics, a lack of common coding, and 
supplier resistance were issues that needed to be overcome. Nollet and Beaulieu 247, also 
looking at health purchasing, this time in the US and Europe, emphasised the need for the 
group structure to evolve and for attention to be given to supplier management, while 
Schotanus et al 248, studying purchasing groups in the Netherlands, highlighted the need for 
voluntary participation, effective communication within the groups and perceived fairness 
over savings distribution.  
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In general, the message of the empirical literature here would appear to be that while there is 
no veto on collaborative buying arrangements caused by context, such arrangements, while 
containing the potential to provide varied benefits, are not a panacea and have to be 
effectively managed in terms of structure, the accommodation of member needs and benefits 
allocation. In this sense, there are parallels to the literature on marketing cooperatives.  
 
6.2.4 Assignment of internal resource and indicative procurement and supply strategies 
A further preliminary internal step is the segmentation of purchases, something that needs to 
be undertaken whatever the decisions made regarding the issues discussed above. A key 
development here was Kraljic 167, the first article on procurement to appear in the influential 
Harvard Business Review. Up to the early 1980s, the classification of purchases had usually 
been based upon expenditure levels. In a wide-ranging article, Kraljic 167 offered a 
segmentation matrix that recognised that purchases differed in more respects than just 
expenditure. Purchases, he argued, should be classified by internally-focused factors, such as 
the importance of the purchase to the organisation’s objectives, and externally-focused 
factors, such as the competitiveness of the supply market. Combining these factors led to four 
purchase profiles and it was argued that different high-level procurement and supply 
management strategies and skill levels were required for each profile. Non-critical items were 
said to require an approach focused upon minimising transaction costs and could be delivered 
by junior staff – or even outsourced. Leverage items would require the use of buying power 
and warranted middle-ranking skills. The requirements of Bottleneck items relate to the need 
avoid supply interruptions and demanded specialist attention. Finally, Strategic items 
required a long-term approach and senior management attention. 
 
This matrix has been very widely used by procurement departments within both the public 
and private sectors over the past 30 years. Indeed, it has been described as ‘the most 
important single diagnostic and prescriptive tool available to purchasing and supply 
management’ .249 Despite this, there has been a relative lack of empirical research assessing 
its efficacy. Much of what exists is largely positive though, not least as the matrix is an 
effective facilitator of cross-functional discussion about expenditure profiles, procurement 
and supply management strategies and staff allocation .250-252 Having said this, researchers 
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have stressed the need to tailor the segmentation matrix to the specific needs of the 
organisation, through being very precise about the specific criteria on each axis, and by then 
carefully designing the measurement system along those axes .253-256 Gelderman 253  also 
reminds managers that the segmentation matrix was only the first part of Kraljic’s 
methodology – there is a further matrix for Strategic items that considers buyer-supplier 
power, a concept discussed later in the chapter. 
 
6.2.5 Developing appropriate specifications  
In recent years, there has been a growing appreciation that buying organisations can stifle the 
performance of suppliers through restrictive, input-based specifications. A key aspect of 
context here is the type of buying situation. Clearly, where requirements are very basic, this 
issue does not apply. However, in more complex areas of expenditure, buying organisations 
are increasingly being encouraged to develop ‘output based specifications’, ‘performance 
based specifications’ or even ‘outcome based specifications’. Accordingly, Javed et al 257 in 
Australian facilities management, Karlsson et al 258 in European manufacturing, Kashiwagi et 
al 259 in UK power generation, and Patil and Molenaar 260 in US construction, all explored the 
link between this more ‘progressive’ type of specification and value for money outcomes, 
particularly in terms of improved supplier innovation. In all studies, there were shown to be 
benefits to this approach, although the Kashiwagi et al 259 and Patil and Molenaar 260 studies 
showed that there were risks as well as opportunities and a need for new organisational 
capabilities. 
 
6.2.6 E-procurement 
A key development, of course, over the past 20 years is the use of e-procurement technology 
within buying organisations. The scope of e-procurement simply maps on to the procurement 
process itself – each stage of the process can now being undertaken online. E-procurement 
set-ups include spend data software; market analysis software; e-tendering; e-auctions (and 
the more recent ‘advanced sourcing’ technology); online contracts; and purchase to pay 
systems. 
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There have been many studies looking at the factors that affect the success of e-procurement 
implementation. First, engagement with internal end-users has been seen as key, as end-user 
resistance to using the technology has been identified as a key implementation 
impediment.261-265 Second, linked to this, was the need for top management support .262, 266, 267 
Third, and again linked, the quality and suitability of the e-procurement system, its usability 
and the quality of information provided to end-users was also seen as key.261, 268-272 Fourth, it 
is reported that there is a need to engage with suppliers over their involvement with the e-
procurement system 261, 262, 268, 273, 274 and to be aware of the capacity of e-procurement to 
exclude certain types of companies that are not capable of developing the necessary 
technology to participate, for example SMEs.275 Finally, in research findings concerning 
reverse e-auctions, Mithas and Jones 276 outlined a series of parameters for successful buyer 
outcomes, including competition levels, reserve prices and information sharing.  
 
In terms of outcomes, Soares-Aguiar and Oalma-dos-Reis 274 noted that a key motivation for 
e-procurement implementation was the fear of falling behind competitors that had already 
become an adopter and had started to enjoy the benefits. The main benefit revealed by the 
literature, not surprisingly, is cost reduction, from lower purchase prices and/or lower 
transaction costs, for example via increased standardisation of specifications, supply base 
reduction and greater contract compliance .271, 277-281 These studies revealed that cost 
reductions took place within a range of different contexts. A further benefit has been shown 
to be improved buyer-supplier relationships 282, 283, although research by Tassabehji 284 
suggested that relationship improvements might be elusive in some cases as, while buying 
organisations were enjoying short-term cost reductions from reverse e-auctions, suppliers 
were obtaining little or no benefits. Finally, Cox et al 166 and Croom and Brandon-Jones 285, 
both of whose studies were in the UK public sector, highlighted the potential of e-
procurement systems to exclude certain types of problematic buyer behaviour, for example 
maverick buying. 
 
 
 
6.2.7 Technical and organisational enablers of successful demand management 
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A final issue concerns the enablers of successful demand management. Demand management 
activities, for example, developing specifications or entering into collaborative buying 
arrangements, involve cross-functional or even inter-organisational decision-making. There is 
disagreement as to the implications of this. Certain contributors to the literature believe the 
challenges of cross-functional/inter-organisational decision-making require technical 
management solutions. Empirical studies to this effect include Hult 286, Kocabasoglu and 
Suresh 287, Rhyne 288 and Trent and Monczka 289, all studying US companies, and McIvor and 
McHugh’s 290 study of a multinational telecommunications company. All of these studies 
stress the importance of effective senior management leadership and cross-functional team 
working that brings together interested parties and allows them to work through the various 
organisational buying issues. 
 
Other contributors, however, while accepting the need for such technical solutions, have 
stressed that political skills and strategies are also required. The key difference with these 
latter contributions is that there is recognition of fundamental conflicts of interest, arising 
from, for example, attachments to certain specifications and suppliers. Cox et al 197 and 
Lonsdale and Watson 198 provide evidence on the difficulties of resolving conflicts of interest 
over such matters in the UK’s National Health Service and the implications it can have for 
value for money. Karjalainen et al 291 note similar issues in the Finnish public sector in 
relation to off-contract or maverick buying. In response to such conflicts within the buying 
process, Lonsdale and Watson 198 suggest that procurement managers seek to build alliances 
with cooperative end-users within the buying organisation in order to prevail in decision-
making. Cox et al 197 and Croom and Brandon-Jones 285 highlight the potential of e-
procurement systems to exclude certain types of problematic behaviour. However, it is also 
conceded by Lonsdale and Watson 198 that a more ‘political’ view of organisations implies an 
acceptance that not all internal conflicts are easily solved. 
 
6.2.8 Summary 
As can be seen, the evidence base on practices and techniques associated with demand 
management is stronger in some areas than others. In terms of an evaluation, with regard to 
alternative structures for the procurement function, collaborative buying initiatives and e-
NIHR HS&DR Project 12/5004/03   
 
131 
 
procurement systems there does not appear to be any evidence that there are restrictions of 
context, but there are clear warnings regarding implementation. An exception to the absence 
of contextual restrictions is in relation to e-auctions. Such a practice appears to play a lesser 
role in highly complex procurements. The studies looking at progressive approaches to 
specification do not suggest any restrictions of context either, although clearly output and 
performance-based specifications will make more sense in the case of more complex areas of 
third party expenditure. 
 
Box 9: Key findings on demand management  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The segmentation matrix pioneered by Kraljic 167, and developed by many others, is a very 
different matter as the matrix has been specifically developed on the basis of aCMO logic. 
Different high-level strategies and internal resource allocations are deemed necessary for 
different purchases that are segmented on the basis of internal importance and external supply 
conditions. This matrix has much wider implications for this literature review and will be 
discussed more in Chapter 7.  
 
Finally, if certain empirical studies are to be believed, sitting on top of all these practices and 
techniques is another factor – the degree to which an organisation’s decision-making is 
political. Whether this is an issue of context is open to question. In any case, political 
decision-making does not affect mechanism selection for optimal outcomes. Rather, its effect 
will be to make any mechanism selection or implementation decision more problematic as 
managers may face internal opposition. 
• No evidence of context restricting decisions regarding procurement structures, 
collaborative buying and e-procurement, but ‘rules’ regarding implementation 
• The Kraljic segmentation matrix, however, embodies the CMO logic 
• A key issue concerns management views on the degree to which their 
organisations are ‘political’. Demand management decision-making more 
difficult in ‘political’ organisations 
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6.3 Evidence on practices and techniques associated with supplier selection  
This section looks at three levels of analysis relating to supplier selection decisions and 
processes: competition, criteria and data analysis. 
 
6.3.1 Preface to the empirical literature on supplier selection 
Following the demand management phase, the buying organisation will approach the market, 
ultimately putting out a request for quotation or proposal (aka invitation to tender). Having 
received bids, the buying organisation will need to select one or more suppliers. The 
academic literature has generated a range of empirical studies investigating how buying 
organisations might best go about this, with the evidence, not surprisingly, emphasising the 
benefits of adopting practices and techniques that are both systematic and objective. See, for 
example, Carter et al 292, Choi and Hartley 293, Hsu et al 294, Kaufmann et al 295, and Talluri 
and Narasimhan .296 The practices and techniques recommended are on three levels: the 
running of a competitive tendering process; the use within the process of objective selection 
criteria to evaluate the relative merits of the shortlisted suppliers; and, the use of a structured 
process for analysis of supplier data.  
 
6.3.2 Running a competitive tendering process 
Studies on the use of competitive tendering processes in private sector markets are almost 
without limit, and, of course, neo-classical economists claim support for the perfect 
competition model, so instead the focus here will be on public sector studies. There has been 
much attention given to public sector competitive tendering over recent decades. In the UK, 
this was initially because of the policy interventions of the Conservative administrations of 
the 1980s which started a movement towards a ‘contracting state’ that has continued to the 
present day. A good deal of this attention has been via public auditing, so the literature terrain 
is extended here to include such studies and prominent government-commissioned policy 
reviews. 
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An early study into compulsory competitive tendering in UK local government was carried 
out by the Institute for Local Government Studies (for the former Department of 
Environment) and reported savings from such tendering to be about 7 per cent, although there 
was significant variation across different services .297 Further into the 1990s, Domberger and 
Rimmer 298 looked at competitive tendering across European public sectors and reported 
substantial cost savings, while Szymanski 299 reviewed the results of compulsory competitive 
tendering in UK local government-provided refuse services and also found that cost 
reductions had been achieved. 
 
More recently, three major studies have reviewed the effects of competition in the public 
sector. Davies et al 300 conducted a literature review and reported that there was some 
evidence of performance and efficiency improvements attributable to competition in the UK 
health and education sectors, although there were also arguably other managerial factors at 
play in the improvements. Julius 301 reviewed the literature on the use by the UK public 
sector of private and third sector organisations and reported that most studies found the cost 
savings from competitive tendering to be between 10 per cent and 30 per cent without having 
an adverse impact upon service quality. The European Commission 302 study into the impact 
and effectiveness of the EU procurement directives reported lower purchase costs of between 
2 per cent and 10 per cent, evidence (albeit limited) of the savings being made without the 
social and environmental aspects of the procurement exercises being diminished and a ratio 
of 4 to 1 in terms of the benefits of the directives versus the costs of them. 
 
The evidence suggests, therefore, that consistent cost reductions are achieved from 
competitive tendering in different contexts. However, service quality, not thought to have 
been affected by cost reductions according to Julius 301, has remained a concern to others. For 
example, Domberger and Rimmer 298 admitted that their data was unable to discern whether 
the cost savings had been at the expense of quality and, while Szymanski 299 argued that the 
cost reductions reported in his study could not be attributed to lower service specifications, he 
was not (because of data limitations) able to rule out the possibility that suppliers, during 
contract execution, were not meeting the service levels required by the specifications. 
Furthermore, a study by Guccio et al 303 into Italian public works contracts found that 25 per 
cent of contracts were subject to renegotiation costs of about 10 per cent. These latter two 
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scenarios, possibly due to moral hazard and hold-up respectively, are examined later in the 
chapter. 
 
The above studies were aimed at assessing the effects of competition on buyer value for 
money. Related to this, although different, is empirical research on the effect of buyer-
supplier power on value for money; that is, the effect of running a selection process under 
different buy-side and supply-side structures. Research by Cox et al 130, 136, 304 provides case 
studies showing both value for money and buyer-supplier relationships affected by the buyer-
supplier power relation. In these studies, organisations that had selected powerful suppliers 
were seen to find difficulty in persuading those suppliers to partake in cost reduction or 
product/service enhancement activities requiring collaboration. Similar findings have been 
presented by Alderman et al 305 and Mortensen and Arlbjorn.306 It is argued therefore that 
buyer-supplier power should be one of the selection criteria 307 – something noted below. 
 
A final relevant issue here concerns the literature on the choice between sourcing a good or 
service using a single supplier and sourcing using multiple suppliers. Much of this literature 
is based on hypothetical quantitative simulations, for example, Burke et al.308 There have also 
been empirical studies though, although there is no agreement on the issue and, in any case, 
the decision is highly situation-specific. Two studies reflect this. Alaez-Aller and Longas-
Garcia 309, looking at the Spanish automotive industry, found that a firm’s choice over this 
sourcing decision tended to change over time as needs and priorities changed, while Krause 
and Scannell 310, reporting on a study involving 312 firms, stated that service firms tended 
more towards using competitive sourcing strategies, whereas product firms tended more 
towards using approaches based upon assessment and direct involvement.  
 
In the information technology and services area, a group of academics led by Lacity and 
Willcocks have undertaken many empirical studies leading them to the conclusion that 
‘multi-sourcing’ (defined here as the use of multiple suppliers, as the situation requires, in 
combination with selective in-house provision) is the most successful sourcing strategy and 
increasingly being adopted by organisations that had previously been sold single source 
solutions. See, for example, Lacity and Willcocks .311, 312 Some of this was attributed to the 
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fact that multi-sourcing allowed buying organisations to avoid problems associated with 
hold-up in the presence of uncertainty, supplier complacency and loss of access to innovation 
from the wider supply market.  
 
6.3.3 The development of selection criteria 
With respect to selection criteria, the most relevant issue of context here is purchase type. 
The evidence stresses the need for supplier evaluation scorecards to contain criteria that are 
relevant to the purchase in question. Given that the empirical studies have, not surprisingly, 
focused upon purchase types that are significant to the organisations in question (as against 
‘non-critical’ items, in Kraljic’s language), the evidence has focused upon the benefits of 
organisations including selection criteria beyond basic cost considerations. First, selection 
criteria focused upon quality are shown to assist in optimal supplier selection.294, 313, 314 A link 
between an appropriate focus upon quality and the buying organisation’s own customers’ 
satisfaction is reported and the selection of suppliers offering high quality is said to be critical 
to organisations’ ability to compete effectively in highly competitive markets.  
 
Second, there is also evidence to support the inclusion of ‘relational attributes’ in the 
selection criteria, particularly when organisations are purchasing complex and innovative 
products or services .315-318 Heywood and Lonsdale 319 reported, in a public sector context, 
that buying organisations could get suppliers to provide evidence of such attributes by 
requiring them to demonstrate that their solution will deliver a good cultural fit, continuous 
improvements, sustainability, effective change management, inclusiveness, long-term 
benefits and benefits-sharing. The benefits of including relational attributes in the selection 
criteria (often using qualitative data) for complex and innovative products and services are 
said to include reduced transaction costs, reduced production costs and improved buyer 
organisation performance.317, 320-322  
 
The experimental study of Huang et al 323 also suggested that buying organisations wishing to 
develop trust with a supplier, as part of relational buyer-supplier exchange, should ensure that 
the supplier selection process, as well as the criteria, contributes to its development rather 
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than hinders it. The authors were particularly referring to the need for the selection process to 
maintain face-to-face contact throughout, rather than moving to computer-mediated contact 
after the initial stages.  
 
Third, as some have argued that buyer-supplier power has an impact on the value for money 
achieved by buying organisations it has naturally been argued that power should be one of the 
selection criteria used by buying organisations. References regarding this were reported 
above in 6.3.2. 
 
6.3.4 Analysis of supplier data 
The third level concerns a structured process for the analysis of supplier data. A number of 
studies have claimed evidence for the benefits of using the analytical hierarchy process, a 
structured framework for evaluating alternatives. The method allows the prioritising of 
different decision criteria and has obvious application to the supplier selection process, as 
well as the subsequent supplier performance management task.324 Constantino et al 325 report 
the benefits of using the analytical hierarchy process in the context of the Italian public 
sector, while Kahraman et al 326 and Sevkli et al 327 report benefits from the use of analytical 
hierarchy process-based methods in a Turkish manufacturing context. Similar methods are 
reported as beneficial to supplier selection outcomes by Yigin et al 328 and Towers and 
Song.329 Clearly, structured analysis of supplier data is possible using less mathematical 
processes and, of course, is frequently undertaken that way in practice. Not surprisingly, 
however, such informal decision-making has not been deemed worthy of academic study. 
 
6.3.5 Summary 
The main contextual factor in relation to the different aspects of supplier selection would 
appear to be the nature of the purchase. The highlighted studies showed that competitive 
processes are able to deliver beneficial outcomes in a range of different contexts, but there is 
also a suggestion in some studies that competition is less effective when purchases start to 
provide the potential for moral hazard and hold-up (something explored below). Selection 
criteria, meanwhile, are also shown to be affected by the nature of the purchase, with criteria 
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designed in line with the complexity and importance of the purchase being an important 
factor in successful procurement outcomes. Finally, in terms of supplier data analysis, while 
studies highlight the benefits of using analytical hierarchy process-based methods, analysis 
may well be less formal in the case of minor purchases. 
 
Box 10: Key findings on supplier selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4 Evidence on practices and techniques associated with contracting  
This section looks at various aspects of contracting, although, like the contracting literature, it 
focuses upon the challenges of uncertainty and incomplete contracting. 
 
 
 
6.4.1 Preface to the empirical literature on contracting 
Having selected a supplier or suppliers, the buying organisation needs to develop some form 
of contract. The phrase ‘some form of contract’ is used advisedly as in many situations the 
contract developed will be, to differing degrees, incomplete. Indeed, most of the key 
literature on business to business contracting is concerned with contractual incompleteness 
and its management. Despite the dominance of this concern, however, it is necessary to cover 
all aspects of contracting here, starting with the most standard of situations.  
• The key aspect of context in relation to supplier selection is purchase type 
• Evidence that the introduction of competition into the public sector has 
delivered benefits, but suggestion also that complex procurements encounter 
difficulties and additional challenges 
• Selection criteria need to align with purchase type 
• Evidence of benefits from using robust data analysis techniques for assessing 
supplier bid data 
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When buying standard goods and services, buying organisations, if they wish to (some major 
retailers, for example, choose not to) will be able to develop a complete contract. That is, all 
necessary details about the product or service – specification, required amount, price and 
delivery – will be known prior to purchase and can be included in a legally-binding 
document.86 This situation is by no means the norm in business to business markets, though, 
and while ‘contract law might not have evolved very much away from these assumptions … 
contract scholarship has’.330 (p.4) 
 
6.4.2 Demand risk and framework agreements 
A more complex, if not the most complex, situation is where the buying organisation has 
clarity over the specification of its requirement, but is unclear about its demand for it. For 
example, an organisation may be aware of the types of agency staff or medical consumables 
it needs, but is not fully clear about its demand over a period of, say, a year. Using historical 
data, the organisation will be able to estimate the parameters of demand, but the parameters 
may differ by a significant percentage. Here, organisations have frequently opted to develop 
framework agreements  with preferred suppliers that specify the type or types of goods or 
services required and the price of those goods or services, but do not commit the buying 
organisation to any level of demand – although there will usually be certain supplier 
expectations, which impacts prices.331 Framework agreements are aimed at helping the 
buying organisation manage demand risk, reduce transaction costs, control the supplier base 
and, as a side-benefit, reduce maverick buying. Such agreements are not a panacea though. 
Procurement managers often provide inadequate choice for end-users, suppliers are often 
dissatisfied with actual demand and such agreements can end up being used where 
commitment contracts are a better option. 
 
The academic evidence on the use of framework agreements in business to business markets 
is scarce. Balcik and Ak 332 report on their usage by disaster relief agencies and how 
suitability is affected by disaster scale; Karjalainen et al 235 find evidence for price and 
process cost savings in the Finnish public sector; Lacoste 333 found framework agreements of 
assistance in balancing cooperation and competition in a manufacturing context; and Lam and 
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Gale 334 looked at UK public sector construction and found no significant benefits in terms of 
price, but significantly reduced transaction costs. Away from academic sources, the National 
Audit Office 335 reported that the potential for the framework agreements used by the UK 
government to deliver lower prices was affected by a lack of coordination between central 
ministries. 
 
6.4.3 Uncertainty and contractual incompleteness 
The most complex contracting situations are those characterised by uncertainty and the most 
significant strand of management literature on contracting concerns the implications of the 
contractual incompleteness that arises from uncertainty. In the context of a chapter about 
practices and techniques, a key issue concerns the use of trust as a self-enforcement 
mechanism in the context of contractual incompleteness. A self-enforcement mechanism is a 
tangible or intangible mechanism that causes contractual obligations to be fulfilled without 
the need for protracted negotiations or conflict. For example, a contract might self-enforce 
because there is an incentive for the supplier to fulfil its obligations. Alternatively, a contract 
might self-enforce because there is a desire on the part of the supplier to fulfil its obligations. 
 
Trust as a self-enforcement mechanism 
Trust, in this context, has been defined as the expectation of one party that the other party 
will not renege on its obligations, while recognising that reneging is a possibility, even if 
opportunities arise for profitable reneging.336 While it is accepted that trust is not easy or 
costless to develop, something that we were reminded of by Spekman et al’s 337 cross-sector 
and multinational study, it has been argued that it leads to lower search, negotiation, 
contracting and monitoring costs. In addition, trust is believed to increase the chances of 
buyers and suppliers developing a value adding relationship via the increased willingness it 
creates on both parts to share information and make joint investments.338 
 
Many studies have been undertaken into the efficacy of trust as a self-enforcement 
mechanism, with many showing a positive association between trust and the performance of 
buyer-supplier relationships. Dyer 339 argued that evidence from the Japanese automotive 
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industry supported the use of trust as a self-enforcement mechanism, while a study by Dyer 
and Chu 340 covering over 300 buyer-supplier relationships in the Japanese, US and Korean 
automotive industries suggested that perceived trustworthiness led to both reduced 
transaction costs and greater information sharing, and that greater information sharing and 
trust were mutually reinforcing. More recently, Keast et al 341 reported that the cost 
reductions achieved in a section of the US healthcare sector were attributable to the ‘spirit of 
partnership’, while Krishnan et al’s 342 study of US electronics manufacturing reported 
improved buyer-supplier relationship performance to be a consequence of collaborative 
contracts.  
 
In order to cast more light on both the processes involved in the creation of trust and the 
impact of trust upon buyer-supplier relationship performance, Malhotra and Murnighan 343 
conducted a study under laboratory conditions in the US. A key finding was that because 
under informal, non-binding contracts any co-operation in the buyer-supplier relationship can 
be viewed by the other party as a function of a manager’s personal inclination, the absence of 
a formal contract, in which cooperation might simply be mandated, provides the optimal 
basis for the development of trust. 
 
Of relevance to the CMO philosophy of this realist review, a number of studies have a 
particular focus on the impact of national culture on the development of trusting relationships 
between buyers and suppliers. These studies often use models such as that of Hofstede 344 in 
an attempt to highlight the impact of particular aspects of national culture. A number of 
studies have found a relationship between national culture and the successful development of 
trust relations between buyers and suppliers. That is, certain national cultural attributes are 
found to support the development of trust .345-349 
 
Trust and contract  
Malhotra and Murnighan’s study 343 highlights a critical divide in the literature regarding the 
role of trust in helping organisations to cope with the contractual incompleteness that arises 
out of uncertainty. They argued, as we have seen, that formal, binding contracts have a 
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deleterious effect on trust. In other words, trust is an alternative to contract. Others differ on 
this and argue that trust and formal contracting actually complement each other. An important 
study providing evidence supporting this point of view was that by Poppo and Zenger 350 (p. 
707), who surveyed information systems managers in the US and reported: ‘Managers appear 
to couple their increasingly customized contracts with high levels of relational governance 
(and vice versa). Moreover, this interdependence underlies their ability to generate 
improvements in exchange performance.’  
 
Many others report similar findings. Caniels et al 351 found in their study of the Norwegian oil 
and gas sector that trust was only effective as a self-enforcement mechanism, enabling the 
successful delivery of project outcomes, when it was accompanied by contractual incentives 
and control systems. Blomqvist et al 352 reporting on cross-country research and development 
alliances and Kadefors 353 reporting on the Swedish facilities management sector agree and 
focus on how the actual process of developing a formal contract and monitoring performance 
thereafter can facilitate the development of trust. It was found that the negotiations can lead 
to increased mutual understanding and shared learning. Bovaird and Halachmi 354, 
meanwhile, argue that formal contracts can complement intentional trust but only if they are 
not too restrictive. Finally, Olander et al 355 report the findings of qualitative research 
concerning research and development contracts and conclude that trust and contracts are 
complements, but that their role differs at different stages of the procurement and contract 
management process. Trust is reported as the prime mechanism at the early exploration 
stages; trust and contract are said to support each other in the development stages; and the 
emphasis is then believed to be more on the contract during the latter stages. 
 
Contracts, opportunism and protection 
A different position is taken by Williamson.86 There are, he said, sufficient managers and/or 
organisations that are prepared to act opportunistically in order for opportunism to be a 
default assumption entering the contracting process, not least because opportunistic actors are 
often hard to identify a priori and selection decisions in business to business markets are 
often time-consuming and expensive to reverse. Accordingly, the contracting process needs 
to have a strong focus on the safeguarding role. This perspective is clearly in conflict with 
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trust theories, but only partially in conflict with theories promoting the idea of trust and 
contract as complementary.  
 
Depending on the purchase type in question, in particular the level of uncertainty present, the 
safeguarding role could include the following: detailing a tight legal contract, making 
credible commitments, assigning property or control rights and/or developing incentives and 
monitoring rights. All of these measures are designed, and recommended to managers, on the 
basis that they allow the two parties to structure a contractual agreement that makes it in the 
economic interests of both parties to refrain from opportunistic behaviour. Such behaviour 
could, for example, include various forms of hold-up from a transaction cost economic 
perspective and adverse selection and moral hazard from an agency theory perspective. 
 
The transaction cost economic model has been the subject of many empirical studies. Macher 
and Richman 356 reported that, at the time of their publication, there had been over 900 papers 
testing the model. There have also been a number of reviews of the empirical literature. Our 
attention will be restricted to a selection of these reviews. Macher and Richman’s 356 own 
review concluded that there is considerable support for many of the central propositions 
within the transaction cost model. This is a view supported by Schepker et al 357 (p. 197), who 
comment that:  
‘[T]he empirical literature strongly supports TCE. As transactional attributes 
increase, so too does the risk that exchange hazards will undermine exchange 
performance.’  
 
Not all of the empirical literature reviews have been as unequivocal, however. David and Han 
358 (p. 39) concluded that the results of the many empirical studies were mixed, commenting 
that: 
‘while we found support in some areas (e.g., with regard to asset specificity), we 
also found considerable disagreement on how to operationalize some of TCE's 
central constructs and propositions, and relatively low levels of empirical support 
in other core areas (e.g., surrounding uncertainty and performance).’ 
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Carter and Hodgson 359 offered a similar view on the model’s empirical support and added 
that the outcomes in the empirical studies could just as easily be explained by theories from 
within the strategic management field. Lacity and Willcock’s 360 review of IT outsourcing 
studies that used the transaction cost economic lens, likewise, produced mixed results, 
particularly with respect to the impact of asset specificity on governance decisions. 
Interestingly, this review also revealed that studies testing the idea that a key driver of IT 
outsourcing was simply a desire to copy peer organisations found significant support. Finally, 
Lonsdale 99 offered case studies that supported the contention that the omission of the concept 
of power from the model was a shortcoming. 
 
Turning our attention to agency theory, it is noticeable that, perhaps because of the very wide 
application of the theory, the number of procurement and supply management related 
empirical studies that are based specifically upon agency theory, as against contractual 
incentives or monitoring in general, is limited.361 However, there are some. Lonsdale et al 362, 
using cross-sector evidence from 180 procurement managers, found that transactions 
characterised by asset specificity and uncertainty were susceptible to adverse selection and 
moral hazard and that these problems of opportunism could be addressed to a degree by 
buying organisations if they adopted defensive procurement and supply management actions. 
Steinle et al 361 looked at 87 buyer-supplier relationships in their study and reported that 
moral hazard was common when the relationship was characterised by information 
asymmetry. Zsidisin and Ellram 363, surveying procurement managers in the US, found that 
managerial efforts to manage supply risk were substantially in line with the central premises 
of agency theory. Finally, in a reminder that academic study separates management issues 
and mechanisms in a manner alien to the real business world, Lonsdale 99 looked at the 
procurement and contract management strategy of a UK central government agency and 
found that efforts to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard sat alongside efforts to avoid 
hold-up as part of an overall approach.  
 
There is also research, however, that shows the importance of care when setting incentives, 
contractual or otherwise. Gibbons 364, in his review article of the literature on incentives, 
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highlights empirical research that has borne out the comment of Kerr 365 that, in a very literal 
sense, ‘you get what you reward.’ This has been shown to be the case in the healthcare sector, 
with various types of incentives promoting gaming and other distortions .214 
 
Reflections on the empirical literature on uncertainty and contractual incompleteness 
The empirical findings reported in this section, while revealing vast disagreements, have 
enormous implications for procurement and supply management. First, whatever view is 
taken on the role of trust, the findings emphasise the fact that a reliance on market forces is 
unlikely to be an adequate basis for policy in the area of public sector contracting. A ‘sharp 
in, sharp out’ approach to contracting out and outsourcing is feasible where the product or 
service is relatively basic, but as uncertainty and asset specificity increase the ability to 
develop complete contracts and retain a credible threat of returning to the market should 
supplier performance be unsatisfactory decreases significantly and other actions and 
mechanisms are necessary. 
 
Second, the findings confirm the view that highly experienced and knowledgeable 
procurement and contract managers – those with feasible foresight 86 – are needed if 
procurement practice is to remain effective as uncertainty and asset specificity increase. This 
places a question mark over any policy to rapidly outsource public services to the private or 
non-profit sectors as highly knowledgeable procurement and contract managers with 
considerable experience of procuring complex services are arguably neither cheap nor in 
plentiful supply. Indeed, this fact has arguably affected the outcomes achieved from the 
purchaser-provider split in the NHS over the past 20 years or so. 
 
Third, the transaction cost economics model argues that when uncertainty and asset 
specificity increase beyond a certain point in-house provision will be the most efficient 
governance mechanism. The make-buy decision is beyond the scope of this literature review, 
but this contention of transaction cost economics is very relevant to the NHS. Indeed, this 
issue was raised by contributors to the recent Health Select Committee report on 
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commissioning, particularly in the context of the purchaser-provider split and the possibility 
that the NHS had incurred the costs of competition without enjoying the benefits.21 
 
6.4.4 Summary 
There are deep disagreements, therefore, regarding the development of the contract. 
However, certain summary points can be made. First, there is insufficient evidence to make 
judgements about framework agreements as a procurement technique. Second, while there is 
disagreement in the contract economics literature over the role that trust plays as a self-
enforcement mechanism (as either an alternative to contract or a complement), there is 
consensus that as levels of asset specificity increase the ability to threaten incumbent 
suppliers with a return to the market decreases – that is, competitive pressure becomes an 
increasingly ineffective self-enforcement mechanism. Third, the disagreements regarding the 
role of trust highlight that the behavioural disposition of supplier managers is a critical 
contextual factor in terms of the contractual mechanism adopted. Misalignment between 
supplier behaviour and contract choice can lead to very adverse outcomes. Fourth, there is the 
suggestion in the empirical literature that managerial behaviour is itself a function of a 
contextual factor – that is, nation and national culture. There is evidence to suggest that 
opportunistic behaviour is more likely in some national contexts than others. Finally, an issue 
is raised in the public sector literature regarding the impact of buyer-supplier power on the 
ability of buying organisations (and suppliers) to negotiate contracts effectively, not least in 
terms of establishing the necessary self-enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Box 11: Findings on contracting 
 
 
 
 
 
• Purchase type affects contracts and contracting, with uncertainty frequently 
causing contractual incompleteness in business to business markets 
• Contracting affected by supplier behaviour - an alignment is required.  
• A debate exists over the nature of supplier behaviour, in particular the 
relevance of the concept of trust 
• Evidence that supplier behaviour, in turn, can be affected by nation 
• The ability to implement the contractual mechanisms suggested by the 
literature is, according to some, affected by the relative power of the 
negotiating parties 
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6.5 Evidence on practices and techniques associated with relationship management 
Contract development and supplier relationship management are linked activities – the 
contract will often seek to facilitate certain supplier management activities during the contract 
period. As a result, it is not surprising that, while two distinct literatures exist, there are 
overlaps between them. The main emphasis within the two literatures, however, is very 
different, with a prominent concern of the literature on supplier relationship management 
being the possibility of buyer-supplier collaboration and performance improvement. It is 
recognised within this literature, of course, that buyers and suppliers will not always have an 
interest in collaborative relationships. The interest will depend, in part, on the financial value 
and strategic importance of the contract and, as a result, in the case of contracts of relatively 
low value and importance, the management activity might be restricted to simply ensuring 
that the supplier is fulfilling its obligations under the contract, i.e. supplier performance 
management (See Cox et al 136 for case evidence on decision processes leading to such 
relationships). The interest in collaboration may also be affected by whether one or both 
parties wish to create new knowledge and assets or exploit existing knowledge and assets, an 
issue raised by Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos 366 in their recent, highly regarded review of the 
wider inter-organisational relationships literatures. Whatever the case, complex and high 
value collaborative buyer-supplier relationships undoubtedly have the greatest potential for 
academic study and have consequently received the greatest attention. 
 
One other dimension needs a brief note here. In the case collaborative relationships, a 
distinction can be made between collaboration that is discretionary and that which is non-
discretionary (although some collaboration combines both). Some close working between 
buyers and suppliers is simply the result of it not being possible for the buying organisation to 
buy a product or service ‘off the shelf’, that is, it is non-discretionary. Other close working is 
discretionary and the result of a wish to create additional value, either through cost reduction 
or product/service enhancement. In the context of all of the above, in what follows, empirical 
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evidence on the nature, behaviours, antecedents and effect of the collaborative form of buyer-
supplier relationships is reported. 
 
6.5.1 The nature of collaborative buyer-supplier relationships 
Right from the beginnings of this literature in the 1980s, there have been a number of key 
activity types that have been argued to be integral to a collaborative buyer-supplier 
relationship. These activity types have been the focus of much empirical testing. One is 
buyer-supplier information exchange and communication, in particular, regarding the product 
or service, demand forecasts, feedback on the actions of the other party and suggestions for 
how the production process might be improved. Many studies have sought to assess the 
importance of effective information exchange and communication for successful 
collaboration, with the evidence suggesting that it is of high importance. Studies by Bastl et 
al 367 on manufacturing companies; Chang and Lin 368 on Taiwanese manufacturing; Hsu et al 
369 on practice in the US and Europe; Kawai et al 370 on Japanese manufacturing; Krause and 
Ellram 371 and Paulraj et al 372 on US practice; and Lacity and Willcocks 360 on IT outsourcing 
all found that information exchange was a key element of successful collaboration. 
Oosterhuis et al 373 and Van de Vijver 374, both looking at relationships within Dutch 
manufacturing sectors, concurred, but made the qualification that information exchange and 
communication were only factors in successful collaboration when uncertainty exists and 
leads to the two parties believing there is a need for this type of collaborative activity. 
 
Joint decision-making and input has also long been considered a key aspect of successful 
buyer-supplier collaboration. Studies by Biehl et al 375 into Canadian manufacturing, 
Lindblom et al 376, 377 into category management, and Perez-Arostegui et al 378 into supplier 
involvement in product design, all report positive effects of joint decision-making and input 
on collaboration. Similarly, joint investment, often to facilitate necessary adaptations, has 
also been a key element in the literature on collaborative buyer-supplier relationships, and, of 
course, in the aforementioned transaction cost literature too. Inemek and Matthyssens 379 
researching manufacturing sectors in Turkey, Jap 380 researching US manufacturing, and 
Rahman et al 381 researching manufacturing sectors in Malaysia, all report the role of 
transaction-specific investments in collaboration. 
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6.5.2 Managerial behaviours in collaborative relationships 
In addition to tangible management activities, models of buyer-supplier collaboration have 
also stressed the importance of sympathetic managerial behaviours to successful 
collaboration. Again showing the overlaps between this literature and the contracting 
literature, the type of behaviour that has been deemed most important is trustworthy 
behaviour. Many studies have been undertaken, with most reporting its positive effect on 
buyer-supplier collaboration. For example, Chung and Jin 382 looking at Korean retail sectors 
found evidence that trust was effective in minimising opportunism within relationships. 
Similarly positive findings have been reported in various contexts by Hansen 383, Jiang et al 
384, Johnston et al 385 , Lane and Bachmann 347, Sengun and Wasti 386, Squire et al 387, 
Tangpong et al 388 and Lacity and Willcocks. 360 Wood and Ellis 389 concur over the 
importance of trust, but stress the difficulties in maintaining it. Similar management 
behaviours shown to be important to successful collaboration in research studies include 
fairness 390, ethical behaviour 391, reciprocation 392, and commitment.393 
 
 
6.5.3 The impact of collaborative relationships on business performance 
Thus far, studies looking at the actions and behaviours that contribute to successful buyer-
supplier collaboration have been reported. However, such collaboration is not an end in itself 
and many studies have sought to ascertain the extent to which collaboration improves 
business performance. The literature on this takes its cue from the pioneering empirical 
studies undertaken into the Japanese automotive industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
studies that led to best-selling books such as The Machine that Changed the World 394, Lean 
Thinking 160, and Beyond Partnership .159 These studies charted the manner in which, and the 
extent to which, collaborative buyer-supplier relationships had improved the performance of 
Japanese automotive supply chains and allowed Japanese manufacturers to take market share 
from Western automotive firms, especially those in the US. 
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Many other subsequent studies have also found significant business improvements arising 
from such collaboration. Bensaou 395, also researching the automotive sectors of Japan and 
the US, charted improved business performance and ascribed it to the way collaboration 
between buyers and suppliers allowed both parties to deal better with uncertainty. In similar 
studies, Biehl et al 375 on Canadian manufacturing ascribed performance improvements to 
joint decision-making; Cai and Yang 396 on Chinese practice ascribed it to co-operative 
norms; Carter 391, 397 on US practice to ethical behaviour; Forker et al 398 on US 
manufacturing to perceptions alignment; Hsu et al 369 to information sharing; Humphreys et 
al 399 on Chinese manufacturing to supplier development; Jap 380 on US manufacturing to 
coordination and joint investments; Paulraj et al 372 on US practice to communication; and 
Rajagopal 400 to relationship quality. 
 
There is, therefore, a large body of knowledge that has established the actions and behaviours 
that can promote collaboration between buyers and suppliers, and the performance 
improvements that such collaboration can deliver. However, the literature also delivers a 
number of warnings about buyer-supplier collaboration. First, Day et al 401 highlight the 
danger of relationships becoming too embedded. Trust was shown in their study to potentially 
be a constraint on relationship performance as well as an enabler. This view is supported by 
Villena et al.402 Second, collaboration can be affected by changing commercial pressures 389, 
something that needs to be taken into account when entering a partnering arrangement that 
involves significant costs. Commercial pressures can cause partnering to be abandoned by 
one party.305 Third, Lane and Bachmann 347 highlight the importance of supportive social and 
political institutions to collaboration, something not present in all nations. Li et al 403 also 
focus on nation and report that it can affect the balance required between formal controls 
(including contract) and the social controls of collaborative relationships. For example, their 
study found that formal and social controls were complements in relationships between 
Chinese and non-Chinese companies, but substitutes in relationships between two Chinese 
companies. 
  
Fourth, there is much discussion on the impact of power on collaborative buyer-supplier 
relationships. It has been found in some studies that the benefits of collaboration are not 
always shared equally.404 Many have ascribed this to the existence and exploitation of power 
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within collaborative relationships. Managers are warned not to assume that a desire to 
‘partner’ is synonymous with a desire to treat the other party as an equal and share benefits 
equally. Various studies have provided evidence of asymmetrical power relations affecting 
collaborative buyer-supplier relationships.99, 133, 136, 304, 405-408 
 
The above studies on power focus mainly on distributional issues. There have been further 
studies about the impact of power on business performance. McHugh et al 409 found that the 
use of power could have a negative effect on relationship performance. Henke et al 410, 
however, found that the use of power to obtain price reductions can co-exist with trusting 
relationships if power is used in a responsible manner, while Tangpong et al 411 found that 
buyers using their dominance increased operational efficiency, but reduced product 
innovation. Overall, therefore, while there is no single message emerging from studies 
concerning power, there is considerable evidence to suggest that managers should include 
considerations of power in their relationship decision-making. 
 
6.5.4 Summary 
Given that the contract will often look to set the scene for the subsequent buyer-supplier 
relationship, it is not surprising that the same contextual variables affect the mechanisms that 
need to be adopted in order to achieve successful outcomes. These are the nature of the 
purchase (asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity are drivers of non-discretionary as 
well as discretionary collaborative activity), supplier behaviour (opportunism can affect the 
outcome of a collaborative relationship and, crucially, affect decisions over whether a 
collaborative relationship is the right mechanism to adopt in a particular situation), nation and 
national culture (as mentioned earlier, empirical studies have established a link between 
national culture and business behaviour) and buyer-supplier power (again, power can affect 
the outcome of a collaborative relationship and, crucially, affect decisions over whether a 
collaborative relationship is the right mechanism to adopt in a particular situation). 
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Box 12: Findings on relationship management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.6 Evidence on practices and techniques associated with operational delivery 
In the previous section, we discussed evidence showing that buyer-supplier collaboration has 
the potential to deliver successful outcomes to buying organisations, particularly in some 
purchase contexts. However, many writers have questioned the logic of restricting 
collaboration to single dyads within the supply chain or network. It is believed that the whole 
system needs to be improved otherwise all that will be achieved are ‘islands of excellence’. 
Accordingly, over the past 25 years, despite the confusion noted by Giunipero et al 54 in their 
recent review about what should be the scope of supply chain management research, and 
again inspired by the aforementioned studies of the Japanese automotive industry, a rich 
research stream has developed looking at efforts made to implement practices and techniques 
to improve the whole supply chain or network. The two most famous parts of this research 
stream have been the lean and agile approaches to supply chain management, although, as is 
shown, there are complications beneath that neat divide. 
 
6.6.1 Lean supply chain practices and techniques 
The lean philosophy, which concentrates on the elimination of waste in supply chains, has 
been adopted in a diverse range of sectors, from original equipment manufacturing 412 to food 
production and distribution.413 Case studies of its application have been conducted in 
• The same contextual variables that affect contracting choices and outcomes 
are seen to affect relationship management choices and outcomes  
• Purchase type affects the extent of relationship activities, with the focus on 
relatively minor purchases being ‘supplier performance management’ 
• Evidence of collaboration delivering significant benefits, however also 
warnings regarding supplier selection for collaboration and the 
implementation of collaborative relationships 
• One such warning concerns buyer-supplier power relations 
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developing country contexts 414, as well as in the developed nations where the majority of 
studies are set. Even where actions associated with it, such as supply base reduction, cannot 
be confirmed as a direct application of lean philosophy, there is widespread awareness of it. 
See, for example, Loader’s 415 survey of English local authorities. Studies of lean supply 
chain management have been prevalent in a healthcare setting too. De Souza 222 reviewed 
over 90 studies, Mazzocato et al 415 present a realist review of 33 studies, and Guimaraes and 
de Carvalho 417 present multiple case studies of strategic outsourcing as a lean technique 
across 15 different countries. 
  
The principal lean technique assessed is just-in-time, the practice of keeping low stock levels 
and pulling products from suppliers when required. A number of empirical studies of just-in-
time implementation demonstrate improved firm performance.418, 419 Explanations include 
speed and synchronization420, improved information flows421, and increased management 
focus.422, 423 Gozalez-Benito’s 423 study is, however, a rare example of any contingent element 
in this area of research. Indeed, Bayo-Mariones et al 424 argue that organisational context, for 
example, the size and age of the firm, matters less than infrastructural features such as 
advanced technologies and quality management. The majority of studies, while they provide 
rich contextual detail, such as the country and sector, to support their methodological rigour, 
contain little reflection on how this may affect implementation. Instead, there is an 
assumption that just-in-time practices can be mimicked and implemented in a wide range of 
contexts425-427, and variables regarding successful implementation are considered managerial, 
for example, top management commitment and leadership.428-430 
 
A significant proportion of research into just-in-time also highlights the importance of 
improved buyer-supplier relationships431-434, which are said to contribute towards the 
continued successful employment of just-in-time practices. Stamm and Golhar 433 find 
genuine commitment in improving relationships, while Yasin et al 434 find that operator and 
management training contribute towards improved linkages and firm success. Meanwhile, 
O’Neal 431 charts a move from adversarial to cooperative exchange attitudes through the use 
of just-in-time and Nassimbeni 432 highlights greater buyer-supplier interaction on both 
quality and design in development activities. However, again reflecting the theme of power 
disparities, Karlsson and Norr 435 question whether just-in-time is really anything more than 
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an exercise in risk displacement, a transfer of the more powerful buyer’s stock holding 
problems on to the weaker parties in the network. Though they confirm this hypothesis, they 
also find that this is not necessarily problematic for dependent suppliers and total economic 
effectiveness is still achieved. 
 
Much of this body of work focuses specifically on just-in-time supply, but a number of 
studies draw distinctions between just-in-time supply and just-in-time production 436, just-in-
time purchasing and just-in-time selling 437 and just-in-time inventory management.429 
However, their findings emphasise the complementarity of these practices and suggest a total 
system just-in-time approach for better performance, be that in terms of organisational 
improvements, cost savings, improved quality and/or improved site management. Within the 
healthcare context, Persona et al 438 chart how just-in-time automatic supply of ward 
materials through the use of intelligent trolleys in Italian hospitals resulted in smaller 
quantities of stored products, out-of-date medicines and order errors. 
 
While these just-in-time practices are based on storing less stock for leaner operations, 
another lean technique goes further by delegating the management of inventory to the vendor. 
Vendor managed inventory  has been tested in a number of contexts, though most frequently 
for various types of manufacturing 439, 440 and in healthcare .438, 441 Within healthcare, Stanger 
442 studied vendor managed inventory for blood supplies in German hospitals, although this 
was hesitantly implemented due to a fear of losing control of this resource. The key to the 
successful implementation of this technique is reported to include the availability and 
usability of good quality data 440, 443 and, again, the development of collaborative 
relationships between buyers and suppliers.441 Kauremaa et al 444, however, notice the 
commercial aspect to vendor managed inventory, arguing that while buyers have an interest 
in more efficient supply, suppliers are attracted to vendor managed inventory as the practice 
has lock-in potential. Here we see a sign of the empirical research reporting motivations 
beyond just multilateral attempts to develop the supply chain. In addition to transactional 
efficiency gains, the benefits of vendor managed inventory noted in the empirical research 
include improved learning spillovers 445, closer buyer-supplier relationships 446 , and, in a 
European healthcare context, clinician time release .447 
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A further lean technique that has been the subject of empirical research, albeit on a lesser 
scale, is value stream mapping. This technique involves a detailed assessment of supply chain 
operations in order to identify and eliminate waste, facilitate cost reductions and increase 
productivity. Empirical research on the application of value stream mapping is mainly 
associated with assembly lines in manufacturing, such as in the automotive industry.448, 449 
Finally, a combined lean six sigma approach has gained academic attention as a method for 
continuous quality improvement and innovation in a wide range of contexts. This has been 
found to be effective in generating improvements, although these are dependent on adequate 
support from higher management levels.450, 451 
 
6.6.2 Agile and leagile supply chain practices and techniques 
An alternative to lean supply chain management is agile, which concentrates on 
responsiveness as the primary goal, as against the elimination of waste. Agile supply chain 
management is most suited to environments where demand is uncertain or fluctuates, such as 
in direct selling or retail 452, particularly fashion .162 In comparison with lean, agile practices 
and techniques have had fairly limited academic attention. Power et al 453 found that customer 
focus, differentiated application of both hard and soft methodologies to meet customer 
requirements and supplier involvement in these processes are critical success factors in the 
creation of more agile supply chains. K et al 454 support this latter point, highlighting 
collaborative distribution and order commitment as practices associated with successful 
agility. Flexibility of production and distribution for improved responsiveness to customers 
has also been reported as critical.452-454 One technique that is not exclusively associated with 
agility, but certainly assists with supply chain flexibility, is build-to-order and there have 
been a number of positive studies of this.455, 456 
 
A key reason for the relative lack of evidence on agile supply chain management is related to 
its presence in the compound approach of leagile. This approach involves breaking down the 
production process into modules. These generic modules are developed using a lean approach 
and then customised under an agile approach. The moment when production moves from lean 
to agile is called the decoupling point.457 There have been a number of studies of this 
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compound practice.457-462 Again, though, research has not been as extensive as with lean and 
a significant proportion of it is illustrative in nature rather than a test of application. However, 
good quality evidence from the literature on build-to-order environments demonstrates well 
the positioning and shifting of the decoupling point 463 and the trade-off between volume and 
mix flexibilities.464 
 
6.6.3 Summary 
In terms of a CMO configuration, the demand profile of a product or service is deemed a key 
contextual variable in the choice between lean, agile and leagile supply chain approaches. 
This relates to Fisher’s model 168, although this does not contain the leagile option. Other 
possible contextual variables, such as nation or sector, are downplayed, however, by those 
specifically working in the agile and leagile areas.  
 
Further contextual variables that might affect the outcomes produced by lean, agile and 
leagile mechanisms are suggested by other procurement and supply chain academics. Here, 
we again see the appearance of both power and business behaviour, with some arguing that 
certain power structures and behaviours within supply chains can make the successful 
implementation of lean, agile and leagile supply chain practices and techniques 
problematic.465 
 
Box 13: Findings on operational delivery 
 
 
 
 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
• Evidence that lean and agile methods can deliver significant benefits 
• Relative lack of investigation into the contextual variables that might affect 
choices and outcomes, apart, that is, from the demand profile  
• Academics from outside the lean and agile literatures, however, offer the 
familiar contextual variables of buyer-supplier power and supplier behaviour 
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This chapter has provided a selective overview of the empirical research undertaken on 
P&SCM practices and techniques. The chapter is divided in line with the four main phases of 
the P&SCM process and informed by the CMO realist literature review approach. Box 14 
summarises the main findings. 
  
As mentioned previously, the literature relevant to P&SCM is located in disparate literatures. 
Consequently, while certain elements of the P&SCM process have been systematically 
studied, there is very little research that has covered all phases and made the connections 
between them. In P&SCM, the initial demand management phase affects the supplier 
selection phase and this, in turn, affects contract development and so on. Nevertheless, great 
strides have been made in understanding this complex process over the past 30 years and 
some concluding comments can be made about where matters currently stand. 
 
First, there is a smaller evidence base for practices and techniques associated with demand 
management, e-procurement apart, than is the case for the other process phases. This is 
largely because the main literature that has focused upon this phase has not had the testing of 
specific practices and techniques as a high priority. The other phases in the P&SCM process 
have a better-developed evidence base, although there is relatively little evidence on supplier 
selection criteria and framework agreements, at least in relation to their importance. The 
evidence bases on public sector competition, contracting, buyer-supplier relationship 
management and lean supply chain management practices and techniques, in particular, are 
stronger. 
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Box 14: Summary of the empirical literature on P&SCM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, there is significant evidence that management matters. A number of economic and 
management principles, embodied in myriad practices and techniques, have frequently been 
shown to assist buying organisations in getting superior value for money outcomes. There is, 
therefore, a clear argument to adopt the realist CMO logic in understanding the P&SCM 
process and both the literature and management practice have made advances over the past 30 
years. 
 
Third, a number of economic and management principles emerge from the empirical 
literature as key contextual variables. The most important consideration for the selection of 
management mechanisms is the nature of the purchase. The appropriateness of mechanisms 
throughout the P&SCM process is dependent upon many purchase characteristics, including 
financial value, complexity, asset specificity, uncertainty and demand characteristics. Other 
highly influential contextual variables are buyer-supplier power relations and supplier 
• Evidence relevant to the procurement and SCM process located in 
disparate literatures. While certain elements of the process have been 
systematically studied, very little research exists that has covered all 
stages in the process. 
• In general, the evidence base is weaker on practices and techniques 
associated with organisational buying behaviour than it is on the other 
process stages. 
• Management matters. There is significant evidence that organisations 
that adhere to key economic and management principles achieve 
superior value for money outcomes. 
• The most important consideration for the selection of management 
mechanisms is the nature of the purchase. 
• Other highly influential contextual variables are supplier managerial 
behaviour, national culture and buyer-supplier power relations. 
• Not all research has incorporated these contextual variables into their 
research design. This needs to be recognised when considering chapter 
findings. 
• Need for research covering all of the stages in the procurement and 
SCM process (and the connections between them) that has key 
contextual variables accounted for in research design. 
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managerial behaviour in terms of levels of trust and opportunism, something, in turn, 
influenced by national culture. 
 
In terms of these latter contextual variables, there is an important point to make regarding this 
empirical review. While the bulk of the empirical literature was produced with an 
understanding of the relevance of the nature of the purchase to mechanisms and outcomes, a 
feature of the literature is that significant parts of it, in particular studies related to buyer-
supplier relationships and supply chain practices and techniques, have not recognised the 
contextual variables of behaviour, nation and power. While this does not invalidate an 
analysis of the empirical literature, it does mean that some studies do not necessarily 
constitute a totally fair test. For example, some have concluded that certain mechanisms have 
not led, or not consistently led, to successful outcomes. However, it is possible that such 
studies have not picked up that it is not the mechanisms themselves that are responsible for 
the unsuccessful outcomes, but their deployment in inappropriate contexts where failure was 
predictable. The same is true in reverse, when conclusions are drawn from sympathetic 
empirical contexts and are then suggested to have universal validity. 
 
Ultimately, what is required is a structured research programme that addresses both the 
fragmented nature of the P&SCM literature, so that the interdependencies of all of the 
process phases are better understood, and the absence of key contextual variables in certain 
parts of the existing literature, so that all mechanisms are subjected to a fair test. No such 
research programme has been undertaken, although the incomplete contracting literature 
comes closest and Lonsdale 99 provides an end to end template from within that literature. 
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Chapter 7 
Portfolio Approaches to Improving Procurement and SCM Practice 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses research question 4, which asks: what are the different approaches to 
improving P&SCM practice and which are likely to work best in the different contexts and 
types of NHS organisations? As we have seen in previous chapters, the P&SCM process is 
complex and involves multiple contexts, phases and actors. As we have also seen there are a 
very wide variety of practices or management interventions that can be used in each phase of 
the P&SCM process. With this in mind, we suggest that arriving at an answer to research 
question 4 requires an approach that enables us to simplify the complex interplay of contexts, 
phases, actors and practices in the P&SCM process. In order to do this we need to be able to 
categorise different P&SCM contexts and relate them to particular types of management 
practices aimed at achieving particular intended outcomes. Our review of the literature 
suggests that the most appropriate way of tackling this question is to use a portfolio approach. 
 
The notion of a portfolio approach to management is rooted in the finance literature, in 
particular the work by Markowitz 467 on the management of risk in equity investments. The 
basic premise of this work is that rational investors will categorise investment opportunities 
according to their particular risk-return ratios and then choose a balanced portfolio of 
investments that maximise the overall expected return for a given level of risk. There are two 
broader insights from this argument, which have subsequently been applied to various areas 
of management thinking and practice including P&SCM .467 The first is that decision-makers 
will typically face a range of different contexts each requiring particular management 
practices to deliver intended outcomes. The logic of portfolio models is thus in tune with the 
CMO logic of realist review. The second insight is that the decisions made and the practices 
deployed in these different contexts should be seen as interdependent, because organisations 
are resource constrained. The portfolio approach emphasises the need for managers to make 
trade-offs in their decision-making to achieve an appropriate balance of outcomes across the 
different contexts which they face.   
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References to portfolio approaches to management first started to appear in the P&SCM 
literature in the early 1980s.467 The paper by Kraljic 167 has been particularly influential, 
spawning the development and testing of a number of similar procurement portfolio models 
by other authors. The limited empirical evidence that exists suggests that portfolio models are 
popular with procurement practitioners254, 468 and their use is associated with greater 
sophistication in the procurement function.469 Broadly speaking, we can categorise these 
various models into one of three types based on their main focus or unit of analysis. These are 
purchase category focused analysis 167, 250, 254, relationship focused analysis251, 470-472, and 
supply chain focused analysis.168 
 
In the remainder of this chapter we discuss these three types of portfolio analysis. We show 
in particular how each type of analysis focuses our attention on a different phase of the 
overall P&SCM process and a different underpinning literature. We suggest that each might 
therefore help us to address one of the three knowledge gaps in the NHS research literature 
that we identified in Chapter 5. 
 
7.2 Purchase category focused portfolio analysis 
Kraljic 167 is generally recognised to have made a seminal contribution to the development of 
portfolio analysis in the P&SCM literature. His ideas appear in some form in the portfolio 
models developed and discussed by many other authors .250, 251, 254, 405, 468, 470, 471 The basic 
aims of Kraljic’s work are to provide a framework for categorising an organisation’s 
purchases according to the level of risk associated with each and to give advice about how 
best to manage these different types of purchase in the form of general procurement strategies 
and related practices. 
 
Kraljic suggests that organisations should categorise their purchases based on two broad 
dimensions, the complexity  of the supply market and the importance or profit impact of the 
good or service. He argues that supply market complexity should be assessed in terms of 
criteria like the number and availability of potential suppliers, the level of competitive 
pressure, the pace of technological change, entry barriers, substitution possibilities, and 
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logistics or storage costs. The importance or profit impact of a good or service is defined by 
criteria like the volume purchased, the cost as a percentage of the organisation’s total 
purchasing expenditure, and the impact on the quality or reliability of the organisation’s end 
product. Using these criteria, assessed on a simple high or low basis, organisations can 
allocate their various purchases into one of the four categories shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Kraljic’s purchasing portfolio matrix (adapted from Kraljic 167)        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
As Figure 8 shows, Kraljic’s argument suggests that organisations are faced with four broad 
levels of purchase risk. These different levels of risk are based on a combination of the 
likelihood of the buying organisation facing problems in the supply market and the impact 
that any problems might have on the buying organisation’s ability to successfully and, if 
relevant, profitably deliver its good or service. So, for example, strategic items are very high 
risk because the buying organisation is highly likely to face supply market problems and 
those problems should they occur will have a significant impact. Leverage items, by contrast, 
pose a lower risk because although they are important to the buying organisation’s success 
and any supply market problems would have a big impact, the likelihood of such problems is 
minimal. 
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The other key elements of Kraljic’s work are the general procurement strategies 
recommended in each category and his advice on how the buying process should be 
organised and managed. His work therefore clearly focuses our attention on the demand 
management phase of the P&SCM process. His core argument is that ‘each of these four 
categories requires a distinctive purchasing approach, whose complexity is in proportion to 
the strategic implications’ 167 (p. 112). Kraljic illustrates his argument with the experiences of 
four case study companies. His different purchasing approaches are summarised in Table 7. 
 
The guidance in Table 7 clearly picks up on the idea expressed in the organisational buying 
behaviour literature that the buying process is expected to be undertaken differently 
depending on the level of risk associated with a purchase. For example, Kraljic’s 
recommended strategies and associated practices have clear echoes of the organisational 
buying behaviour literature’s discussion of expected behaviour in different purchase 
situations. As we discussed in Chapter 3 the organisational buying behaviour literature 
suggests that known suppliers offering well proven products and services will be favoured in 
high risk situations, and there will be an emphasis on non-price selection criteria (i.e. quality, 
delivery performance, service levels). The organisational buying behaviour literature also 
suggests that in situations of high risk buying centre participants will favour suppliers with 
which their organisation has strong prior relationships and well established networks of 
communication. These insights are strongly mirrored by Kraljic’s recommended strategies 
and practices in the highest risk purchase categories, strategic and bottleneck items, where he 
suggests a need for closely controlled and long-term relationships. By contrast, the 
organisational buying behaviour literature suggests that for lower risk procurement decisions 
buying centre participants will use price as the dominant selection criterion and seek to 
stimulate competition from as wide a range of suppliers as possible. Again, these insights are 
reflected in Kraljic’s recommendations for the lower risk purchase categories, leverage and 
non-critical items, where he suggests that buying organisations should standardise and 
consolidate their requirements and seek to exploit supply market competition for a better 
price. 
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Table 7: Kraljic’s recommended purchasing approaches (adapted from Kraljic 167) 
Purchase category Strategy and 
associated practices 
Required 
information 
Decision level 
Strategic items 
 
Strategy – develop 
long-term supply 
relationships 
 
Practices – 
Accurate demand 
forecasting 
Detailed market 
research 
Contract staggering 
Risk analysis 
Contingency 
planning 
Logistics, inventory 
and supplier control 
 
Highly detailed 
market data 
Long-term supply 
and demand trend 
information 
Good competitive 
intelligence 
Industry cost curves 
Top level 
e.g. director of 
procurement  
Bottleneck items 
 
Strategy – insure 
supply volume or 
capacity, if necessary 
at cost premium 
 
Practices –  
Control of suppliers 
Security of 
inventories 
Back-up plans 
 
Medium-term 
demand and supply 
forecasts 
Very good market 
data 
Inventory costs 
Maintenance plans 
Higher level 
e.g. head of 
procurement 
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Leverage items 
 
Strategy – exploit 
purchasing power 
 
Practices –  
Seek out new 
suppliers 
Product substitution 
Targeted price 
negotiations 
Contract/spot 
purchasing mix 
Consolidate/optimise 
order volume 
 
Good market data 
Short to medium-
term demand 
planning 
Accurate supplier 
performance data 
Price forecasts 
 
Medium level 
e.g. chief buyer 
Non-critical items 
 
Strategy – streamline 
purchasing process 
 
Practices –  
Standardise 
requirements 
Monitor/consolidate 
order volume 
Optimise inventory 
 
Good market 
overview 
Short-term demand 
forecast 
Economic order 
quantity inventory 
levels 
Lower level 
e.g. junior buyer 
 
We can make the same observation of a mirroring of the organisational buying behaviour 
literature in Kraljic’s suggestions about the required information and the appropriate decision 
level in his different purchasing approaches. In terms of searching for information about 
supplier options, the organisational buying behaviour literature suggests that this will become 
more active and extensive as procurement risk increases. Kraljic similarly suggests that 
information search should be more detailed and extensive in the higher risk purchase 
categories. As regards decision level, the organisational buying behaviour literature suggests 
that the participants involved in a high risk buying decision will typically be more highly 
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qualified and experienced. Kraljic suggests that decisions about the higher risk purchase 
categories should be handled by the more senior members of the procurement function, who 
by extension should be the most highly qualified and experienced. Despite this narrow 
functional focus, Kraljic does also recognise the organisational buying behaviour literature’s 
suggestion that more people will be involved in high risk buying decisions and that they will 
be drawn from a wider range of departments or organisational sub-units. He notes that 
‘greater integration, stronger cross-functional relations, and more top-management 
involvement are all necessary’ in higher risk purchase categories. 167 (p. 116) 
 
Given this resonance with the organisational buying behaviour literature, we propose that 
Kraljic’s work might be useful in addressing the first knowledge gap identified in Chapter 5 
about the decision-making roles, processes and criteria at work in the clinical commissioning 
groups and the commissioning support units, and about how these commissioning 
organisations should operate to be effective. In particular, Kraljic’s work provides a simple, 
clear and systematic framework that might be of use when shaping commissioning strategies 
and allocating scarce management resources to acquire different types of healthcare services. 
For the same reasons we also suggest that Kraljic’s model might be of value to NHS trusts 
undertaking procurement of different types of healthcare related goods and services. 
 
There are, however, criticisms of Kraljic’s work, which suggest that there might be some 
challenges in drawing simple lessons from it for commissioning and procurement in the NHS. 
These criticisms are of three main types. First, Kraljic’s framework is thought to be too 
simplistic in its analysis of purchasing context and its recommended procurement strategies 
to deal with the complexity of organisational decision-making. As Dubois and Pedersen 473 
suggest, it seems problematic to deduce strategies from an analysis based on just two 
dimensions and where the potential for interaction between those dimensions is not 
acknowledged. Second, and in a related vein, Kraljic’s recommended strategies are seen as 
too generic and too static or reactive. Some authors argue that the framework fails to 
acknowledge the possibility of different, more nuanced strategies within each category and 
does not provide guidance for buying organisations to move their purchases proactively from 
one category to another more favourable position .250, 254, 469, 474 Third, there are what have 
been called ‘measurement issues’. 469 (p. 21) Authors point to difficulties in deciding the 
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operational meaning of purchase importance and supply risk 475, difficulties in knowing 
whether all of the appropriate variables are being used to measure these dimensions468, and 
difficulties in deciding how to weight these variables to produce a combined value on each 
dimension.251  
 
Despite this range of criticisms, the available evidence suggests that Kraljic’s thinking is 
popular with management practitioners254, 468, which indicates that they find it of value in 
their decision-making. Work by Gelderman and van Weele 250, 254 examines why this might 
the case by looking at how managers handle these proposed weaknesses in practice. In case 
study research with three Dutch industrial companies, two large international businesses and 
one smaller nationally focused company, they found that the Kraljic framework was used in a 
customised way that suited the particular context and needs of each company. They comment 
that ‘the generic nature of the Kraljic approach allows for customisation, implying that users 
have to make all kinds of decisions, implementing the portfolio analysis’ 254 (p. 210). This 
customisation applied to the nature of the dimensions used, the variables used to measure 
each dimension, and the methods used to measure the individual variables and to arrive at an 
overall value against each dimension. This suggests that these companies regarded Kraljic’s 
work as a broad orientating device which could be used as a basis for analysing their 
purchased goods and services rather than as something given and immutable.  
 
Moreover, the companies did not move from positioning their goods and services to pursuing 
procurement strategies in an unthinking and deterministic way. Rather, in each of the cases 
‘the positioning of items was followed by a process of reviewing the positions in the matrix 
and a process of reflection on the consequences’.254 (p. 210) The companies saw the Kraljic 
framework as indicative, as a means to stimulate and focus discussion about procurement 
activities and as a vehicle for exploring and resolving conflicting preferences between 
stakeholders. Finally, Gelderman and van Weele found that rather than simply following 
Kraljic’s generic strategic recommendations the companies pursued a range of nuanced 
strategies either to hold a position within a purchase category or to move to another category. 
The companies saw the framework as a useful means of identifying ways to reorganise and 
re-specify their purchase requirements to better mitigate risk or achieve greater value for 
money.        
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Based on these findings, then, it seems that Kraljic’s portfolio approach is of value to 
practitioners so long as it is used in a customised, indicative and reflective way, as an aid to 
intelligent decision-making. It might therefore provide a basis on which NHS commissioning 
and procurement organisations could organise their demand management processes to be 
effective in acquiring different types of goods and services. 
 
7.3 Relationship focused portfolio analysis 
Another criticism made of Kraljic’s portfolio approach is that it does not take into account the 
supplier’s perspective .468, 473 It addresses issues of complexity on the supply side, but this is 
done at a generic market level and from the perspective of the buying organisation only. 
Kraljic’s work is therefore seen to lack a proper engagement with buyer-supplier 
relationships. It could be argued that this criticism is somewhat unfounded in that Kraljic’s 
framework is clearly not intended to address buyer-supplier relationships. It is a means of 
thinking in a more structured and systematic way about how buying organisations should 
behave when purchasing different types of goods and services. Nonetheless, the different 
procurement approaches suggested by Kraljic inevitably have implications for suppliers, will 
provoke a response from suppliers and will be delivered through interactions with suppliers, 
so a complementary set of portfolio thinking is required. 
 
Responding to the observation that Kraljic does not try to deal with these issues, another 
strand of the portfolio literature has developed with an explicit focus on the development and 
management of appropriate forms of buyer-supplier relationship in different contexts. This 
relationship focused portfolio analysis therefore clearly draws our attention to the relationship 
management phase of the P&SCM process. Consequently, the theoretical underpinnings of 
these frameworks lie principally in the inter-organisational relationships literature, although 
use is also made of ideas from the economics of contracting literature. In particular there are 
frameworks drawing on resource dependency theory to address issues of power in buyer-
supplier relationships 405,  471, and frameworks using resource dependency theory, social 
exchange theory and transaction cost economics to focus on the social and economic factors 
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shaping buyer-supplier relationships.251, 470 We discuss each of these broad types in turn 
below. 
 
Given the basis of these various frameworks in the inter-organisational relationships literature 
we suggest that they might be useful in addressing the second knowledge gap in the NHS 
research literature identified in Chapter 5. This gap is about how buyer-supplier relationships 
develop over time and about how, in particular, collaborative efforts can be facilitated and 
maintained to deliver supply improvement and innovation in the NHS. 
 
The basic premise of portfolio frameworks emphasising the role of power in buyer-supplier 
relationships is that the nature of the power structure between a buyer and a supplier has a 
strong influence on the kind of relationship that each party is willing and able to develop. 
Work by Cox et al 476 is based on a model for understanding the nature of buyer-supplier 
power structures that uses ideas from resource dependency theory 134 and from industrial 
economics.135 This model suggests that buyers and suppliers will interact on the basis of one 
of four power structures, buyer dominance, supplier dominance, interdependence and 
independence.  The nature of the power structure is seen as a function of the relative 
dependence of each party on the other. So buyer dominance implies supplier dependence, 
supplier dominance implies buyer dependence, and the other two structures imply a balance 
of dependence, either high (interdependence) or low (independence). Dependence is, in turn, 
seen as a function of two main underlying factors: how important each party is to the 
objectives of the other and how much choice each party has beyond a particular exchange 
partner. There are echoes here of the two dimensions used in Kraljic’s framework, but this is 
more explicitly concerned with importance and choice for both parties rather than just for the 
buyer. 
 
Cox et al 136, 476 link this power model to the relationship portfolio framework shown in 
Figure 9. They suggest that buyers and suppliers can potentially form one of six main types 
of relationship, and that power is a key influence on which is possible. They illustrate their 
argument with a series of short case studies involving both public and private sector 
organisations. 
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Figure 9: A portfolio of buyer-supplier relationships (from Cox et al 136, 476)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Figure 9 shows, Cox et al argue that buyer-supplier relationships differ along two 
dimensions. ‘Way of working’ is about how closely buyer and supplier interact with another 
in terms of things like information sharing, operational linkages and relationship-specific 
investments. A collaborative relationship is closer on all of these dimensions than an arm’s 
length one. The ‘share of surplus value’ dimension relates to the commercial balance of a 
relationship in terms of who bears the costs and who receives the benefits. In a buyer-skewed 
relationship, for example, the supplier bears the bulk of the costs and the buyer receives most 
of the benefits. This framework has two key implications. First, collaboration is only possible 
where either one party dominates the other or where both parties are highly dependent on one 
another. This is because such interactions represent a substantial investment, which 
organisations will only undertake if they have a strong incentive to do so. Dependency is 
deemed to create such an investment incentive while independence does not. Second, the 
framework suggests that collaboration is not necessarily about an equal sharing of costs and 
benefits. Collaboration can be successfully undertaken even where one party is dominant and 
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therefore receives a greater share of the relationship benefits and bears a smaller share of the 
costs. This is what Cox et al call adversarial collaboration.  
 
Work by Caniёls and Gelderman 405, 471 explores similar issues around the link between 
power and buyer-supplier relationships, and uses the same underlying concepts drawn from 
resource dependency theory. In this case, though, the discussion of power is used to extend 
Kraljic’s framework and to draw out its implications for buyer-supplier relationships. Data 
from a survey of 248 Dutch purchasing managers is used to test if proposed associations 
between power structure and relationship style in each quadrant of the Kraljic matrix are 
borne out in practice. The associations proposed by Caniёls and Gelderman are shown in 
Figure 10. Their findings support the expected link between power structure and relationship 
style in all of the quadrants except that for strategic items. Here they find that long-term 
collaborative relationships are the norm, but that supplier dominance tends to be a more 
common power structure than interdependence.  
 
Figure 10: Expected power and relationship styles in Kraljic’s portfolio matrix (derived 
from Caniёls and Gelderman, 405, 471) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Caniёls and Gelderman conclude that these findings suggest two things. First, the nature of 
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type of relationship that they are able to develop with one another. Second, collaborative 
relationships underpinned by a power structure in which one party is dominant will not 
necessarily be ineffective as a number of authors have argued .477-479 These findings appear to 
support the notion of adversarial collaboration suggested by Cox et al .136, 476  This suggests 
that a dominant power position can be an effective basis for managing a close exchange 
relationship if the weaker party sees their dependency as legitimate and the stronger party 
does not abuse their position. 
 
Other relationship focused portfolio frameworks are less explicitly concerned with the role of 
power. They draw on resource dependency theory, social exchange theory and transaction 
cost economics to examine the broader social and economic factors which influence the 
development and management of different kinds of buyer-supplier relationships.  
 
Olsen and Ellram 251 propose a three-step portfolio model to assist in managing buyer-
supplier relationships. The first step, analysis of the organisation’s purchases, builds 
consciously on Kraljic’s framework. The suggested dimensions along which purchases 
should be categorised are, like those in Kraljic’s model, the strategic importance of a 
purchase and the difficulty of managing the purchase situation. A number of factors are 
suggested that might be used in measuring these dimensions. These are again very similar to 
those in Kraljic’s model, but as suggested by Gelderman and van Weele 254, it is recognised 
that the precise factors used may vary with each organisation. 
 
It is in the second and third steps of their model that Olsen and Ellram show how Kraljic’s 
framework might be extended with a more conscious focus on buyer-supplier relationships. 
They argue that the procurement strategies and implicit relationship styles proposed by 
Kraljic’s matrix are ideal types and that they ignore the nature of the actual relationships that 
an organisation has with its suppliers in each purchase category. The second step of their 
model, then, is to analyse these actual relationships to see how effectively they are delivering 
what Kraljic recommends as ideal. Olsen and Ellram suggest that relationships are analysed 
against two dimensions, the relative attractiveness of the supplier and the strength of the 
relationship. They propose that supplier attractiveness, which is analogous to supplier 
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competence or capability, should be measured by a range of economic and technological 
factors inspired by resource dependency theory, and by organisational and cultural factors 
inspired by social exchange theory. The factors proposed to assess the strength of the 
relationship are about how effectively the buyer and supplier interact with one another. These 
are consciously derived from social exchange theory, dealing with the level of commitment, 
cooperation and longevity in a relationship. 
 
Having compared actual with ideal, step three of the Olsen and Ellram model is about the 
development of action plans to ensure that the relationships in each purchase category are as 
effective as possible in delivering Kraljic’s ideal type procurement strategies. Three broad 
types of action plan are suggested. First, for those relationships where supplier attractiveness 
is high or moderate and relationship strength is low or moderate, the suggested plan is to 
strengthen the relationship by allocating more resources. Second, where a supplier’s 
attractiveness is low the suggested plan is either to commit resources to developing that 
supplier if the relationship strength is high or moderate, or to switch to a more attractive 
supplier if the relationship strength is low. Third, Olsen and Ellram recognise that 
relationship management is about making trade-offs between different relationships in an 
organisation’s portfolio given resource constraints. So, they suggest that organisations should 
examine all of their relationships to see where allocated resources can be reduced in order to 
re-use them in implementing type 1 and type 2 action plans.                
 
Bensaou 470 provides a very similar step-wise model to analyse and propose different styles of 
buyer-supplier relationship to match particular contextual circumstances. His model draws on 
transaction cost economics  to describe the key contextual factors influencing the 
development of different types of relationship. Based on a survey of 447 managers from three 
US and eleven Japanese car manufacturers he finds that the level and balance of relationship 
specific investments, akin to the transaction cost economics notion of asset specificity, are 
crucial factors influencing what is the most appropriate style of relationship for a buyer and a 
supplier to develop. Specific investments are those ‘that are difficult or expensive to transfer 
to another relationship or that may lose their value when redeployed to another supplier or 
customer’. 470 (p.36) This association between specific investment and relationships is 
summarised in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11:  Bensaou’s relationship portfolio model (adapted from Bensaou 470) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
As well as identifying which type of relationship is most appropriate in the context of 
different levels and distributions of specific investments, Bensaou also provides guidance on 
the characteristics of an effective management approach for each type of relationship. As 
shown in Table 8, he describes each management approach in terms of three generic 
dimensions: information sharing practices, boundary spanners’ task characteristics, and the 
social climate. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Bensaou’s recommended relationship management approaches (adapted from 
Bensaou 470) 
Relationship type Information sharing 
practices 
 
Boundary spanners’ 
task characteristics 
Social climate 
Captive 
 Buyer 
Strategic 
Partnership 
Market 
Exchange 
Captive 
Supplier  
Low High 
Supplier’s specific investments 
Low 
High 
B
uy
er
’s
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
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Strategic partnership 
 
Frequent and rich 
media exchange 
Regular mutual visits 
 
Highly ill-defined 
and unstructured 
Non-routine, 
frequent, unplanned 
events 
Significant time 
spent with other 
party on coordination 
issues 
Early supplier 
involvement in 
design 
 
High mutual trust 
and commitment 
Extensive joint action 
and cooperation 
Emphasis on fairness 
and excellent 
reputation  
 
Captive buyer 
 
Exchange of detailed 
information on a 
continuous basis 
Frequent mutual 
visits 
 
Structured and highly 
predictable 
Significant time 
spent with supplier 
Mutual trust not well 
developed 
Strong effort by 
buyer to develop 
cooperation 
Supplier not 
concerned with its 
reputation 
 
Captive supplier 
 
Little information 
exchange 
Few mutual visits, 
typically initiated by 
supplier 
 
Limited time spent 
with supplier 
Some focus on 
complex, 
coordinating tasks 
High mutual trust, 
but narrowly focused 
Limited direct joint 
action and 
cooperation 
Greater burden put 
on supplier 
 
Market exchange 
 
Limited information 
exchange, focused at 
time of contract 
Limited time spent 
with supplier 
Highly routine and 
Positive social 
climate 
No systematic joint 
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negotiation 
Structured routines 
for operational 
coordination and 
monitoring 
 
structured tasks, little 
interdependence with 
other party 
effort and 
cooperation 
Some emphasis on 
fairness and good 
reputation 
 
To sum up, our discussion shows that there are various relationship portfolio frameworks that 
might help to address the knowledge gap in the NHS research literature about how buyer-
supplier relationships develop over time. In particular, these frameworks show that 
collaboration is not always appropriate or possible and that contextual factors like power, 
supplier attractiveness, relationship strength and relationship specific investments are likely 
to have an important influence on the development of collaboration. 
 
It is important to recognise, however, that these frameworks can provide only a partial 
understanding of the scope for improvement in buyer-supplier relationships, because they 
focus at the dyadic level. As Dubois and Pedersen 473 suggest, we need also to see 
relationships in their wider network context, because this may have an important influence on 
how they are best managed. With this in mind, we turn in the final section of this chapter to 
portfolio analysis that focuses at the level of the supply chain. 
 
7.4 Supply chain focused portfolio analysis 
Unlike the relationship portfolio models discussed above, this literature focuses solely on 
approaches to using collaborative relationships between buyers and suppliers across an 
extended chain to deliver improved performance. These models draw directly on arguments 
made in the integrated supply chain management literature and focus our attention on the 
operational delivery phase of the P&SCM process. As discussed in Chapter 6, the integrated 
supply chain management literature can broadly be divided into work addressing the concept 
of lean and the elimination of waste through practices like just-in-time delivery and value 
stream mapping, and work dealing with supply chain agility and responsiveness through 
practices like flexible production and build-to-order supply. We also noted work that suggests 
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using a combination of these approaches to create so-called ‘leagile’ supply chains. The key 
aim of supply chain focused portfolio analysis is to identify the contextual factors that 
influence when it is appropriate to adopt these different supply chain management 
approaches. We suggest therefore that this kind of analysis might be useful in addressing the 
third knowledge gap in the NHS research literature that we identified in Chapter 5. This gap 
is about the scope to apply different integrated supply chain management thinking and 
techniques to supply chains delivering physical goods to the NHS. 
 
Although we can identify a number of supply chain focused portfolio models 202, 459, 466, 480, 
481, each of these is fundamentally derived from the framework developed by Fisher.168 
Fisher’s core argument is that the decision as to which supply chain management approach, 
lean or agile, is most appropriate is determined by the nature of the product delivered by a 
supply chain to the end customer. He provides a number of case examples to support his 
argument. Fisher identifies two types of product, functional and innovative, which he 
distinguishes on the basis of the predictability of end customer demand and, by extension, the 
degree of uncertainty in the wider supply chain. He argues that functional products are ‘the 
staples’ that satisfy the buyer’s ‘basic needs’, and that because such needs change very little 
over time, these products have ‘stable, predictable demand and long life cycles’ 168 (p. 106). He 
also notes that because there is little variety and customisation in functional product 
offerings, firms compete primarily on price and typical profit margins are low. Conversely, in 
the case of innovative products Fisher 168 (p. 106) argues that while innovation might enable 
firms to limit direct competition and earn higher profit margins through first mover 
advantage, their ‘very newness…makes demand for them unpredictable.’ He also argues that 
innovative products will typically exhibit a short life cycle and a greater number of variants 
as suppliers offer buyers a range of different options in order to test the market. These 
characteristics are assumed to further increase the unpredictability of demand. 
Fisher then suggests that in order to link these product types appropriately to one of the two 
broad approaches to supply chain management, we need to understand which objective, 
supply chain efficiency or responsiveness, is most important for a firm seeking to 
successfully and profitably deliver each type of product. His answer in the case of a 
functional product is to keep physical supply chain costs, the costs of producing, storing and 
distributing the product, as low as possible, because of the price sensitivity of buyers. The 
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practices necessary to create such a lean supply chain are summarised in Table 9. In the case 
of an innovative product, Fisher suggests that firms should place greater emphasis on supply 
chain flexibility and responsiveness, because of the significant impact on profitability of 
having either too little or too much of a product when first mover advantage is crucial and the 
life cycle is short. The key objective in this case is to have the right product, available in the 
right quantities, at the right time.459 The practices necessary to create such an agile supply 
chain are also summarised in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Matching product types with supply chain management approaches (adapted 
from Fisher 168 and Mason-Jones et al 459) 
 Lean supply with 
functional product 
 
Agile supply with 
innovative product 
Asset/resource utilisation 
 
Maintain high average 
utilisation rates 
 
Deploy excess buffer 
capacity 
Inventory management 
 
Generate high turns and 
minimise inventory 
 
Deploy significant buffer 
stocks of generic or modular 
inventory 
 
Lead-time focus 
 
Reduce lead-time as long as 
cost is not increased 
 
Invest aggressively in ways 
to reduce lead-time 
Key supplier selection 
criteria 
 
Cost and quality Speed, flexibility and quality 
Product design 
 
Simplify design to use fewer 
parts and reduce errors/need 
for rework 
 
Use modular design to 
postpone final product 
assembly for as long as 
possible 
 
Information exchange and Highly desirable Obligatory 
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enrichment 
 
Forecasting mechanism 
 
Algorithmic Intelligent consultation 
 
 
This discussion suggests that Fisher’s portfolio framework and others derived from it might 
be a relatively simple and potentially useful source of guidance for those in NHS 
procurement organisations seeking to improve the performance of supply chains delivering 
clinical and non-clinical goods and services. There are, however, a number of possible 
limitations to the utility of these frameworks that should be borne in mind. These limitations 
are a function of the particular contextual circumstances on which these models are typically 
focused.  
 
First, and most obvious, they are designed to be applied to supply chains delivering physical 
products rather than services to end customers. Consequently, some of the analytical 
categories (e.g. product life cycle, product variety, lead time, and inventory management) 
may not be easily transferable to a service setting. That said, as we discussed in Chapter 5, 
lean concepts have been used to identify waste in healthcare service delivery and to generate 
ideas for improvement, which suggests that these challenges of terminology can be 
overcome. Second, these models are typically focused on the context of relatively high 
volume manufacturing supply chains where there is a repeated production process. There has 
been relatively little discussion of the models’ usefulness in generating management advice 
for supply chains in a low volume or one-off project context, which may characterise some of 
the more specialist areas of healthcare. Third, these frameworks are typically focused upon 
supply chains serving private consumer demand rather than the organisational buyer demand 
that one would see in NHS procurement. Consequently, there is little discussion of the 
possibility that the end customer might well play an extensive and active role in design and 
specification decisions, which might in turn impact on the predictability of demand.  
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Work by Sanderson and Cox 132 deals directly with these latter two limitations. They argue 
that although the logic of Fisher’s model is challenged by applying it in the context of a 
shipbuilding supply chain, with one-off project characteristics and an active organisational 
buyer, it can still provide a useful frame of reference for thinking about how best to manage 
supply chains. Their case study evidence suggests that functional products such as electrical 
cable might not necessarily have a predictable demand profile when they are supplied into a 
complex project context in which ‘the design and build schedule…are incomplete and subject 
to on-going change’ 132 (p. 21). If one follows Fisher’s advice unreflectively this generates a 
paradox, with a relatively more costly agile supply approach being recommended for a 
functional product where cost efficiency should be paramount. Sanderson and Cox suggest 
that one way out of this paradox is to use a leagile approach, which is recommended for 
supply chains where ultimate customer demand is highly volatile and unpredictable, but end 
users are also price sensitive.202, 459 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
To sum up, then, this chapter has discussed three different types of portfolio analysis and has 
shown how they might help us to address three key knowledge gaps in the NHS research 
literature. In broad terms, we suggest that these various portfolio approaches might be a 
useful means of improving P&SCM practice in the NHS, because they identify key 
contextual factors in the demand management, relationship management and operational 
delivery phases of the process and suggest appropriate forms of management intervention to 
deliver intended outcomes. It is important to emphasise, however, that these portfolio models 
should not be used in a rigid, deterministic or unreflective manner. Our discussion has also 
shown that these models can and often should be used in a customised way to take account of 
the particularities of specific organisational contexts. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The approach taken in this report is a theory based realist review and synthesis. This route 
was chosen on the basis of a judgement that what constitutes effective practice in P&SCM is 
likely to be highly context dependent. A realist review approach emphasises the contingent 
nature of the evidence and addresses questions about what works in which settings, for 
whom, in what circumstances and why. In this chapter we summarise the main findings from 
our synthesis of the P&SCM literature and highlight some of the principal literature sources. 
We also discuss a number of areas for further research. 
 
This study aimed to assist NHS managers and clinicians in developing more effective 
commissioning and procurement practice by: 
1. Exploring the main strands of the literature about P&SCM and identifying the main 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks. 
2. Assessing how far these P&SCM theories are relevant and useful in helping us to 
make sense of policy and practice in NHS commissioning and procurement. 
3. Assessing the empirical evidence about how different P&SCM practices and 
techniques, informed by different theories, might contribute to better procurement 
processes and outcomes. 
4. Evaluating various context-sensitive portfolio approaches to improving P&SCM 
practice, and showing how these relate to theories about effective P&SCM. 
 
Our review shows that the P&SCM literature draws on a very diverse range of disciplinary 
bases, theories and models. This is not surprising given that P&SCM encompasses a wide 
range of organisational processes, activities and actors, in many different contexts and types 
of organisations. It makes sense to adopt a multidisciplinary perspective. That said some of 
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these P&SCM theories have been used more than others to explore the particular contextual 
circumstances of the NHS. This suggests that there are a number of knowledge gaps in the 
NHS research literature where the relevance and utility of some P&SCM theories have not 
yet been properly articulated and explored.  
 
The empirical evidence on the efficacy of different P&SCM practices and techniques, 
suggested by different theories, is also highly fragmented and at times contradictory. It does 
suggest though that matching management practice appropriately with context is crucial. Key 
contextual factors include the level of purchase risk, the potential for opportunism rather than 
trustworthy behaviour, and the structure of power underpinning a buyer-supplier interaction. 
We suggest that various portfolio approaches to P&SCM are likely to assist in the appropriate 
matching of management practice with context in order to deliver particular intended 
outcomes. 
 
8.2 Theories about procurement and supply chain management 
The P&SCM research domain draws on a very diverse range of disciplinary bases, theories 
and models. It is not possible to identify a single, coherent and dominant body of thought 
relating to P&SCM (22). We have though identified four broad literatures each associated with 
particular theories. This four-fold categorisation is based on a clustering of theories by their 
primary explanatory focus on a particular broad phase in the P&SCM process. These are: 
• The organisational buying behaviour  literature grounded in various theories and 
models of organisational decision-making 59, 69-72, which focuses on the demand 
management phase 
• The economics of contracting literature grounded in agency theory and transaction 
cost economics 83-86, which focuses on the selection and contracting phase 
• The networks and inter-organisational relationships literature grounded in social 
exchange, resource dependency, relational contract and dynamic capabilities theories 
106, 108, 117, 120, 476, which focuses on the relationship management phase 
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• The integrated supply chain management  literature grounded in systems theory and 
behavioural economics 138-142, which focuses on the operational delivery phase 
We addressed this theoretical diversity by developing a realist interpretation framework that 
surfaces the contextual assumptions, key explanatory mechanisms and intended outcomes of 
these various P&SCM theories. This framework suggests that practitioners engaged in 
P&SCM activities face choices about which theory might work best as a basis for interpreting 
their situation and for guiding their actions. It may be more appropriate to focus on some 
mechanisms than on others depending on what an organisation’s interest is in terms of 
intended outcome. Where, for example, there is an interest in the benefits that can flow from 
P&SCM practices (value appropriation, value creating innovation, or improved efficiency 
and responsiveness), then mechanisms encouraging collaboration (power or trust) are the 
appropriate focus. These mechanisms are associated with the inter-organisational 
relationships literature or the integrated supply chain management literature. Alternatively, 
where there is an interest in managing the risks associated with a procurement decision 
(competence or behavioural), then there should be a focus on decision-making in the buying 
process predicated on the organisational buying behaviour literature, and on contractual or 
governance safeguards based on the economics of contracting literature. 
 
These insights are at a generic level, however. We found that the precise characteristics of the 
mechanism-outcome configurations outlined above are likely to vary depending on the 
context. For example, the organisational buying behaviour literature informs us that the 
various characteristics of a procurement decision (e.g. size and complexity of buying centre, 
formality of decision rules, extent and intensity of information search) should vary depending 
on the level of risk associated with that decision, which in turn depends on the characteristics 
of the purchase.59 In an NHS context, we can contrast situations within hospital trusts where 
they are purchasing generic medical supplies or aspects of facilities management (e.g. waste 
management) with situations involving clinical commissioning groups and local councils 
where various stakeholders are putting together tenders for integrated health and social care 
for elderly people (e.g. the collaboration between Kingston Clinical Commissioning Group 
and The Royal Borough of Kingston upon Thames).  
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Similarly, the integrated supply chain management literature tells us that choosing the 
appropriate techniques to integrate and coordinate a supply network, the generic alternatives 
being so-called ‘lean’, ‘agile’ and ‘leagile’ techniques, and the outcomes that those 
techniques are likely to have, depend on the nature of the product or service delivered by the 
network.165 The inter-organisational power literature also suggests that management choices, 
in this case concerning the extent to which a buyer and a supplier collaborate with one 
another, are shaped by the power context.136  
 
Mapping this on to the NHS, we can see places within the service where the main emphasis 
on improvement will involve using ‘lean’ techniques to improve process flow (for example, 
the layout within hospitals of wards, stores, etc.) and others where the need is for the rapid 
formation and dissolution of informal multi-disciplinary NHS and social care worker teams to 
address locally-specific health needs – a process more in line with ‘agile’ techniques. 
However, as mentioned, enthusiasm for these integrated supply chain management 
techniques needs to be tempered with an appreciation of how operational ambitions can be 
constrained by contextual factors, such as power. In the examples above, this could mean 
plans for hospital re-organisation might be constrained by the costs imposed by a powerful 
PFI-contractor and flexible health and social care delivery might be obstructed by power and 
politics within the different public sector organisations. 
 
These observations draw our attention to the work of writers like Kraljic 167, Fisher 168 and 
Bensaou 470 who offer so-called portfolio models of P&SCM practices. These models suggest 
that the general mechanisms in each P&SCM theory used to explain different outcomes 
should be understood as an expression of specific practices or management interventions used 
in particular contexts. The use of such models can be particularly useful in organisations 
where procuring entities have recently been created and/or where people with limited 
commercial experience are involved in commercial decisions. The models can frame debates 
over procurement decisions and provide a short cut to a certain level of understanding for 
those with a non-commercial background. Such models are often used by procurement 
managers in their dealings with internal customers for this reason. With clinical 
commissioning groups still being in their infancy, the models could have a similar role to 
play in the NHS. 
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8.3 Evidence on the impact of P&SCM practices and techniques 
Chapter 6 supplemented the identification of P&SCM practices and techniques by 
summarising the evidence about their impact that has been collected over the past 30 years. 
We found that empirical evidence on the efficacy of different P&SCM practices and 
techniques, informed by different theories, is highly fragmented and at times contradictory. 
Research to test the efficacy of practices and techniques in one phase of the P&SCM process, 
while in many cases systematic and co-ordinated, has largely been undertaken in isolation 
from testing in the other phases. There is very little empirical research that has considered all 
of the phases in the process and examined the connections between them.  
 
The evidence does provide support for many of the practices and techniques though and also, 
crucially for the approach taken within this literature review, suggests that matching 
management practice appropriately with context is crucial in all phases. Key contextual 
variables identified by the literature are the characteristics of a purchase (including financial 
value, complexity, asset specificity, uncertainty and demand profile), the behavioural 
orientation of suppliers (trustworthiness or opportunism), national culture and buyer-supplier 
power. 
 
Specific findings from each phase of the P&SCM process: 
• The evidence base on practices and techniques associated with demand management 
is stronger in some areas than in others. The evidence on alternative structures for the 
procurement function 235-240, collaborative buying initiatives 241, 244-248, and e-
procurement systems 261-263, 265, 266, 269, 274 does not suggest any clear cut contextual 
influences on management choice, but there are warnings regarding implementation. 
Studies looking at output and performance-based specifications also suggest that 
context does not have a significant impact on the appropriateness of these practices, 
although they are regarded as more useful in the case of complex purchase 
requirements .257-260, 483 Evidence shows though that an e-auction tends to be less 
appropriate in highly complex procurements.276 The literature also contains evidence 
supporting both technical 286-290 and political management approaches 197, 198, 291 to 
dealing with the challenges of multi-actor decision-making. 
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• Evidence on supplier selection emphasises the benefits of adopting practices and 
techniques that are both systematic and objective .292-294, 296, 484 There is evidence that 
competitive tendering processes are able to deliver beneficial outcomes in a range of 
different contexts 298, 301, but there is also a suggestion in some studies that 
competition is less effective when purchases start to provide the potential for moral 
hazard and hold-up .299, 303 Selection criteria are also shown to be affected by the 
nature of the purchase, with criteria designed in line with the complexity and 
importance of the purchase being a key factor in successful procurement outcomes 
.315-318 Finally, a number of studies highlight the benefits of using structured, 
computational methods, like the analytical hierarchy process method, to evaluate and 
compare supplier bids .325-327, 329 
 
• Evidence on the negotiation and drafting of contracts is characterised by a number of 
areas of disagreement, particularly over whether contracts and trust are complements 
or substitutes 343, 350-353, 355, and over the extent to which the arguments of agency 
theory and transaction cost economics are robust in explaining management 
practice.356-359, 363 There is substantial evidence, however, that as the purchase 
requirement becomes more complex, innovative or bespoke, and levels of asset 
specificity and uncertainty increase commensurately, the buyer’s scope to develop a 
complete contract and to retain a credible threat of returning to the market decrease 
significantly. As we found in the NHS research literature, the evidence shows that this 
kind of purchase requirement is often associated with the use of extra-contractual 
governance mechanisms as proposed by transaction cost economics.357 
 
• The bulk of the evidence on relationship management tends to focus on buyer-
supplier collaboration and to ignore less complex and more arm’s length forms of 
interaction. Researchers have looked extensively at the practices underpinning 
successful collaboration and have identified information exchange 367, 368, 370, 372-374, 
joint decision-making 375, 376, 378, and joint investment 379-381 as critical. Trust is seen as 
a key mechanism crucial to building and sustaining collaboration .382-388 Similar 
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mechanisms identified in the literature are fairness 390, ethical behaviour 391, 
reciprocation 392 and commitment 393. Many studies have found that significant 
performance improvements in dimensions like cost, quality and flexibility flow from 
buyer-supplier collaboration .369, 375, 391, 395, 400 There is also evidence, however, of the 
dangers and challenges that collaboration can bring. Trust can be a constraint on 
performance 401, 402, and collaboration can be undermined by changing commercial 
pressures 305, 389, by social and cultural factors 347, 403, and by the irresponsible 
exploitation of a power advantage .409, 411  
  
• Evidence on the practices and techniques associated with operational delivery focuses 
primarily on those that support the creation of a lean supply chain. The main lean 
technique reported on is just-in-time, and a number of studies demonstrate improved 
firm performance .418, 420-423 Other important lean practices include vendor managed 
inventory 438-441 and value stream mapping.448, 449 Evidence on the benefits of vendor 
managed inventory in a European healthcare setting points to clinician release time.447 
Research on the key drivers for successful implementation of lean practices tends to 
focus on factors like top management commitment and leadership 428-430, good buyer-
supplier relationships 432, 434, and the quality and availability of information .443 
Evidence on agile supply chain practices and techniques is much less substantial, but 
a number of writers do show how these practices have enhanced firm performance 
measured in terms of flexibility and responsiveness to changing customer demand .452, 
453, 455 There is also some evidence, however, of potentially negative aspects of lean 
and agile practices, including risk displacement from a powerful buyer onto a weaker 
supplier435 and buyer lock-in as a result of dedicated investments.444 
It was known prior to the start of the research that there had been very little empirical testing 
across all of the four P&SCM phases and that there had been substantial testing of both 
supplier relationships and integrated supply chain management practices and techniques. 
What was, perhaps, a little surprising was that the evidence base for many aspects of demand 
management and certain aspects of supplier selection was quite limited. These areas are both 
critical to the securing of good value for money, and inter-related with other phases of the 
P&SCM process, and thus worthy of greater investigation. Overall, though, NHS managers 
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responsible for commissioning and procurement are able to draw upon an area of academic 
study that has been subject to considerable empirical investigation.  
 
8.4 Relevance and utility of P&SCM theories for NHS policy and practice 
As was suggested by the brief examples that appeared in 8.2, we found that all four of the 
P&SCM literatures identified by our review are of some relevance and use in making sense 
of policy and practice in NHS commissioning and procurement. This suggests that the CMO 
configurations embedded in these theories can offer some guidance to NHS practitioners 
about how to proceed when seeking to achieve certain intended outcomes in particular 
circumstances. 
 
This is not surprising because, while all sectors of an economy and public sector have unique 
features, there is little to support the claims often heard within the service of NHS 
exceptionalism. The multiple stakeholder involvement, political sensitivities, path 
dependencies, technical complexities policy and legal/regulatory constraints and unbalanced 
commissioning-provider relationships (i.e. the clinical commissioning group-hospital trust 
relationship in many parts of the NHS), are features that, to a lesser or even greater extent, are 
seen elsewhere. Indeed, commissioning and procurement within the NHS has many echoes of 
procurement within the defence and aerospace sectors (for relevant discussion see Cox et al 
130, Sanderson and Cox 132 and Sanderson 133). This is not to say that the NHS does not face 
complex challenges, it clearly does. It is just to say that are similar to the challenges faced by 
managers within other sectors. 
 
Accordingly, in Chapter 4 we discussed three key themes in NHS commissioning and 
procurement policy. We found that:  
• The organisational buying behaviour literature provides a relevant lens for understanding 
clinically-led commissioning and evidence-based procurement. In particular it draws our 
attention to the importance of decision-maker experience and expertise, decision-maker 
attentiveness, systematic and extensive information search, and formal decision rules in 
higher risk commissioning or procurement decisions.15, 59, 75 
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• The economics of contracting literature, particularly agency theory, provides a relevant 
lens for understanding clinically-led commissioning, which is intended to better align the 
interests of patients (principals) and GPs (agents)36; agency theory, in the form of models 
addressing collaboration between principals 174, 179 is also relevant to policies driving the 
coordination or consolidation of NHS spending; agency theory and transaction cost 
economics are relevant to the various market-based reforms introduced into the NHS 
since the purchaser-provider split in 1991, the former focusing on the role of contracts 189 
and the latter drawing our attention to the likelihood of incomplete contracting in the case 
of many healthcare services.171, 188, 190 
 
The networks and inter-organisational relationships literature, particularly that addressing 
power 133, 476, is relevant to joint commissioning or collaborative procurement initiatives, 
which can be seen as an attempt to give commissioners or NHS trusts greater power 
resources in their interactions with providers or suppliers; this literature, particularly that 
dealing with trust, commitment and collaboration, is also relevant to understanding why 
inter-organisational cooperation has persisted alongside competition and market-based 
reforms in the NHS .184, 190, 192, 194 
• Aspects of the integrated supply chain management literature are relevant to 
understanding the implementation of collaborative procurement initiatives, in particular 
the role of e-procurement in helping to coordinate NHS trust demand and match it with 
supply more efficiently. 
   
The relevance of the P&SCM literature to the NHS was reflected in the evidence on NHS 
commissioning and procurement practice that was discussed in Chapter 5. Dividing the 
evidence in terms of the four broad phases of the P&SCM process, we found that: 
• Evidence on demand management in the NHS is discussed in terms of arguments and 
concepts associated with the organisational buying behaviour literature, although there 
are few direct and explicit references to that literature. Papers look at commissioning and 
procurement decisions in terms of: the role, expertise and experience of decision makers 
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207, 322; the size and composition of decision-making units 20, 171, 172, 201, 203, 204; and the 
criteria that influence specific decisions.205, 206 There is evidence of the political nature of 
some commissioning and procurement decisions and the impact of power on the 
resolution of conflicts between the preferences of different actors .198, 208-210, 482 There is 
also evidence of the use of sense-making behaviours, persuasion rather than power, to 
influence commissioning decisions.199 
 
• Evidence on selection and contracting in the NHS explicitly acknowledges the relevance 
of the economics of contracting literature. Some authors discuss the use of classical, 
complete contracting, inspired by agency theory, particularly where commissioners or 
procurement teams are dealing with new and often untried providers with which they 
have had no prior relationships.98, 180, 213 This work also identifies problems with complete 
contracting however, in particular very high transaction costs incurred by commissioners 
and providers in contract negotiation and drafting and in the monitoring of performance 
against detailed targets. Transaction cost economics is typically regarded as a more 
appropriate and useful lens given the difficulties of writing complete contracts ex-ante for 
the delivery of healthcare services characterised by uncertainty, complexity and acute 
information asymmetry.171, 188, 190, 211 Some writers 181, 188, 212 also draw on what they see 
as complementary ideas from relational contract theory, demonstrating that this phase of 
the procurement process overlaps and interacts with the post-contract relationship 
management phase. 
 
• The research evidence on relationship management in the NHS is typically discussed in 
terms of concepts drawn from the networks and inter-organisational relationships 
literature. Papers are broadly divided into those placing more emphasis on mechanisms 
like trust and collaboration drawn from social exchange and relational contract theories, 
and those emphasising mechanisms like power drawn from resource dependency theory. 
In the former category evidence shows the continuing importance of trust and cooperation 
in facilitating effective relationships between NHS commissioners and providers, 
particularly in the case of complex services and long-term care, despite efforts to increase 
competitive tension through the quasi-market reform process .35, 183, 215-218 Some research 
suggests, however, that the quasi-market reforms have had a more significant disruptive 
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effect on trust and collaborative relationships between NHS commissioners and 
providers. This work brings mechanisms like power more to the fore and suggests that 
while collaboration can and does take place in NHS networks, the nature of power 
relations is an important factor in when and where it occurs.180, 184, 192, 219-221 
 
• Evidence on operational delivery in the NHS is often discussed in terms of concepts 
drawn from the integrated supply chain management literature. Ideas like lean, agile and 
total quality management are seen as relevant and useful in a context where resources are 
constrained, but high standards of quality (related to patient safety and dignity) and speed 
and responsiveness (related to patient satisfaction) have to be maintained. This research 
can be broadly divided into papers which discuss the mapping and improvement of 
patient care pathways and associated processes223-227, and papers looking at the 
management of inter-organisational supply chains delivering clinical and non-clinical 
goods and services to healthcare providers .229-233 Papers in the former category, dealing 
with intra-organisational healthcare processes, are predominant in the literature.222 
In overall terms we found that some of these P&SCM theories have been used much more 
heavily and explicitly than others as frames of reference in the particular contextual 
circumstances of the NHS. Transaction cost economics, agency theory and aspects of the 
networks and inter-organisational relationships literature dealing with trust and collaboration, 
in particular relational contract theory, are the most frequently used. Some aspects of the 
integrated supply chain management literature, in particular concepts like lean, also feature 
heavily, but typically in an intra-organisational context focused on improving patient care 
pathways. By contrast, our review found that the organisational buying behaviour literature, 
the resource dependency models of power relationships in supply chains, and the inter-
organisational integrated supply chain management literature have been applied less 
explicitly or in a heavily circumscribed way in the NHS context. This suggests a number of 
research gaps that are outlined later in the chapter. 
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8.5 Portfolio approaches to improving P&SCM practice in the NHS 
It has been established that the P&SCM process is complex and involves multiple contexts, 
phases and actors. There are also a very wide variety of practices or management 
interventions that can be used in each phase of the P&SCM process. In order to think about 
how we might improve P&SCM practice, we need an approach that enables us to simplify the 
complex interplay of contexts, phases, actors and practices in the P&SCM process. We need 
to be able to categorise different P&SCM contexts and relate them to particular types of 
management practices aimed at achieving particular intended outcomes. Our review of the 
literature suggested that a portfolio approach would be the most effective way of achieving 
such a categorisation. 
 
In Chapter 7 we identified three types of portfolio analysis based on their main focus or unit 
of analysis: 
• Purchase category portfolio models 167, 250, 254 
• Relationship portfolio models 251, 405, 470, 471, 476 
• Supply chain portfolio models 168, 459, 466, 481  
We found that these various portfolio approaches might be a useful means of improving 
commissioning and procurement practice in the NHS, because they identify key contextual 
factors in the demand management, relationship management and operational delivery phases 
of the P&SCM process respectively, and suggest appropriate forms of management 
intervention to deliver intended outcomes. We emphasised, however, that these portfolio 
models should not be used in a rigid, deterministic or unreflective manner. Our review has 
also shown that these models can and often should be used in a customised way to take 
account of the particularities of specific organisational contexts. 
It is beyond the scope of this project to undertake primary research in order to provide 
detailed empirical analysis on how portfolio models could be used in the NHS and with what 
results. However, a few illustrations can point the way. In some respects, the Kraljic167 
purchase category portfolio model is already being used in the NHS. For example, on the 
hospital trust procurement side, ‘non-critical’ items have long been organised in order to 
minimise transaction costs, most recently via the NHS Supply Chain online catalogue. 
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Equipment purchases, by contrast, are seen as ‘strategic’ items and given greater attention by 
the more senior members of a hospital trust’s procurement function. A number of non-clinical 
services, such as those related to the estates function (cleaning, catering, waste management, 
security and estate maintenance) have been treated as ‘leverage’ items, not always with 
satisfactory outcomes (e.g. poor cleaning outcomes). Hospital trusts have also, on occasions, 
taken Kraljic’s advice regarding the need to investigate the potential for spend aggregation – 
that is, aggregating demand across the trust or even buying jointly with other trusts. As the 
National Audit Office1 has pointed out, though, practice in this respect is patchy. 
 
On the commissioning side, relationships with acute trusts will always be in the ‘strategic’ 
quadrant  in Kraljic’s model. The long-term nature of such relationships then brings into play 
relationship portfolio models. The model of Cox et al 136, 476 is useful here. Many 
commissioning managers complain that their relationships with hospital trusts are in the 
supplier-dominated adversarial collaboration category. The Cox et al model offers 
suggestions here for moving the relationship into the non-adversarial collaborative category 
(e.g. the removal of certain clinical services from what is often a monopoly provider in order 
to promote an element of competitive threat and increasing the attractiveness of the 
commissioning organisation as a ‘customer’, through efforts to promote efficiencies that can 
benefit both parties). However, perhaps more to the point, the model also points managers 
towards the type of negotiation and attention to detail that is required when operating in the 
supplier-dominated adversarial collaboration category. The relationship portfolio model of 
Cox et al is also useful for the other clinical services that clinical commissioning groups are 
responsible for (e.g. smoking cessation and sexual health services) where commissioners will 
have greater room for manoeuvre. 
8.6 Areas for further research 
As mentioned, our review and synthesis has revealed a number of important knowledge gaps 
in the NHS research literature where the relevance and utility of some P&SCM theories has 
not yet been properly articulated and explored. We suggest three main areas for further 
research to help fill these gaps. For each area, we also show how this further research might 
help to address some of the questions raised at the outset by members of our advisory group 
(see Chapter 2) and that this study has not answered: 
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1. We have identified a relatively limited number of studies looking at NHS 
commissioning and procurement, which make use of the arguments and concepts 
offered by the organisational buying behaviour literature. In most cases this literature 
is not explicitly acknowledged and most of the studies only consider certain discrete 
factors such as decision-maker characteristics, the size and composition of decision-
making units, and the criteria that influence decisions, rather than looking at the 
interaction between these factors and their impact on specific decision-making 
processes. The issues arising out of conflicting preferences and the role of power and 
politics in resolving such conflicts are also not well understood, particularly in the 
context of NHS commissioning organisations. We recommend empirical research to 
examine in detail the processes through which those working in clinical 
commissioning groups and commissioning support units are making different kinds of 
commissioning decisions and to see if the various factors proposed by the 
organisational buying behaviour literature can help us to make sense of these 
processes. This would provide an evidence base on which to consider how clinical 
commissioning groups and commissioning support units might improve their 
decision-making effectiveness. This research might also provide answers to a number 
of questions identified by the advisory group, for example ‘How should NHS 
managers and clinicians commission services for different client groups?’ and ‘How 
does commissioning differ across different services within the health sector?’ 
   
2. We have identified a number of studies that consider the role, impact and persistence 
of collaborative relationships between commissioners and providers in the NHS. The 
bulk of this work draws on concepts like trust and reciprocity from social exchange 
theory and relational contract theory in particular. We identified only a limited 
number of studies that use resource dependency theory to think about the role of 
power as an influence on the scope for and the nature of collaboration between 
organisations in the NHS context. Moreover, those NHS studies that do consider the 
role of power tend in most cases to look at dyadic relationships and to ignore the 
wider network in which those relationships are embedded. We recommend a study to 
examine the role of power in NHS healthcare networks, looking in particular at the 
resources that clinical commissioning groups might have at their disposal to 
encourage collaborative relationships with potentially powerful providers to bring 
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about desired innovations and improvements. Some related questions identified by the 
advisory group that this research might also address are ‘Who is responsible for the 
overall design of the supply chain?’ and ‘When and where within a supply chain is 
collaboration better than competition?’ 
 
3. Our review identified that relatively little work has been done to examine the impact 
of integrated supply chain management thinking and techniques on the procurement 
activities of NHS trusts, NHS Supply Chain and the collaborative hubs. Rather than a 
lack of interest from scholars, this suggests that integrated supply chain management 
thinking and practice have not been taken up in a big way by those in NHS 
procurement as a means of improving the management of their supply chain 
relationships with suppliers of healthcare related products. The few relevant studies 
that do exist tend to be very narrowly focused, either on implementation problems in 
particular supply chains or on specific integrated supply chain management practices 
or technologies like e-procurement. We recommend empirical research to explore 
how much awareness and understanding of integrated supply chain management 
thinking and techniques exists in NHS procurement organisations, to see which, if 
any, practices are currently being used and what scope there might to be implement 
such practices in a more comprehensive way. In addressing this last question, the 
proposed research would consider the nature of power relations between NHS 
procurement organisations and their various suppliers, drawing on the argument that 
power might be a key influence on the willingness of suppliers to cooperate with such 
practices. A related question raised by the advisory group that this research might also 
be expected to address is: ‘What are the particularities of commissioning in health that 
could mitigate the import and implementation of models and practices from other 
sectors?’ 
 
8.7 Concluding remarks 
We acknowledge that our study has limitations, particularly associated with the relative 
newness of the realist synthesis method and the diverse nature of the sources of evidence on 
which the review is based. There are still relatively few exemplar studies using a realist 
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review approach and, as a consequence, detailed guidance on data extraction, appraisal and 
synthesis is limited. That said suggested standards of good practice have recently started to 
emerge.40, 41 Recognising the complexity and breadth of the topic addressed, however, this 
study adheres broadly to those standards rather than following them closely. Given the very 
diverse theoretical and empirical literature about P&SCM, we have intentionally used 
evidence from a broad range of peer reviewed journals, books, and policy documents. This 
does not mean, however, that our search strategy is comprehensive. Rather, we have used 
purposive sampling to focus on literature that helps us to address the CMO configurations 
that drive the review. Our conclusions and our recommendations for further research need to 
be seen in this context. 
 
A further potential limitation relates to the fact that we were only able to include a minor 
element of patient and public involvement in the study. Although we took the view that 
patient and public involvement was perhaps not as central to our review as it would be for an 
empirical research study focusing directly on the delivery of healthcare, we still recognised, 
in line with the principles of realist review, the need for linkage with health service users as 
well as medical and procurement practitioners and academic experts. Our intention therefore 
was to include a number of individuals from the NHS user community in our expert advisory 
and stakeholder group. Ultimately, though, we were only able to recruit the chief executive of 
a third sector provider of NHS services to represent the voice of service users. This suggests 
that our study may well have missed some patient insights in framing the review and 
interpreting the findings. Despite these limitations, we suggest that our study still offers 
theoretically-informed and contextually-sensitive guidance to assist NHS managers and 
clinicians in enhancing their commissioning and procurement practice in the dynamic and 
challenging circumstances that they face.  
 
This study shows that those engaged in P&SCM activities face choices about how to proceed. 
The theories and evidence reviewed show that there is no one best way for NHS managers 
and clinicians to undertake their commissioning and procurement responsibilities. Instead, we 
have endeavoured to provides some insights about which mechanisms might be triggered by 
particular management practices used at particular stages of the P&SCM process and in 
particular contexts, resulting in particular outcomes. We understand, of course, that these 
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insights must be presented in a more easily digestible form if our research is to have a 
meaningful impact on NHS commissioning and procurement practice in the years ahead. A 
practitioner guide will therefore be developed based on our findings with the help of our 
advisory group. This will offer a steer about the choices that practitioners face around 
demand management, selection and contracting, relationship management and operational 
delivery and the likely outcomes of those choices in different contextual circumstances. 
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RQ1: Theories about P&SCM 
In ABI/INFORM, ASSIA, BSP, IBSS, Scopus and SSCI  
 
Title: procur*; purchas*; buy*; “supply chain manag*”; SCM; logistics 
AND 
Title: framework OR literature OR model*OR review OR theor* 
 
RQ2: Evidence about P&SCM in the NHS 
In health specialist database, HMIC 
 
Title: procur* OR purchas* OR buy* OR “supply chain” OR logistics OR commission* 
 
In ABI/INFORM, ASSIA, BSP, IBSS, Scopus and SSCI  
 
Title: procur*; purchas*; buy*; “supply chain”; logistics; commission* 
AND  
Subject heading: health* OR NHS OR “National Health Service” 
 
RQ3 and RQ4: Evidence about P&SCM practices and approaches to improvement  
In ABI/INFORM, BSP and Scopus   
 
Title: “needs assessment”; specification*; demand management; “activity based costing” OR 
ABC; “vendor assessment” OR “supplier assessment”; “vendor rating” OR “supplier rating”; 
“vendor evaluation” OR “supplier evaluation”; “strategic sourcing”;  network sourcing”; 
“partnership sourcing”; “balanced sourcing”; “category management”; “e-procurement”; “e-
auction*”; “e-business”; “collaborative procurement”; “purchasing consorti*” OR 
“procurement consorti*”; contract* AND collaborat*; contract* AND network*; contract* 
AND partner*; negotiat* AND collaborat*; negotiat* AND network*; negotiat* AND 
partner*; “contract management”; “just in time” OR JIT; “supplier managed inventory” OR 
“vendor managed inventory”; “electronic data interchange”; “economic order quantity” OR 
EOQ; “build to order” OR “made to order”; “life cycle cost” OR “whole life cost”; “total cost 
of ownership” OR TCO; “target costing”; “lean supply”; “value stream ma*” OR VSM; 
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“value analysis”; “agile supply”; “leagile supply”; “six sigma” 
AND 
Abstract: buy* OR purchas* OR procur* OR suppl* 
 
Title: “approved supplier*” OR “preferred supplier*”; “supplier selection”; “supplier 
management”; “supplier development”; “supplier relation*” 
AND 
Abstract: buy* OR purchas* OR procur* OR supply 
 
Abstract: “vendor appraisal” OR “supplier appraisal”  
AND 
Abstract: buy* OR purchas* OR procur* OR suppl* 
 
Abstract: “purchasing portfolio matrix”; “purchasing hub” OR “procurement hub”; “service 
level agreement” OR SLA; “framework agreement”; “supplier improv*”; “supplier 
compliance”; “supplier rationali*” OR “supplier based rationali*”; “contract compliance”; 
“purchasing cards” OR “procurement cards” 
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Appendix 2: Sample extraction forms 
 
Title of paper 
 
 
Johnston and Lewin (1996), Organizational Buying Behaviour: 
Toward an Integrative Framework, Journal of Business Research, 
35 
  
Name of reviewer 
 
JS 
Type of paper: single 
theoretical perspective or 
comparative overview 
 
Single – reviews and synthesizes 25 years of OBB research 
following the classic work by RFW, WW and S in late 1960s and 
early 1970s. 
Contextual 
assumptions: underlying 
world view and 
behavioural assumptions 
 
 Units of analysis are the buying centre (multi-actor) and the 
process steps/stages 
Actors have differing motivations and preferences 
Actors have bounded rationality 
Inevitable conflicts in decision-making are resolved either thru 
persuasion or power and politics 
 
Mechanisms: core 
concepts used to explain 
why outcomes happen, 
e.g. power, trust, 
collaboration, contract, 
governance, innovation, 
transparency etc. 
  
Characteristics of the buying centre (size and complexity, 
experience and expertise of members) 
Handling of conflict in buying centre 
Nature of decision rules and information search 
Purchase history (nature of buyer-supplier relations) 
Intended outcomes: e.g. 
waste minimisation, 
improved quality, 
quicker response to 
change, value for money, 
risk minimisation etc. 
  
Minimisation of purchase risk 
Overall relevance to 
RQ1: core or peripheral 
  
 
Core – an excellent review and synthesis of the major 
contributions to the OBB perspective, revealing the core context, 
mechanism and outcome dimensions. 
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Title of paper 
 
 
An economic analysis of the limits of market based reforms in the 
English NHS 
Allen, Pauline 
BMC Health Services Research 2013 13(s1): S1 
 
Name of reviewer 
 
TM 
Type of paper: 
theoretical lens, research 
design 
 
 
Theory: neo-classical economics, new institutional economics and 
socio-legal theory. 
 
Application of market concepts to research evidence of the 
operation of the quasi market in the NHS. 
Context: features of the 
environment and of 
actors identified in study 
 
 
NHS in England – past three decades of reforms.  
Interventions: describe 
nature of what is 
happening 
(Secondary) analysis of application of market principles/‘third 
way’ to NHS. Evidence used from previous studies conducted by 
researchers based in the UK using economic and socio-legal 
logic.  
 
Mechanisms: why are 
the interventions used 
expected to generate the 
intended outcomes?  
  
Markets are not perfect and therefore need regulation. Markets 
are not concerned with equity. 
 
Hierarchies are not efficient, but they involve authority and 
accountability for resource allocation. 
 
Quasi markets combine advantages of both competition and 
fairness. 
 
Outcomes: intended 
and/or actual 
 
  
Theoretical imitations of quasi markets, supported by evidence: 
‐ Demand side: patients reliant on parts of the state (GPs) to 
make decisions for them – no real agency; 
‐ Supply side: little competition between suppliers; 
‐ Pricing: where pricing is fixed, competition may have 
improved quality, though this is difficult to confirm; 
‐ Contracting: contracts have proved difficult to complete, 
so remain relational; 
‐ Regulation: little evidence of use or need, due to central 
rules about ensuring both competition and co-operation. 
‐  
Relevant findings 
 
 
 
Quasi market mechanisms are ineffective as they operate under 
the national polity, which continues to be hierarchical.  
Author argues that healthcare goals such as fairness of access 
cannot be delivered by a market structure, and warns against the 
extension of market principles evident in the Coalition 
Government’s policies.  
 
Methodological strength 
of paper in its domain 
Theoretical analysis with secondary evidence. Methodological 
approaches of the studies used were not discussed (due to 
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constraints of space). 
Overall rigour and 
relevance (i.e. an 
original and scholarly 
contribution? does it 
address our RQ?) 
 
Of peripheral relevance – as not an empirical study – but relevant 
to capture commentary from experts relating to post-HSC Act 
2012 for RQ2, RQ4 and for overall report.  
 
 
Title of paper 
 
 
Buyer-supplier relationships in a servitized environment 
 
Bastl, Marko 
Johnson, Mark 
Lightfoot, Howard 
Evans, Steve 
 
2012, International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management 
 
Name of reviewer 
 
TM 
 
Type of paper:  
 
Case study research , using Cannon and Perreault's relationship 
connectors framework 
Context: features of the 
environment and of 
actors identified in study 
 
A manufacturing company and two of its two suppliers – 16 
employees on multiple organisational levels, and evidence from 
both sides of a relationship  
Interventions: what is 
happening 
  
Adoption of servitization  
Mechanisms: why – 
generative force  
  
Structural – relationship connectors – more open exchange of 
information (situated agency), strengthened operational linkages, 
structural changes in relationship and support for integrated 
solutions. 
More agency-based mechanisms: relational norms in contracting 
and reduction of win-lose mentality.  
 
Outcomes: intended 
and/or actual 
  
Servitization strategy impacts upon buyer-supplier relationships 
Relevant findings 
 
 
 
The authors use the case study approach to examine the tripartite 
relationship between a manufacturing company and two of its two 
suppliers as the buyer adopts a servitization strategy. The authors 
use Cannon and Perreault's relationship connectors framework to 
analyse the data and find that the implications are notable in all 
five relationship connectors (information exchange, operational 
NIHR HS&DR Project 12/5004/03   
 
226 
 
linkages, legal bonds, cooperative norms and buyer and supplier 
adaptation). This advances the understanding of the implications 
that the adoption of servitization has on the manner in which two 
parties interrelate and conduct commercial exchange 
 
Methodological strength 
of paper in its domain 
 
Good, solid 
Overall rigour and 
relevance  
Good R&R, depending on how much products and services can 
be bundled in the new competitive environment (perhaps via 
CSUs?) 
RQ3 – Phase 3 – buyer-supplier relationships 
 
 
 
